The economics of health inequality in the English National Health Service by Asaria, Miqdad
  
The economics of health inequality in the 
English National Health Service 
 
 
 
Miqdad Asaria 
 
 
 
PhD 
 
University of York 
Health Sciences 
 
 
 
 
 
 
September 2016 
  
   
 Abstract  
This thesis explores the economics of health inequalities in the English National 
Health Service (NHS). It consists of five applied economic studies that explore 
different questions regarding socioeconomic inequalities and the NHS. It is bound 
together by an integrative chapter that provides the historical background to, and 
draws conclusions across, the body of work.  
The first of the five applied studies examined the financial costs that 
socioeconomic inequalities exact on the NHS, the second looked at socioeconomic 
inequalities in access to primary care, the third looked at socioeconomic 
inequalities in health outcomes attributable to the NHS, and the final two studies 
extended the established methods for the economic evaluation of health care 
programmes to explicitly value minimising socioeconomic health inequalities as 
well as maximising population health. These extended methods were termed 
distributional cost-effectiveness analysis.  
The studies found that dealing with the excess morbidity associated with 
socioeconomic inequalities cost the NHS approximately a fifth of its annual 
budget. Socioeconomic inequalities in access to and quality of primary care 
significantly improved from 2004 to 2011 in response to government policy to 
tackle these. However, socioeconomic inequalities in health outcomes stubbornly 
persisted over this period, by 2011 socioeconomic inequality was still associated 
with over 158 000 patients experiencing one or more preventable hospital 
admissions and almost 40 000 patients dying from causes amenable to health care. 
Distributional cost-effectiveness analysis methods were shown to be practically 
applicable in an NHS setting. This was demonstrated using a case study comparing 
population health programmes in which trading off between health maximisation 
and health inequality minimisation was necessary. 
The thesis provides an evidence base and practical new methods that should serve 
as a foundation to better understand the role of the NHS in tackling 
socioeconomic inequalities in health. In so doing, it also outlines an exciting 
programme of further research.  
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 Integrative Chapter 
Introduction 
This thesis examines the economics of socioeconomic inequalities in health in the 
context of the English National Health Service (NHS).  
The World Health Organization defines health inequities as:[6] 
 “differences in health which are not only unnecessary and avoidable but, in 
addition, are considered unfair and unjust”  
The focus of this thesis is on socioeconomic inequalities in health — the variation 
in health associated with differences in the social and economic environments in 
which people live — and hence can be viewed as unnecessary, avoidable, unfair 
and unjust. For the purposes of this thesis the terms health inequity and 
socioeconomic inequalities in health are used interchangeably. 
It is widely recognised that health and its distribution are a function of more than 
just health care. This multifaceted nature is conceptualised by economists through 
the lens of the Grossman model for health production,[7–9] and understood by the 
wider social sciences through the lens of the social determinants of health.[10] This 
presents two distinct approaches for examining socioeconomic inequalities in 
health: (i) a broad approach considering inequalities in health outcomes such as life 
expectancy due to inequalities in the social determinants of health; and (ii) a narrow 
approach considering inequalities in access to and outcomes of health care, 
focusing on health outcomes that are more specifically attributable to the role of 
health care in producing health.  
With this context in mind, the overarching aims of the thesis are: to contribute to 
(a) understanding the impact that socioeconomic inequalities in health have on the 
NHS; (b) understanding the impact the NHS itself has on socioeconomic 
inequalities in health; and (c) developing methods that the NHS can use to evaluate 
and compare proposed policy initiatives to tackle health inequalities.  
The thesis begins with a section outlining the historical background of research and 
policy regarding socioeconomic inequalities in health in England. The four sections 
that follow this background describe how the papers that constitute this thesis 
addressed the overarching aims outlined above. Each section begins by positioning 
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 the respective papers within the existing academic literature and policy context, 
then explains the contribution of the paper to knowledge and understanding about 
the aims it addressed, and concludes by highlighting areas for further research 
suggested by its findings. The chapter concludes with a summary section that picks 
up key themes across the studies. This summary section explains how taken 
together these studies provide an evidence base and a practical set of tools that will 
enable the NHS to identify and evaluate interventions that tackle socioeconomic 
inequalities in health. The full papers constituting the core of the thesis are 
reproduced in the appendix.  
Historical background 
In this section I briefly outline some of the key milestones of health inequality 
policy in England. I describe how socioeconomic inequalities in health, 
government policy towards it, and the academic literature about it, have evolved 
over time and in relation to each other. Whilst this historical background section is 
far from comprehensive, its aim is to provide sufficient context within which to 
interpret the work presented in this thesis. 
In 1837 the national registration of births and deaths in England came into force 
with recording of cause of death, age at death, and occupation on every death 
record. This was coupled with the classification of the whole population by age and 
occupation in the decennial censuses. The production of these key datasets have 
catalysed and underpinned the wealth of research and policy that have sought to 
unpick and address socioeconomic inequalities in health ever since.  
Amongst the earliest advocates of this research agenda was William Farr, who in 
1839 was appointed as the first ‘Compiler of Abstracts’ at the General Register 
Office (GRO). Farr pioneered the field of social epidemiology with his series of 
‘Letters to the Registrar General’ appended to the GRO annual reports.[11] These 
were filled with insightful observations on the social gradient in mortality, and they 
proposed and examined a range of hypotheses regarding the causes of this 
gradient.[12] 
Another notable early intervention in the field was that of social reformer Edwin 
Chadwick. He was invited by the then government to undertake an independent 
inquiry on sanitation following the influenza and typhoid epidemic in London in 
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 the 1830s.[13]  In 1842 Chadwick published his response to this inquiry as: ‘The 
Sanitary Conditions of the Labouring Population of Great Britain’.[14] He found 
that disease amongst the poor was largely caused by damp, filth, and overcrowded 
living conditions. His report was not favourably received by the Conservative 
government of the time, a harbinger of the recurrent tension between academic 
research and policy making on socioeconomic inequalities in health. After the 
election of the Whigs in 1847, Parliament passed the 1848 Public Health Act 
implementing many of the recommendations made by Chadwick. These included 
establishing and improving water supplies, sewage systems, and refuse collection. 
A long period of sustained economic growth followed resulting in dramatic 
improvements in the determinants of health. These improvements, coupled with 
further developments in public health, resulted in what has been termed the 
‘epidemiological transition’.[15] Previously large numbers of people were dying at 
young ages from infectious diseases. As a result of the ‘epidemiological transition’ 
life expectancy increased rapidly, and instead people were dying much later in life 
of chronic diseases such as cardiovascular disease and cancers. Despite these huge 
strides in improving population health, socioeconomic gaps in health persisted.[16] 
One explanation for the continued socioeconomic inequality in health, despite the 
‘epidemiological transition’, was that the poor still had little if any access to health 
care when they got sick. Disease was identified as one of the five ‘Giant Evils’ in 
the seminal Beveridge report of 1942.[17] The report’s recommendations were felt 
to be too costly to implement by the Conservative government in power at the 
time it was published. The opposition Labour Party on the other hand 
enthusiastically embraced the report. This appeared to chime with post-war public 
opinion, and resulted in them winning a landslide victory in the 1945 elections. The 
scale of their election victory gave them a strong mandate to pursue the ideas 
proposed by Beveridge. In doing so the English welfare state was built. One of the 
most ambitious goals of this welfare state was the establishment of the National 
Health Service (NHS), achieved in 1948. This provided universal health care free at 
the point of delivery — for the first time giving the poor access to health care. 
When the NHS was established in 1948 there was no explicit principle that 
governed how NHS resources should be geographically allocated. Resource 
allocation in the NHS therefore naturally followed — and so perpetuated — the 
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 existing geographically uneven distribution of government resources. This 
allocation was skewed towards London and the South East — the most 
prosperous parts of the country. By the 1970s it was becoming apparent that richer 
geographical areas were benefiting more from the NHS than poorer areas, despite 
having less need for health care among their populations. This was famously 
described as the ‘inverse care law’ in a study by Julian Tudor Hart, published in 
1971.[18]  
From 1971 to 1975, NHS resource allocation began to move towards a more 
formal approach with the adoption of the ‘Crossman Formula’. This formula took 
into consideration population size and composition. In 1976 the Resource 
Allocation Working Party (RAWP) made its first set of recommendations on how 
to allocate NHS funds to regions. The RAWP formula was based on the principle 
of ‘equal opportunity of access to health care for people at equal risk’. To estimate 
these allocations the RAWP formula weighted the population size and composition 
of areas according to their health care needs, as measured by the standardised 
mortality ratio. This formula directly informed NHS resource allocation between 
1976 and 1995, and its ‘weighted capitation’ principles have underpinned all 
subsequent funding formulae in the NHS. The key developments in the post-
RAWP formulae were in the ways in which they captured health care needs more 
accurately as more detailed data sets and sophisticated statistical methods became 
available.[19] 
Ideas of  ‘health care for all’ and tackling social gradients in health were also 
gaining international traction during this period, as exemplified by the World 
Health Organisation’s (WHO) declaration following the Alma-Ata conference on 
primary health care in 1978.[20] It was in this context that the ruling Labour 
government commissioned Sir Douglas Black, then Chief Scientist at the 
Department of Health and Social Security (DHSS), to undertake an independent 
inquiry into health inequalities. The resulting ‘Black Report’, published in 1980, 
found that there were large and pervasive inequalities in health across the 
population.[21] Furthermore, it found that these inequalities had widened rather 
than narrowed since the introduction of the NHS. There had been a change in 
government between the time that the report was commissioned, and when it was 
finally published. The incoming Conservative government led by Margaret 
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 Thatcher did not acknowledge the findings of, or embrace the recommendations 
of, the report.[22] 
Following the ‘Black Report’ the Health Education Council (HEC), an 
independent body funded by the DHSS, commissioned Dame Margaret Whitehead 
to update the analysis in the report using the most recently available data. This 
update was published as ‘The Health Divide’ in 1987 — reinforcing the findings 
and recommendations of the ‘Black Report’.[23] This new report received a 
similarly frosty reception to that received by the ‘Black Report’ with the press 
conference organised to announce its launch being cancelled at the last minute. 
Few if any of the recommendations of these reports were adopted by the 
government at the time. 
In 1997 a Labour government was elected on the back of a socially progressive 
political agenda. One of the first acts of this new government was to commission 
Sir Donald Acheson, former Chief Medical Officer (CMO), to conduct an 
independent inquiry into health inequalities. The ‘Acheson Report’ was published 
in 1998.[24] For the first time for a report of this kind, it was received by a 
sympathetic government. The report again confirmed the findings of the ‘Black 
Report’, and made a number of recommendations for inter-departmental actions to 
tackle the social determinants of ill-health. 
In response to the ‘Acheson Report’ the government launched an ambitious and 
well-funded raft of policies to tackle socioeconomic inequalities in health. These 
included the ‘Sure Start’ programme to provide early learning opportunities for 
children living in poverty; the creation of ‘Health Action Zones’ where local 
strategies to improve health in deprived areas were implemented; the introduction 
of a national minimum wage; and a ‘New Deal’ to help the young and the long 
term unemployed into work. Alongside these, a number of more general 
investments were made in housing, education, urban regeneration, and 
healthcare.[25,26] ‘Spearhead’ local authority areas were identified as the areas of 
the country with the worst health and deprivation, and explicit targets were set to 
close the gap between these areas and the rest of the country.[27] 
The National Institute for Clinical Excellence (NICE) was created in 1999. Part of 
its remit was to introduce the use of rigorous economic evaluation to decide which 
treatments the NHS should pay for, thus ending the ‘postcode lottery’ in drug 
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 prescribing in primary care. NICE also worked to establish clinical best practice 
guidelines to ensure uniform standards of care across the health service. These 
functions were in part seen as a way to stop those better able to navigate the 
system getting better care in the NHS.[28] NICE merged with the Health 
Development Agency in 2005 to become the National Institute for Health and 
Clinical Excellence — taking on additional public health responsibilities. Its remit 
was further widened following the Health and Social Care Act (2012)[29] to include 
social care, and it was again renamed, this time as the National Institute for Health 
and Care Excellence.  
A host of measures were also introduced to strengthen primary care including: the 
‘Quality and Outcomes Framework’ (QOF) in 2004, a pay for performance 
programme to improve the quality of care provided by General Practitioners 
(GPs); and the ‘Equitable Access to Primary Medical Care’ programme of 
investment, in which £250 million was invested to increase the number of GPs in 
under-doctored areas between 2008 and 2012. 
Despite this comprehensive and sustained assault on socioeconomic inequalities in 
health, by the end of the thirteen years of Labour government in 2010, their 
attempts at tackling inequalities were widely considered to have failed.[30,31] It was 
not that the policies implemented did not improve the health of the poor, rather it 
was that during the same period the health of the rich improved too. In fact 
income inequality widened over this period, and the health of the rich improved 
even faster than the health of the poor, thus health inequality failed to improve. 
Reflections on the failure of these strategies have concluded that at the time they 
were launched there was a wealth of research describing and explaining 
socioeconomic inequality in health, however, there was little evidence available on 
effective strategies to tackle health inequality, and still less evidence on the cost-
effectiveness of such strategies.[32,33] Furthermore, it became increasingly 
accepted in the academic literature that action on health inequality could only 
succeed in conjunction with action on income inequality.[34–38] This did not 
appear to be a priority for the government of the time, and indeed one of the 
leading figures in this administration, Peter Mandelson, was notorious for his 
comment about being “intensely relaxed about people getting filthy rich as long as 
they pay their taxes”.[39] 
16
 The ‘Marmot Review’ was published in 2010 as the final action on health 
inequalities by the outgoing Labour government.[40] The review confirmed that 
substantial health inequalities remained, and it proposed a wide programme of 
actions to tackle the social determinants of health. With the change of government 
in 2010, and the onset of the programme of austerity measures, the 
recommendations of the ‘Marmot Review’ were not as enthusiastically embraced as 
those of the ‘Acheson Report’ that preceded it.  
The idea that in order to tackle socioeconomic inequality in health it is crucial to 
tackle the social determinants of health, ‘the causes of the causes’,[41] has been at 
the core of each of the landmark reports commissioned by the government over 
the years. Furthermore, the recommendations made by each of these landmark 
reports have shown an appreciation for the distinction between ‘upstream’ 
structural population wide strategies that have the potential to reduce 
socioeconomic inequality in health,[42,43] as compared to ‘downstream’ agentic 
strategies — requiring behaviour change — that are likely to increase health 
inequality.[44,45] 
Most recently, government public health strategy has largely side-stepped making 
the significant structural interventions that have been advocated by the academic 
and clinical public health communities. Key examples include government 
responses to academics’ recommendations on alcohol minimum pricing,[46,47] and 
childhood obesity.[48] Instead, the government has focused on voluntary 
agreements with industry partners,[49] and recommendations targeted at 
individuals to take responsibility for their own health.[50,51] 
Socioeconomic inequalities in health 
Ever since the publication of the ‘Black Report’ in 1980,[21] it has been widely 
recognised that socioeconomic inequalities in England have been associated with 
steep social gradients in both mortality and morbidity. These findings have been 
repeatedly confirmed, and health inequalities have been shown to persist through 
time as described in the several landmark studies that followed. The most recent of 
these, the ‘Marmot Review’[40], found using data from 1999 to 2003, a gap in life 
expectancy of 7 years between the most and least deprived areas in the country, 
and an even larger gap of 17 years in disability free life expectancy between these 
areas. More recent research estimating the social distribution of health in 
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 England[52] found that the gap in terms of quality adjusted life expectancy in 2012, 
between people living in the most deprived fifth and least deprived fifth of 
neighbourhoods in the country, to be 12 quality adjusted life years (QALYs). There 
are not only gaps between the richest and poorest groups in society, but there is 
also a consistent socioeconomic gradient in health across the population. In other 
words, every increase in socioeconomic deprivation, corresponds to a reduction in 
life expectancy and an increase in morbidity.  
The founding principles of the English NHS,[53] and more recently the NHS 
constitution,[54] clearly state that health care should be allocated solely in 
accordance with clinical need, and not correspond to the ability to pay for care. 
Given this, we would expect the stark differences in the relative health of the 
different socioeconomic groups described in these landmark studies to feed 
through to similar differences in the level of health care use by these groups — in 
other words, we would expect poorer people to use more health care because they 
are sicker. There have been numerous studies that have confirmed that such social 
gradients both in morbidity and in overall use of the health service are observed in 
practice. These studies are summarised in the reviews by Goddard and Smith in 
2001,[55] Dixon et al in 2007[56] and Cookson et al in 2016.[57] What has been 
lacking in the literature, however, is a rigorous translation of these socioeconomic 
inequalities in health care use into an estimation of the financial burden that they 
exact on the NHS.  
Paper 1[1] of this thesis explored the financial cost to the NHS of the excess 
morbidity associated with socioeconomic inequality. It examined the extent to 
which the financial costs associated with the social gradient in the use of hospital 
care in any given year, were offset by the social gradient in life expectancy, when 
these costs were aggregated over patients’ expected lifetimes.  
The paper looked at the costs to the NHS of patients admitted to hospital in the 
financial year 2011/12. These costs totalled £22 billion, accounting for 
approximately one fifth of the total NHS budget for that year. Patients were 
attributed to deprivation groups based on the Index of Multiple Deprivation (IMD 
2010) of the neighbourhood (lower layer super output area) in which they lived. A 
steep social gradient was observed in hospital admission rates at any given age — 
with those living in more deprived areas being admitted to hospital more 
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 frequently. The gradient for the more serious emergency admissions was found to 
be much steeper than that for the typically better planned elective admissions. The 
paper explored what the impact on hospital use would have been, if people who 
lived in all the more deprived neighbourhoods, had had similar rates of hospital 
admissions to those who lived in just the most affluent fifth of neighbourhoods in 
the country. In such a scenario, after adjusting for differences in age and sex, the 
cost to the NHS for that year would have been reduced by £4.8 billion. 
Furthermore, the paper used differences in mortality rates at neighbourhood level, 
to project hospital costs over patients’ lifetimes. It found that expected cumulative 
lifetime hospital costs increased with deprivation, despite longevity decreasing with 
deprivation. 
Not all hospital episodes contained enough detail to both allocate costs to them 
and to attribute them to deprivation levels. Of the almost 19 million hospital 
episodes recorded for patients admitted in 2011/12 approximately 9% were 
excluded from the analysis. For the purposes of the paper it was assumed that 
these missing hospital episodes were equally distributed across the deprivation 
quintiles and so costs for each quintile were inflated by approximately 9% to 
account for these missing data. In the supplementary appendices for the paper 
there is a detailed breakdown of this missing data. From this appendix we can see 
that for those excluded hospital episodes where deprivation information was 
available — comprising approximately half of all excluded hospital episodes — 
these excluded episodes were marginally more prevalent amongst those patients 
living in the most affluent areas. The implication being that should all excluded 
episodes have been similarly distributed our interpolation will have over-inflated 
costs in patients from the more deprived areas and under-inflated costs in patients 
from the more affluent areas and hence this may have biased the estimated cost of 
inequality in our analysis upwards.  
Inpatient hospital care accounted for approximately a fifth of the total hospital 
budget in 2011/12. If similar trends were also present in the rest of the NHS, for 
example in primary care and specialist visits (some evidence of which can be found 
in the supplementary materials for the paper), then the actual total cost to the NHS 
associated with socioeconomic inequality in that year alone would have been in the 
order of £20 billion — a fifth of the total NHS budget. Furthermore, the literature 
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 suggests that poorer people tend to under-use many types of health care relative to 
their level of need/morbidity. This implies that if anything, the NHS would have to 
spend even more than this amount in order to tackle unmet health care needs in 
socioeconomically disadvantaged communities.[18,58] 
This study confirmed the strong association between deprivation and ill health as 
evidenced by patterns of health care use and mortality. Additionally, it has for the 
first time rigorously translated these in terms of the financial costs that they impose 
on the NHS. The study looked at both cross-sectional and lifetime costs. It found 
that healthier people cost less to the publically funded health care system over their 
lifetimes than less healthy people, despite living longer. The implication of this 
finding is that, should ill-health associated with socioeconomic inequality be 
reduced, then this could result in both short term and lifetime savings in terms of 
health care costs to the NHS.  
The results give a sense of the size of potential government investment in tackling 
socioeconomic inequality that, if effective, may actually be cost saving for the 
public sector as a whole. This is particularly relevant at a time when the NHS 
budget is being squeezed.[59] To evaluate the financial consequences of tackling 
socioeconomic inequality, non-NHS financial impacts on the public sector must 
also be accounted for. Emerging studies on the wider impacts of reducing 
socioeconomic inequality support such interventions, demonstrating net positive 
financial impacts of reducing socioeconomic inequality across the public sector.[60]  
There is a well-established causal relationship between socioeconomic inequality 
and health.[61] Furthermore, while the causal pathways involved are complex, the 
direction of causality has been shown to run predominantly from improvements in 
socioeconomic conditions to improvements in health.[62] Given these 
relationships, there is ample motivation to identify interventions to tackle 
socioeconomic inequalities, and evaluate them in terms of their cost-effectiveness 
and distributional impacts. In doing so, it is necessary to take into account the 
magnitude and distributions of financial and non-financial costs, opportunity costs, 
and benefits, across the public sector. The methods described in papers 4 and 
5,[4,5] discussed later in this chapter, demonstrate how such evaluations can be 
conducted in the context of the NHS. 
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 This study looked at hospital admissions in 2011/12; i.e. those that occurred 
directly following the most recent change of government. Since then the 
government has introduced a programme of austerity measures that have reduced 
public spending targeted towards some of the most vulnerable people in the 
country. The United Nation’s Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 
has expressed concerns about the regressive nature of these measures. In their ‘6th 
Periodic Report on the United Kingdom’ published in 2014, they note the:[63] 
“considerable and often cumulative effects on social security, access to justice, education 
and healthcare, especially for vulnerable and marginalized groups, such as women, 
children, persons with disabilities, ethnic minorities and migrants.” 
As these austerity measures start to take effect they will likely result in a widening 
of the underlying socioeconomic inequalities in society.[64] Hence, if the causal 
relationships described here hold, we will likely see a steepening of the observed 
social gradient in costs to the NHS. In simple terms, the reduction in government 
expenditure directed at the most vulnerable in society, will feedback through the 
deterioration of population health, to result in increased health care related costs to 
the NHS. These unfortunate circumstances, combined with imaginative research 
study design, may present further opportunities to tease out the causal relationships 
between changes in socioeconomic inequality and health, or at least health care 
use.[65,66] 
It is noteworthy that private spending on health care not funded by the NHS 
accounts for approximately 20% of total spending on health care, with this 
proportion remaining stable between 2000 and 2015.[67] Data is not available 
about the distribution of the consumption of private health care nor about the 
proportion of this consumption comprising inpatient hospital admissions. 
However, if we assume consumption of private inpatient hospital care is skewed 
towards the more affluent sections of the population, the substitution of NHS 
funded care for private care may account for part of the observed social gradient in 
NHS hospital expenditure that we observed in our study.     
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 Socioeconomic inequalities in supply of health care 
The declaration made by the World Health Organisation, following the 
international conference on primary health care in Alma-Atta in 1978,[20] is widely 
recognised as bringing to the fore the ideas of ‘health care for all’ and — its most 
recent incarnation — the ‘universal health coverage’ movement.[68,69] 
Fundamental to these movements is the idea that universal access to primary 
health care, regardless of socioeconomic position, is a basic right and a necessary 
pre-requisite to tackling health inequality.  
The scale of the financial impact of socioeconomic inequalities on the NHS found 
in paper 1[1] illustrate that substantial socioeconomic inequalities in health in 
England remain, despite the NHS’ founding principles to provide health care for 
all. To a large extent these may be attributable to inequalities in the wider social 
determinants of health. However, there is value in ensuring that the NHS is doing 
all it can to ameliorate these health inequalities, and is not exacerbating these 
inequalities in any way. To this end the Health and Social Care Act (2012) 
stipulates:[70] 
‘In exercising functions in relation to the health service, the Secretary of State must have 
regard to the need to reduce inequalities between the people of England with respect to the 
benefits that they can obtain from the health service.’ 
This thesis begins to explore the NHS’ role in contributing to health inequalities by 
examining socioeconomic inequalities in the supply of health care. Primary care is 
at the heart of keeping people healthy. In the English NHS general practitioners 
(GPs) play the crucial role of managing patients with chronic conditions, engaging 
patients in preventative health care initiatives, and planning and coordinating 
elective hospital procedures as and when patients need them. Having an adequate 
supply of GPs is a critical prerequisite to ensuring adequate access to primary care 
which in turn in essential for the effective management of ill health. Hence, any 
socioeconomic inequalities in the supply of primary care constitute the first step in 
the patient pathway in which the NHS can have an impact on socioeconomic 
inequalities in health.  
Previous studies have found substantial and persistent variations in the 
concentration of GPs across large administrative geographies. These studies did 
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 not explicitly link the variations they found to socioeconomic inequalities.[71,72] 
However, the potential social gradient in GP supply had been noted by policy 
makers. Expanding primary care provision in under-doctored areas was highlighted 
as a key challenge in tackling health inequality in the 2006 Department of Health 
White Paper ‘Our Health, Our Care, Our Say’.[73] This led to the subsequent roll 
out of the ‘Equitable Access to Primary Medical Care’ programme, where £250 
million was invested in opening new GP practices in under-doctored areas between 
2008 and 2012.[74] Prior to our work, the most recent previous study in this area 
used data up until 2008.[71] There had not been any studies examining how the 
socioeconomic distribution of access to GPs had changed over the key period 
since 2008, a period during which significant investments in addressing supply 
issues in primary care were made. 
Paper 2[2] looked at the socioeconomic distribution of GPs in England between 
2004/05 and 2013/14. The paper examined how the socioeconomic inequalities in 
the geographical distribution of GPs responded to the increasing government 
attention to inequalities in access to primary care. 
The paper found substantial inequalities in the distribution of GPs at the beginning 
of the study period. In 2004/2005 the most socioeconomically deprived fifth of 
neighbourhoods had approximately 4 fewer GPs per 100 000 of population 
(adjusted for need) than the most affluent fifth of neighbourhoods. By 2013/2014 
this socioeconomic gradient in GP supply appeared to have been eliminated. The 
number of full time equivalent GPs per 100 000 population serving the most 
socioeconomically deprived fifth of neighbourhoods increased over this period 
from 54 to 60. A smaller increase, from 57 to 60 GPs per 100 000 population, was 
observed over the same period in the most affluent fifth of neighbourhoods in the 
country. The increase in GP supply in the most deprived fifth of neighbourhoods 
was larger in areas that received targeted investment for establishing new practices 
under the ‘Equitable Access to Primary Medical Care’ programme than in similar 
areas that did not receive this funding. 
This paper brought the existing literature up to date by including the latest data on 
GP supply. It also extended the existing literature by explicitly focusing on 
socioeconomic variations in GP supply. It did this by first attributing GP supply to 
neighbourhood level. It then used this to describe the trends in the relationship 
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 between the level of socioeconomic deprivation of neighbourhoods and their level 
of GP supply. The study found that the targeted government policy to open new 
GP practices in under-doctored areas reduced inequalities of access to primary 
care. This demonstrates that sustained policy commitment to clearly defined and 
measurable objectives can be effective in addressing socioeconomic inequalities.  
It was observed that socioeconomic inequality in GP supply had been eliminated 
by the end of the study period. This finding was contingent on the adjustment for 
the differing needs for primary care being adequately reflected in the standard need 
adjustment formulae.[75] A key driver of the need for health care is having one or 
more chronic conditions.[76] There are clearly observed socioeconomic gradients 
in rates of multi-morbidity amongst the population.[77–79] Existing need 
adjustment formulae do not explicitly account for multi-morbidity and hence are 
likely to be underestimating need in socioeconomically deprived populations.  
The Carr-Hill need adjustment formula, used by the NHS to adjust for need in 
primary care and applied in this study, estimates that in 2013/14 the need for 
primary care was 3.8% higher for those people in the most deprived fifth of the 
population as compared to those in the most affluent fifth of the population (see 
the supplementary appendices of this paper for detailed exploration of the various 
need adjustment formulae used by the NHS). Data from the NHS Quality and 
Outcomes Framework attributed to deprivation quintiles indicate that in 2011/12 
prevalence of cardiovascular disease, severe mental illness and diabetes were 71%, 
67% and 28% higher respectively in the most deprived fifth of the population as 
compared to their prevalence in the most affluent fifth of the population.[80] 
These figures suggest that the current need adjustment formulae may be 
dramatically underestimating the social gradient in need for primary care. 
Further research is required to improve current need adjustment formulae to 
reflect patterns of need for health care more accurately, particularly in relation to 
multi-morbidity and socioeconomic deprivation.  
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 Socioeconomic inequalities in health outcomes attributable to health care 
In 2003 the UK government made tackling socioeconomic inequalities in health a 
priority for the NHS in England. It embarked on a sustained programme of 
investment in the health service, and set explicit national inequality targets for key 
health indicators such as life expectancy and infant mortality.[27] As part of this 
investment flagship programmes were launched to strengthen primary care, 
including the world’s largest primary care pay for performance programme.[81] 
Much of what is required to improve performance on indicators such as those 
targeted is however, outside the scope of the NHS. Hence, even where these 
interventions were successful in reducing inequalities in the quality and delivery of 
primary care,[82] the government’s broad health outcome based inequality 
indicators failed to improve.[83,84]  
In order to hold the NHS accountable for inequalities in health, the health 
outcomes selected to measure inequality performance against must be those over 
which the health service has some direct influence. One such outcome is the rate 
of emergency hospitalisation for chronic ambulatory care sensitive conditions.[85] 
This captures hospitalisations for conditions such as asthma and diabetes. Such 
hospitalisations can largely be avoided if the conditions are managed properly in 
primary care. For these conditions there is evidence demonstrating that the 
investments made in primary care described above did lead to improvements for 
the average patient.[86] However, substantial socioeconomic inequalities between 
patients in these hospitalisation rates stubbornly persisted.[87] Another important 
outcome that the NHS could and should be held accountable for is premature 
mortality from conditions amenable to health care.[88] These also improved on 
average following the investments in the health service, with some evidence 
suggesting that even the socioeconomic gradient in such deaths began to 
flatten.[89] 
There has been research looking at how some of these outcomes responded during 
this period in which the NHS invested heavily to tackle socioeconomic inequality 
in health.[87,89] However, prior to our work in this area, there has not been work 
to describe what happened in terms of socioeconomic inequality across the patient 
pathway in a unified framework. Such an approach is useful when evaluating what 
may or may not have worked to reduce inequality.  
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 Paper 3[3] of the thesis examined the evolution of socioeconomic inequalities in 
the supply of primary care, quality of primary care, emergency hospitalisations for 
chronic ambulatory care sensitive conditions and mortality amenable to health care. 
It constructed indicators at these four points in the patient pathway, and tracked 
the trends in these indicators between 2004/2005 and 2011/2012. The study found 
that socioeconomic inequalities in supply and quality of primary care were more or 
less eliminated over the study period. However, only modest improvements were 
observed in both the levels and the socioeconomic distribution of the emergency 
hospitalisation and mortality outcomes. By the final year of the study period 
socioeconomic inequality was still associated with 158 396 patients experiencing 
one or more preventable hospitalisations and 37 983 patients dying from causes 
amenable to health care.  
This study was the first of its kind measuring socioeconomic inequality in the NHS 
by bringing together input, process and outcome indicators in a unified framework. 
In order to do this all the key national administrative health data sets were 
assembled and linked. A common methodology was applied across all measures to 
produce a suite of comparable indicators that could be computed consistently over 
time at neighbourhood, local, and national levels. Analytic tools were developed 
with a focus on communicating results in a meaningful and easily interpretable 
manner to policy makers. Health care inequality indicators based on this work and 
the wider study within which it was conducted have since been adopted by the 
NHS as part of the ‘CCG Improvement and Assessment Framework’.[90–92] 
The study computed deprivation gradients across the four outcomes measured 
using linear regression methods. In the supplementary appendix to this study we 
compared the deprivation gradients computed using linear regression with more 
sophisticated negative binomial models. We found that in some cases the more 
sophisticated regression models had a marginally better fit to the data resulting in 
smaller confidence intervals around the estimated deprivation gradients. However, 
measures of the level of inequality and the trends observed in this inequality over 
time were almost indistinguishable between the simple and more sophisticated 
models. Therefore, to make our indicators as easy to compute and interpret as 
possible and hence maximise the likelihood of them being adopted by the NHS we 
opted for the simple linear regression based models to present in the main analysis. 
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 The primary care quality outcome used in this study was based on data from the 
NHS Quality and Outcomes Framework (QOF). QOF data is collected by GP 
practices and measures the degree of compliance with a set of pre-defined disease 
specific patient management protocols. GPs receive financial rewards for 
performing well on the QOF. Given the inherent conflict of interest, with GPs 
both measuring their own performance and being financially rewarded for good 
performance on the QOF, some have questioned the reliability of the data and its 
susceptibility to gaming.[93] One such mechanism that can be exploited for gaming 
the QOF is excluding patients from the measures, who are deemed by the clinical 
judgement of their GP, to not be clinically suitable candidates for treatment 
according to the standard pre-defined protocol. In the supplementary appendices 
to this study we explore the impact of recalculating our QOF based primary care 
quality indicator when these excluded patients are re-included. We find that 
approximately 5% of patients are excluded from the QOF calculations per year, 
and that whilst this does inflate QOF performance scores we find that these 
exclusions occur almost uniformly across the deprivation gradient and hence have 
negligible impact on the levels of or trends in socioeconomic inequality in primary 
care quality.  
The somewhat perplexing conclusion to be drawn from this paper was that 
eliminating inequalities in primary care access and quality was not sufficient to 
substantially address inequalities in outcomes amenable to health care. There are a 
number of hypotheses that can be explored in further research as to why this may 
have been the case: (a) This study did not control for differences in the prevalence 
of the underlying conditions or the prevalence of the risk factors leading to the 
conditions that result in the potentially avoidable emergency hospitalisations and 
deaths. It may well be the case for example, that the NHS treats each patient with 
one of these conditions equally regardless of their socioeconomic background. The 
inequalities that we observe may instead be an artefact of a greater prevalence of 
these conditions in more deprived populations. Recent studies suggest that while 
some risk factors such as smoking, blood pressure and cholesterol have improved 
over time others such as obesity and diabetes have got worse over time. However, 
these studies have indicated that regardless of these trends there are substantial 
socioeconomic gradients in all of these risk factors and that these gradients have 
27
 persisted or even widened over time.[94–96] This relationship between social 
gradients in risk factors and health outcomes does not alleviate the NHS of the 
responsibility to tackle the inequalities in health care outcomes observed. Rather, it 
locates the responsibility for tackling these inequalities in the setting of clinical 
priorities and the allocation of resources towards tackling those conditions that are 
more concentrated in deprived populations. (b) On a related note, it is known that 
wider social determinants of health, such as the prevalence of unhealthy 
behaviours, were becoming more unequally distributed over this period.[97] It may 
have been the case that the primary care strengthening interventions implemented 
over this period worked to prevent these growing inequalities in unhealthy 
behaviours feeding through into growing inequalities in health outcomes. (c) It is 
likely that the need adjustment in the primary care supply indicator was inadequate, 
and that inequality in fact still remained in GP supply at the end of the study 
period. Additionally, socioeconomic inequalities in other aspects of NHS delivery 
that influence health care outcomes, other than GP supply — including GP quality 
not captured by the quality and outcomes framework (QOF), practice nurse supply 
and quality, hospital supply and quality, as well as the coordination of care — may 
also have been driving the socioeconomic inequalities in health outcomes 
observed. (d) Finally, it is possible that the primary care strengthening measures 
have not been given sufficient time to work their way through the system, and that 
the beneficial impacts on outcomes amenable to health care are yet to be reaped.  
Whilst this study presented health inequality indicators at a national level, the same 
indicators can also be computed for local levels of geography, such as at local 
authority or clinical commissioning group level. These are levels at which local 
commissioning decisions about public health, primary, and secondary care 
investment are made. Examining such indicators over time, at local levels, can 
highlight those local areas performing particularly well at tackling health 
inequalities as well as those performing particularly badly. This information can 
then be used, in conjunction with historical information about local level 
investment decisions, to learn lessons about the kinds of initiatives to encourage 
and/or avoid when tackling socioeconomic inequalities in health.[92,98] To this 
end, as an extension of this work, we have developed an interactive tool (accessible 
at www.ccg-inequalities.co.uk) to allow CCGs to view their performance at 
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 reducing socioeconomic inequalities amenable to health care as measured by the 
indicators developed in this study. The tool also allows CCGs to compare their 
performance at tackling socioeconomic inequalities in health with other similar 
CCGs.  Using such indicators for policy evaluation and lesson learning are key 
areas of further research. 
Economic evaluation of interventions tackling socioeconomic inequalities 
in health 
Ever since the establishment of the National Institute for Clinical Excellence 
(NICE) in 1999, cost-effectiveness analysis (CEA) has played a prominent role in 
decisions regarding whether or not the NHS should fund new health care 
interventions. In response to being given this central role, CEA methods for 
evaluating health technologies have been rigorously formalised and 
standardised.[99] These methods however, largely focus on what happens on 
average across the NHS, with only cursory regard to distributional issues.[100]  
Methods for evaluating public health interventions, where reducing socioeconomic 
inequalities in health is often a top level objective alongside improving population 
health, are less well developed.[101,102] In low and middle income country settings 
Extended Cost-effectiveness Analysis (ECEA) has recently emerged as a 
methodology for disaggregating the benefits of health care programmes. This 
disaggregation by socioeconomic group presents the impacts of health care 
programmes in terms of both the health gains they deliver and the financial risk 
protection they provide.[103] This approach provides useful information about 
socioeconomic inequalities in health, however, it does not suggest a course of 
action where trade-offs exist between health improvement and health inequality 
reduction. In addition to this, the applied studies that have followed this approach 
have not thus far incorporated opportunity costs or their distributions into their 
analyses.[104–107] 
The wider literature on the economics of inequalities, particularly the literature 
around evaluating income inequalities, uses social welfare functions to evaluate the 
trade-offs between increasing average income and reducing income 
inequality.[108–113] Various forms of social welfare function have also been 
applied to evaluate health distributions,[114–116] and these have been used to 
underpin approaches such as equity weighting of health gains.[117]  
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 These theoretically grounded social welfare function based approaches have, 
however, rarely if ever been applied to choose between alternative interventions in 
a health care context. Instead, ad-hoc multi-criteria decision analysis (MCDA) 
based approaches, in which various dimensions of the alternative interventions 
being compared are identified and prioritised by stakeholders, have proved more 
popular in applied studies.[118,119] This gap in the literature, showing how a social 
welfare function based approach can be applied in the context of the English NHS, 
is the focus of the final two papers in the thesis. 
Paper 4 and 5 [4,5] show how to extend the mature methods of CEA as used by 
NICE in the NHS. They do this by using the theoretically grounded social welfare 
function based approach to incorporate distributional concerns. This enhanced 
CEA approach was termed distributional cost-effectiveness analysis (DCEA). The 
studies went on to explore the challenges of operationalising these methods in the 
NHS using an applied example.  
The two papers, paper 4 outlining the methods and paper 5 discussing how to 
apply them to NHS interventions in detail, used the DCEA methods to compare 
two alternative approaches to augment an existing NHS cancer screening 
programme. The first approach resulted in better population health on average but 
also greater health inequality as compared to the second approach. The DCEA 
methods were applied to quantify where in the population the health opportunity 
costs and health benefits of the two alternative approaches fell. Population health 
distributions associated with each alternative were estimated and standardised to 
reflect the equity relevant characteristics of the population. These standardised 
distributions were evaluated in the DCEA framework to resolve the equity-
efficiency trade-offs inherent in the NHS choosing one of these approaches over 
the other. This process was applied iteratively to determine which alternative 
should be pursued by the NHS under a range of different plausible social value 
judgements. Alternative social value judgements were made in the selection of 
equity relevant characteristics used for standardisation, the form of the social 
welfare function used, and the level of inequality aversion applied within the 
chosen social welfare function to evaluate equity efficiency trade-offs. 
These papers built on the well-established methods of cost-effectiveness analysis as 
used in health technology assessment by NICE in the NHS. They demonstrated 
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 how these methods could be extended in practice using social welfare analysis, and 
illustrated how these extended methods could be applied to NHS population 
health programmes. The methods were found to be particularly relevant for 
evaluating programmes in which reducing health inequalities was identified as an 
important objective. The case study demonstrated the application of the proposed 
methods in the NHS using publicly available data. In so doing, it highlighted the 
social value judgements needed in order to evaluate the equity-efficiency trade-offs 
observed.[4]   
Many of the methods comprising the DCEA approach including CEA, 
standardisation for fairness, inequality measurement, and social welfare analysis, 
have already been extensively explored in the literature. The contribution of these 
papers was to demonstrate how these various methods can be combined and 
applied in practice in the context of the NHS. In so doing, these studies have 
produced the first rigorous applied quantitative economic evaluation of a public 
health programme in the NHS that accounts for both health improvement and 
health inequality reduction objectives using methods underpinned by a clear 
theoretical framework.   
The DCEA work has shown that applied social welfare analysis is possible in the 
NHS. It highlighted the key role played by social value judgements in underpinning 
the resolution of equity efficiency trade-offs that may arise when reconciling these 
potentially competing objectives. Further work is required to develop the methods 
to meaningfully elicit such judgements in the NHS.[120,121] 
Other distributional weighting methods, not specifically dealing with 
socioeconomic inequality, such as the burden of illness based weights in the 
Department of Health’s value based pricing proposals, can also be captured by the 
general social welfare function based DCEA approach.[122] Burden of illness 
weights would require a social welfare function that maximises health whilst 
expressing a level of inequality aversion over remaining quality adjusted life 
expectancy in the absence of disease. The DCEA framework ensures that the 
social welfare function is applied to both the direct beneficiaries of the proposed 
health policy as well as those impacted by the resources consumed to deliver the 
proposed policy. Using the DCEA framework ensures that the weights used in 
evaluating policy options are a function of the inequality of interest in the 
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 population and hence are automatically updated as this underlying inequality 
changes.  
The DCEA approach developed in these methodological studies are best suited to 
evaluate interventions that are large enough in scale so as to have a discernible 
impact on the population health distribution. Additionally, DCEA methods only 
provide useful insights over and above traditional CEA methods in situations 
where decision makers are explicitly concerned about the distribution of health. 
DCEA in its current form only evaluates interventions from a health sector 
perspective, that is to say it only considers health sector costs, health sector 
outcomes and health sector opportunity costs when comparing interventions.  
This sole focus on the health sector is the main limitation of the DCEA methods 
proposed, particularly as distributional economic evaluation is most obviously 
applicable to evaluate large scale public health programmes. Public health 
programmes often comprise of complex interventions, funded from a number of 
different public sector budgets, and have distributional impacts on multiple 
outcomes, including but not necessarily limited to health. Another important 
limitation of the approach is that DCEA requires explicit social value judgements 
to be made. The requirement to make such potentially politically sensitive 
judgements explicit may be deemed undesirable by some decision makers. 
Additionally, DCEA evaluations combine context specific social value judgements 
with context specific population health distributions to arrive at conclusions. This 
degree of context specific information embedded in the analysis makes it non-
trivial to generalise conclusions across different contexts. Finally given that the 
particular specification of the social welfare function used and social value 
judgements applied may alter the conclusions reached by the analysis, as with any 
framework used to make resource allocation decisions, it is vital that robust 
processes are implemented to hold decision makers accountable for the 
reasonableness of their decisions.[123–125] 
Further research is required to develop methods to extend cost-effectiveness 
analysis to be able to evaluate interventions where cost and benefits accrue across 
different parts of the public sector, and to evaluate the resulting inter-sectoral 
distributional issues.[126–128] 
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 Summary of the thesis as a whole 
Undertaking the research that comprises this thesis has given me an appreciation 
of how national policies can be effective at tackling inequality whilst also providing 
me with an understanding of the limitations of such policies. This endeavour has 
allowed me to explore a range methodological approaches and helped me to hone 
the discipline of distilling the results of complex economic and statistical analysis 
into concise and rigorous policy relevant conclusions suitable for publication in 
academic journals.  
This integrative chapter began by describing the history of policy to tackle 
socioeconomic inequality in health in England, paying particular attention to the 
most recent concerted effort to tackle health inequality in the 2000s.  There is a 
degree of consensus in the academic literature that this effort had limited success, 
in part due to a lack of evidence on proven strategies to tackle socioeconomic 
inequalities in health.[32,33] 
The overarching aims of the thesis were: to contribute to (a) understanding the 
impact that socioeconomic inequalities in health have on the NHS; (b) 
understanding the impact the NHS itself has on socioeconomic inequalities in 
health; and (c) developing methods that the NHS can use to evaluate and compare 
proposed policy initiatives to tackle health inequalities. 
The first paper in this thesis outlined the scale of the impact of socioeconomic 
inequality on the NHS. It translated this impact into financial costs, and 
demonstrated how socioeconomic inequality is exacerbating the financial crisis 
currently faced by hospitals in the NHS. The analysis indicated that reducing the 
excess morbidity and mortality associated with socioeconomic inequality would 
result in both immediate savings and savings over patients’ lifetimes accruing to the 
NHS. If this could be done, the study suggested that the health care cost savings to 
be reaped due to decreases in morbidity would outweigh the additional health care 
costs incurred due to the associated increases in longevity. Of course, reducing 
health inequality is easier said than done, and an effective programme for doing 
this would likely have costs of its own.  However, our findings form the 
foundation of a compelling financial case for the government to tackle 
socioeconomic inequalities in general, as well as for the NHS to tackle the impact 
of health care on socioeconomic inequalities in health specifically. 
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 With this in mind the next two studies looked at the impact of the NHS on 
socioeconomic inequality in health. A suite of indicators were developed for 
monitoring inequality performance at key points in the patient pathway in order to 
quantify the scale of the inequalities that the NHS could plausibly reduce. These 
indicators were designed to make them easily computable using data available to 
the NHS, and easily interpretable by and meaningful to NHS policy makers. The 
studies found that whilst significant progress had been made from 2004/5 to 
2011/12 in reducing the social divide in supply and quality of primary care, 
substantial socioeconomic inequalities in health remained, even when focus was 
restricted to those health outcomes that the NHS should have had a direct impact 
on.  
The thesis proposed a number of possible hypotheses to explain why 
socioeconomic inequalities in health care outcomes failed to improve in line with 
the inequality in supply and quality measures. To investigate these hypotheses 
further and identify where best to focus resources to reduce these inequalities, a 
finer grained natural experiment based approach is recommended. Monitoring 
health care outcome indicators over time, across the country, and comparing 
inequality performance on these at a local level, will highlight local NHS policies 
that have and have not worked to reduce health inequalities. Those policies that are 
observed to work at a local level can then be evaluated in order to explore whether 
or not they are worthwhile to pursue across the country. 
In order to evaluate such policies, the final two studies in the thesis proposed 
methods to extend the cost-effectiveness analysis methods already widely adopted 
within the NHS. These methods were extended to explicitly incorporate concern 
for distributional issues. Using these methods, and a suitable set of social value 
judgements, policies can be chosen that optimally combine the potentially 
conflicting goals of maximising health gains while minimising socioeconomic 
inequalities in health across the population. 
The work in this thesis has a number of implications for policy. Firstly it helps with 
the agenda setting task of highlighting the financial importance of socioeconomic 
inequalities in health for health care, social care and other public services. Secondly 
it helps with the quality assurance task of ensuring that health equity is firmly 
embedded in the performance assessment of health care delivery organisations. 
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 Finally it helps with the priority setting task of designing and implementing 
‘proportional universal’ policies. Some of this potential policy impact is already 
being realised as demonstrated by the NHS’ adoption of the health inequality 
indicators developed in this work as part of the ‘Clinical Commissioning Group 
Improvement and Assessment Framework’.[91] Various aspects of the work have 
also featured in the national media.[129,130]  
The work in this thesis also has implications for health economics. The first of 
these is that it provides tools for equity informative quality monitoring of NHS 
organisations. These can be used routinely when comparing organisations and 
conducting research to retrospectively evaluate the impact of policy on these 
organisations. Secondly it provides tools to perform equity informative CEA. Such 
enhanced CEAs can be performed routinely when prospectively evaluating public 
health interventions to ensure that health inequality concerns are meaningfully 
addressed in these analyses.  
The work presented in this thesis suggests an exciting programme of further 
research. Such a programme may include: (1) Extending the scope of the costs of 
inequality work beyond hospital admissions to also examine the costs of inequality 
in primary, specialist and social care. (2) Examining the impact of the government’s 
programme of ‘austerity’ on socioeconomic inequality and using this to infer the 
causal impacts of changes in inequality on changes in NHS spending. (3) 
Improving the primary care need adjustment formulae used in the NHS. The 
formulae currently in use suggest implausibly small social gradients in need for 
primary care when compared to the social gradients observed in the prevalence of 
chronic diseases. These formulae need to be updated to better account for multi-
morbidity and deprivation. (4) Using the inequality monitoring tools developed in 
the thesis to identify interesting natural experiments at the local level and then 
using these natural experiments to evaluate the effectiveness of policies to tackle 
health inequalities. (5) Extending the DCEA methods to enable them to evaluate 
the distributional impacts of cross sector interventions having costs and 
consequences that extend beyond the NHS. This will allow them to be applied to a 
much broader range of public health interventions. 
The historical background section, at the start of this chapter, described how 
political windows of opportunity for tackling health inequality come and go in 
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 cycles. This thesis provides tools to identify and gather evidence of local policies 
that are successful in reducing socioeconomic inequalities in health. It also 
provides methods to evaluate the cost-effectiveness and distributional impacts of 
such policies once identified. Using these tools and methods, an evidence base can 
be amassed on policies that the NHS can pursue to successfully tackle 
socioeconomic inequalities in health. When the next political window of 
opportunity opens, this evidence base can help the NHS to dent the stubbornly 
persistent link between socioeconomic conditions and avoidable sickness and 
premature death. 
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 Appendices 
 
These appendices contain full reproductions of the five papers that this thesis is 
built around. Each paper is reproduced in its own section and followed by all 
supplementary materials published alongside the paper. 
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 Appendix A: Paper 1 - The costs of inequality: whole-population modelling 
study of lifetime inpatient hospital costs in the English National Health 
Service by level of neighbourhood deprivation 
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ABSTRACT
Background There are substantial socioeconomic
inequalities in both life expectancy and healthcare use in
England. In this study, we describe how these two sets
of inequalities interact by estimating the social gradient
in hospital costs across the life course.
Methods Hospital episode statistics, population and
index of multiple deprivation data were combined at
lower-layer super output area level to estimate inpatient
hospital costs for 2011/2012 by age, sex and
deprivation quintile. Survival curves were estimated for
each of the deprivation groups and used to estimate
expected annual costs and cumulative lifetime costs.
Results A steep social gradient was observed in overall
inpatient hospital admissions, with rates ranging from
31 298/100 000 population in the most afﬂuent ﬁfth of
areas to 43 385 in the most deprived ﬁfth. This gradient
was steeper for emergency than for elective admissions.
The total cost associated with this inequality in 2011/
2012 was £4.8 billion. A social gradient was also
observed in the modelled lifetime costs where the lower
life expectancy was not sufﬁcient to outweigh the higher
average costs in the more deprived populations. Lifetime
costs for women were 14% greater than for men, due
to higher costs in the reproductive years and greater life
expectancy.
Conclusions Socioeconomic inequalities result in
increased morbidity and decreased life expectancy.
Interventions to reduce inequality and improve health in
more deprived neighbourhoods have the potential to
save money for health systems not only within years but
across peoples’ entire lifetimes, despite increased costs
due to longer life expectancies.
INTRODUCTION
Healthcare systems in most high-income countries
aspire to provide equitable care, adopting the prin-
ciple of equal access to services for equal need,1
even when this is difﬁcult to deﬁne and implement
in practice.2 Some, such as the National Health
Service (NHS) in England go further, and aim for
equal use of healthcare or even equal outcomes.3
However, health status is powerfully inﬂuenced by
socioeconomic factors, with lower income asso-
ciated with greater healthcare needs.4 So for a
system to be equitable it must de-couple use of
healthcare services from individual income and
contributions towards system costs. This is usually
achieved through social insurance schemes, or—as
in the case of the English NHS—by funding system
costs through progressive income taxation.
Through the use of such funding arrangements,
healthier people subsidise care for those who fall
ill, and more afﬂuent sections of society subsidise
the more deprived.
There is a widespread assumption that over the
life course such systems disproportionately favour
people lower down the socioeconomic scale, in
terms of the imbalance between their contribution
to the costs of health services and their use of
those services.5 Lower socioeconomic status is
associated with lower incomes, and therefore,
smaller income tax and social insurance contribu-
tions, but also with greater healthcare need, in par-
ticular, the earlier development of multiple
chronic morbidities.6 7 However, evidence on
actual use of services is more nuanced. More
deprived populations tend to make greater use of
unplanned (emergency) services than afﬂuent
populations, and are slightly more likely to visit
the GP,8 but are less likely to visit a medical spe-
cialist or to use many types of planned and pre-
ventative services.9
Most studies, to date, on the costs and use of
healthcare services by different socioeconomic
groups have been cross-sectional. This is an
important limitation, because morbidity and mor-
tality may have opposing impacts on lifetime
healthcare costs—greater morbidity will tend to
increase lifetime costs, whereas dying younger
will tend to reduce them. After early childhood,
average current-year healthcare costs for indivi-
duals increase throughout life, rising dramatically
from the age of 50.10 These higher healthcare
costs for poorer people in life may be partially
offset by a shorter lifespan. Alternatively, given
that the rising costs in older age are largely
driven by the onset of chronic disease, earlier
onset of these diseases in poorer populations may
simply shift the healthcare costs to younger age
groups.
Consideration of these longitudinal relationships
is necessary in order to determine the impact of
socioeconomic factors on health system costs.
Measuring the size of this impact is important not
just to quantify the relative healthcare beneﬁts
received by different social groups, but to under-
stand the costs borne by the health service as a con-
sequence of social inequality. In this study, we
aimed to measure the costs to the NHS of socio-
economic inequality, by estimating the lifetime
inpatient hospital costs of the whole English popu-
lation by socioeconomic status.
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METHODS
Data
This study focuses on socioeconomic differences in inpatient
hospital costs across the life course. Hospital admissions in
England are recorded in the Hospital episode statistics (HES)
data set used to reimburse hospitals for provided care. This data
set contains details on every episode of care, and a new ﬁnished
consultant episode (FCE) record is created for every new admis-
sion, and every time responsibility for the care of a patient
passes from one consultant to another. The HES FCE records
data about the patient (age, sex, place of residence) and their
hospital stay (diagnoses, procedures, length of stay). Using this
information the FCE is allocated to a healthcare resource group
(HRG), which collates hospital stays that use similar levels of
resources—this is the English version of diagnosis related groups
used in the USA. Hospitals are reimbursed by the NHS through
the payments by results (PbR) system based on the HRG,
adjusted for the speciﬁcs of the case—for example, a more com-
plicated case with longer than usual length of stay attracts add-
itional reimbursement. Reimbursement is also adjusted for local
cost variations (termed ‘market forces factors’). Costs attached
to each HRG for each year, and variations for more complex
cases, are given in the NHS national reference costs.11 Details of
how to derive costs from HES data are available in the PbR
documentation,12 and their use in health economic analysis is
discussed in Asaria et al.13 We use HES inpatient data for 2011/
2012 and associated reference costs in this study.
The basic geographical unit of analysis in this study is the
lower-layer super output area (LSOA). The country is divided
into 32 482 LSOAs each containing, on average, 1500 people
(range 1000–3000). Population data for 2011/2012 are taken
from Ofﬁce for National Statistics (ONS) midyear population
estimates split by LSOA, sex and age (ages 0–84 in single-year
estimates, and then 85+). This data estimates the total resident
population, including homeless people and people living in
institutions. Mortality data for 2011/2012 are taken from the
ONS, split by LSOA, sex and age (ages 0–84 in 5-year age
bands, and then 85+). Area deprivation for LSOAs is measured
using the index of multiple deprivation (IMD) for 2010. The
IMD includes seven domains: (1) income; (2) employment; (3)
health deprivation and disability; (4) education skills and train-
ing; (5) barriers to housing and services; (6) crime; and (7)
living environment. These domains are combined to produce an
overall deprivation rank for each LSOA. We grouped LSOAs
into deprivation quintiles based on this rank ranging from Q1
(the most deprived ﬁfth of LSOAs) to Q5 (the least deprived
ﬁfth of LSOAs).
Analysis
We grouped HES inpatient data into age, sex and IMD quintile
categories. Of the 18 808 903 episodes in our 2011/2012 HES
data set, 1 659 295 episodes (8.8%) could not be grouped due
to missing data on either age, sex or LSOA of residence, and
were dropped from the analysis. We then calculated the total
cost for each age, sex and IMD quintile group using the HRGs
and the relevant reference costs. Market forces factors adjust-
ments were not made as we are interested in the variation in
resource use by deprivation group rather than local cost varia-
tions. We then inﬂated these costs by 8.8% to account for the
missing data (we assumed that missing data were equally distrib-
uted across all patient groups and HRGs). Finally, we divided by
the population in each age, sex and IMD quintile group using
ONS population estimates to estimate average costs for each
group:
average costage; sex; imd ¼
P
hospital costsage; sex; imd1:088P
populationage; sex; imd
We used these average costs to calculate the total cost associated
with inequality in 2011/2012 by comparing the costs as
observed in the data with the costs calculated, by assuming that
each individual experienced the average costs (split by age and
sex) experienced in the least deprived ﬁfth of areas:
cost of inequalityimd; age; sex ¼
X
½populationage; sex; imd
 ðaverage costage; sex; imd
 average costage; sex; imd¼Q5Þ
Next we used the mortality data to calculate mortality rates by
age, sex and IMD quintile group and used these in turn to cal-
culate survival curves for each group:
mortality rateage; sex; imd ¼
P
deathsage; sex; imdP
populationage; sex; imd
survivalage; sex; imd ¼
1; age ¼ 0
survivalage1;sex;imd
ð1mortality rateage1; sex; imdÞ age . 0
8<
:
We used these survival curves to calculate expected cost at each
age split by sex and IMD quintile group by adjusting the average
cost for the probability of an individual from each group being
alive to incur that cost. Finally, we summed across these age
groups to get an expected lifetime cost for an individual in each
sex and IMD quintile group (assuming mortality experience and
hospital costs remained constant at 2011/2012 level):
expected costage; sex; imd ¼ survivalage; sex; imd
 average costage; sex; imd
expected lifetime costsex;imd¼
Xage
expected costage; sex; imd
We repeated this analysis for emergency and elective hospitalisa-
tions, and also compared rates of outpatient hospital use among
the different groups.
The analysis was performed using Oracle 11g and R 3.2.3—
the analysis code is available at https://github.com/miqdadasaria/
cost-of-inequality
RESULTS
Social patterning of hospital episodes
In 2011/2012, there were 11 477 435 elective episodes and
7 914 736 emergency episodes to hospitals in England
(19 392 171 total episodes). Numbers of episodes decreased
between the ages of 0 years and 10 years in both sexes, then, for
men, increased up to the age of 70 years, before declining in the
oldest age groups, and for women, spiked sharply between ado-
lescence and the age of 40 years —reﬂecting admissions relating
to reproduction—before gradually increasing up to the oldest
age groups (ﬁgure 1A). For ages 0 years–60 years, there was a
clear social gradient in both sexes, with episodes increasing with
area deprivation. After the age of 60 years, this trend began to
reverse until in the over 75 years age group the most deprived
areas had the fewest episodes. The greatest gap between social
groups occurred in women during the peak reproductive years.
Figure 1B shows the rate of episodes after adjusting for the
different demographic structures of population groups. After
Asaria M, et al. J Epidemiol Community Health 2016;70:990–996. doi:10.1136/jech-2016-207447 991
Inequality and health
42
early childhood, rates of hospital episodes generally increased
with age, and were higher in women than in men between the
ages of 20 years and 40 years, and higher in men after the age
of 70 years. A social gradient was again evident with a higher
rate of episodes in more deprived areas, but in the case of
episode rates, the gradient persisted across the entire age range.
This indicates that the relative fall in the number of episodes for
older age groups in more deprived areas was due to a relative
decline in population, with fewer people in deprived areas sur-
viving into old age (ﬁgure 2A).
The trends for average annual costs per head of population
(ﬁgure 1C) closely mirrored the patterns for hospital episode
rates, suggesting that costs associated with different population
groups were primarily driven by volumes of hospital usage
rather than differences in types of hospital usage across the life
course.
The social gradient in hospital episodes was evident for elect-
ive and emergency admissions, but the gaps were greater for
emergency admissions (table 1). Compared with residents in the
most afﬂuent ﬁfth of areas, residents of the most deprived ﬁfth
Figure 1 All hospital inpatient admissions split by age, sex and deprivation. Graphs are based on hospital episode statistics for year 2011/2012
and are broken down by sex (female on the left male on the right), deprivation (different line colours) and are plotted against age. (A) Shows the
total number of hospital episodes. (B) Shows the hospitalisation rate that is, adjusts for the demographic structure of the population. (C) Translates
from hospital episodes to average annual costs due to these hospitalisations.
992 Asaria M, et al. J Epidemiol Community Health 2016;70:990–996. doi:10.1136/jech-2016-207447
Inequality and health
43
of areas had a 20% higher rate of elective episodes, a 71%
higher rate of emergency episodes, and a 39% higher rate of
episodes overall. Detailed age, sex and deprivation breakdowns
of the different types of admissions are given in the online
supplementary appendix ﬁgure A1.
The potential savings for the NHS if the costs associated with
the age and sex-speciﬁc episode rates in the most afﬂuent quin-
tile in 2011/2012 were achieved in the other deprivation groups
are given in table 2. The total cost associated with socio-
economic inequality in 2011/2012 was £4.8 billion, and there
was a clear social gradient across the entire deprivation
Figure 2 Survival curves and cumulative lifetime costs split by age, sex and deprivation. Graphs are based on mortality data and hospital episode
statistics for year 2011/2012, and are broken down by sex (female on the left male on the right), deprivation (different line colours) and are plotted
against age. (A) Shows the probability of surviving against age. (B) Shows the cumulative expected hospital costs calculated by adjusting hospital
costs by the probability of being alive at any given age and cumulating these adjusted costs over all previous years.
Table 2 Estimated cost of social inequality
IMD quintile Female (£) Male (£) Total (£)
Q1 (most deprived) 1 127 006 663 1 065 236 932 2 192 243 595
Q2 706 629 004 671 287 893 1 377 916 897
Q3 410 841 645 405 654 922 816 496 567
Q4 198 794 943 19 012 169 9 388 916 642
Q5 (most affluent)* − − −
Overall 2 443 272 255 2 332 301 446 4 775 573 701
This table shows the difference in inpatient hospital costs between those in the most
affluent group and each of the other deprivation groups assuming everybody in the
other groups would have the same average hospital costs as those in the most
affluent groups adjusted for the different demographic profiles of the groups. All data
are based on hospital episode statistics for year 2011/2012.
*Comparator group—costs in this group are £2 608 800 295, £2 208 982 887 and
£4 817 783 181 for women, men and total, respectively.
IMD, index of multiple deprivation.
Table 1 Number and rate of hospital episodes by admission type
IMD
quintile
Elective Emergency All
Total Rate* Total Rate* Total Rate*
Q1 (most
deprived)
2 481 014 23 727 2 055 481 19 658 4 536 495 43 385
Q2 2 355 297 22 338 1 706 833 16 188 4 062 130 38 526
Q3 2 310 208 21 811 1 546 013 14 596 3 856 220 36 408
Q4 2 235 779 21 254 1 390 347 13 217 3 626 126 34 472
Q5 (most
affluent)
2 095 137 19 804 1 216 063 11 495 3 311 200 31 298
Overall 11 477 435 21 783 7 914 736 15 021 19 392 171 36 804
This table shows the total numbers and rates of hospital episodes split by type of
hospital admission and deprivation group. All data are based on hospital episode
statistics for year 2011/2012.
*Rate per 100 000 population.
IMD, index of multiple deprivation.
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spectrum, with the largest cost observed in the most deprived
group (£2.2 billion). Costs were broadly similar in men and
women.
Estimates of lifetime costs
Survival curves for men and women by deprivation quintile are
shown in ﬁgure 2A. People who lived in more afﬂuent areas
were expected to live longer than those who lived in more
deprived areas, and women were expected to live longer than
men at any given deprivation level.
Combining data on survival and average costs, we calculated
expected costs of hospital admission over the life course for
each deprivation group, assuming survival and costs remained
constant at 2011/2012 levels. Cumulative lifetime costs are
shown in ﬁgure 2B. Average lifetime costs for men ranged from
£43 358 for the most afﬂuent group to £50 163 for the most
deprived, and the respective costs for women ranged from
£48 409 to £59 255. Overall, women had 14% higher expected
lifetime hospital costs than men, largely due to the increased
costs associated with the reproductive years, but also due to
their longer life expectancy. Despite having longer life expect-
ancy, people living in the most afﬂuent ﬁfth of areas had lower
lifetime hospital costs than those living in more deprived areas.
Analyses for emergency and elective admissions are presented
in the online supplementary appendix ﬁgures A1 and A2.
Results were broadly similar to those for all admissions, but
expected cumulative lifetime costs for elective episodes in men
converged and were highest for people living in the most afﬂu-
ent ﬁfth of areas. Results for outpatient appointments are also
given in the online supplementary appendix ﬁgure A3. Very
similar trends were apparent to those for inpatient admissions,
with outpatient hospital use increasing with greater deprivation
level and age, and spiking for women between the ages of
20 years and 40 years.
DISCUSSION
Summary of key ﬁndings
In this study, we aimed to quantify the hospital care costs to the
NHS of socioeconomic inequality. As expected, we found that
hospital admission rates generally increased with age, and were
higher in women during the reproductive years and higher in
men at most other ages. For all ages, there was a clear socio-
economic gradient, particularly for emergency admissions, with
the rate of admissions increasing with neighbourhood depriv-
ation. The costs to the NHS associated with this inequality were
partially offset by lower life expectancy in more deprived
groups, but remained substantial: £4.8 billion per year at 2011/
2012 levels.
Strengths and limitations
This is the ﬁrst study based on comprehensive whole-population
data in England to explore the relationship between lifetime
hospital costs to the NHS and socioeconomic inequality. We
used data at small-area level to minimise, as far as possible, the
risk of ecological fallacy that may have masked inequality at
larger and coarser geographical levels. Mortality data were used
to extrapolate the results of the analysis across the patient life-
time to allow conclusions to be drawn on both cross-sectional
and lifetime costs of inequality to the NHS.
The study is subject to several limitations. First, we did not
control for differing need for healthcare among the different
groups, and so do not make any judgements on whether the dif-
ferent levels of healthcare use are ‘fair’ or appropriate, given dif-
ferences in need. For example, it may be the case that for any
given level of morbidity, poorer patients use less healthcare than
richer patients, and hence, our estimate of the cost of inequality
to the NHS, while representing current practice, underestimates
ideal practice where patients receive equal treatment for equal
need. Second, the focus of our analysis was inpatient care, but
healthcare costs are also incurred through outpatient appoint-
ments and in primary care. In 2011/2012, inpatient costs and
primary care costs each constituted 22% of the total NHS
budget of £101.42 billion.14 In our supplementary analyses, we
found that outpatient healthcare use followed trends similar to
those for inpatient use. This suggests that our estimates repre-
sent a lower bound on the total cost of inequality to the NHS.
Third, our lifetime extrapolation assumes that hospitalisation
rates and costs observed in 2011/2012 will remain constant into
the future, and that mortality rates in 2011/2012 can be used to
predict survival rates in future years. The extrapolation also
assumes that deprivation levels are ﬁxed over individuals’ life-
times. While these assumptions may not hold in practice we feel
they give a reasonable indication of the relative magnitudes and
directions of future trends. Fourth, the underlying population
and mortality data breakdowns that we use in this study are
truncated at 85 years of age, so mortality and hospitalisation
rates for older age groups are assumed to be constant and not to
increase further with age. Finally, while we use small-area-level
deprivation in our analysis, to fully guard against ecological
fallacy, individual-level deprivation data would be required.
Such data are not available in a form that can be linked to
health data in England. This remaining potential for ecological
fallacy is likely to bias our estimate of the costs of inequality
downwards.
Comparison with other studies
As far as we know, this is the ﬁrst published analysis of the
inpatient costs of socioeconomic inequality in England. The
2010 Strategic Review of Health Inequalities (the Marmot
Review) estimated the cost of inequality to the NHS to be £5.5
billion per year,4 but the basis for this calculation and the
detailed ﬁndings were not described. ONS estimated that overall
NHS spending in 2011/12 was 25.3% higher for those in the
lowest income quintile compared with those in the highest
(spending of £1836 and £1465 respectively).15 However, this is
an estimate based only on variation in the age and sex make-up
of respondents from neighbourhoods with different levels of
deprivation. By contrast, we used comprehensive national data
to calculate the actual variation in healthcare costs by area
deprivation, and to model lifetime costs. Our approach found
that inpatient hospital costs in 2011/2012 were 31% higher for
people living in the most deprived quintile of neighbourhoods
compared with people living in the least deprived quintile
(average annual inpatient hospital costs per resident of £597
and £455, respectively). Forget et al16 modelled lifetime health-
care costs based on the population of Manitoba, ﬁnding costs
for women were 40% higher than for men. As with our study,
this gap between the sexes developed during the peak childbear-
ing years and widened at the end of life. However, while the
authors described wide variations in healthcare costs between
individuals, the contribution of socioeconomic factors was not
assessed. Finally, Hanratty et al17 modelled socioeconomic
inequalities in public expenditure on healthcare in the last year
of life in Stockholm County Council. They used individual-level
income data as their socioeconomic variable and found that
after controlling for age, sex, diagnosis group and healthcare
utilisation there was substantially greater public expenditure on
higher income patients than on lower income patients. This
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suggests that if we were able to adjust for need and to use
individual-level deprivation data in our analysis, our estimate of
the cost of inequality to the NHS would be higher.
Policy/clinical implications
Socioeconomic inequalities in the determinants of health result
in both increased morbidity and decreased life expectancy. We
found that the substantially higher healthcare costs accrued by
residents of deprived areas throughout their lives are only
slightly offset by their lower life expectancy. Evidence suggests
that even in a country with universal access to healthcare, more
afﬂuent groups beneﬁt more,8 18 19 and healthcare is not
entirely equitable. If healthcare provision were to adequately
meet need, the cost disparities we describe could be even
greater, although better prevention and early intervention could
also result in a net reduction in the costs associated with
inequality, as has been found in social and educational
interventions.20 21
Rising healthcare costs in older age are largely driven by the
onset of chronic disease, and the earlier onset of these diseases in
poorer populations shifts the healthcare costs to younger age
groups. Better primary and secondary prevention, progressively
weighted towards more deprived populations, is an obvious
response, but one that has proved hard to achieve. Anticipatory
interventions to tackle the onset of chronic conditions in
deprived neighbourhoods can result in signiﬁcant patient
beneﬁt,22 potentially generating net savings for the health system
in any given year, as well as across the lifetimes of these patients.
However, while there is scope for health professionals to do
more to tackle health inequalities as providers and
commissioners,23 24 the root causes of these inequalities are
socioeconomic, and the healthcare system—however, equitable—
can only partially alleviate their impact.25 26 A range of recent
national social and health system programmes (eg, Health Action
Zones, the Quality and the Outcomes Framework) have been
associated with more equitable access to high-quality care,26 27
and in some cases, with improvements in educational and health
outcomes,28 29 but for the most part inequalities in health out-
comes have persisted—or have actually worsened.30–32
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 Appendix 1: The costs of inequality: whole-population modelling study of 
lifetime inpatient hospital costs in the English National Health Service by 
level of neighbourhood deprivation 
This supplementary appendix provides additional details about the social gradient in hospital 
utilisation and associated costs in terms of type of inpatient appointments (elective versus 
emergency) as described in Figures A1 and A2 as well as describing the social gradient in use of 
outpatient care as described in Figure A3. 
Figure A1: Hospital inpatient admissions split by admission type, age, sex and 
deprivation 
 
Notes to figure A1: Graphs are based on hospital episode statistics for year 2011/12 and are 
broken down by admission type (set of graphs on the left show elective admission while those 
on the right show emergency admissions), sex (female on the left within each admission type and 
male on the right), deprivation (different line colours) and are plotted against age. Panel a shows 
the total number of hospital episodes. Panel b shows the hospitalisation rate i.e. adjusts for the 
demographic structure of the population. Panel c translates from hospital episodes to average 
annual costs due to these hospitalisation. 
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 Figure A2: Hospital inpatient costs broken down by admission type age, sex and 
deprivation 
Notes to figure A2: Graphs are based on and mortality data and hospital episode statistics for 
year 2011/12 and are broken down by sex (female on the left male on the right), deprivation 
(different line colours) and are plotted against age. Panel a shows cumulative expected hospital 
costs due to elective hospital episode and Panel b shows the cumulative expected hospital costs 
due to emergency hospital episodes. These costs are calculated by adjusting hospital costs by 
survival probabilities and cumulating these adjusted costs over all previous years. 
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 Figure A3: Outpatient appointments split by age, sex and deprivation 
 
Notes to figure A3: Graphs are based on hospital episode statistics for year 2011/12 and are 
broken down by sex (female on the left male on the right), deprivation (different line colours) 
and are plotted against age. Panel a shows the total number of outpatient appointments. Panel 
b shows the appointment rate i.e. adjusts for the demographic structure of the population. 
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Appendix 2: Missing data exploration 
From the 18 808 903 total episodes in the HES inpatient data set for 2011/12 costs were 
successfully calculated for 17 147 086 episodes. Of the 165 925 episodes that costs were not 
calculated for we had deprivation and sex data for just under half of these. For these 775 349 un-
costed hospital episodes we compare the deprivation and sex distribution with that of the 17 147 
086 costed hospital episodes to determine the plausibility of the assumption we use in our study 
that the data is missing at random. 
Figure A2.1 Summary of missing costed hospital inpatient episodes 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table A2.1 Missing hospital episodes with sex and deprivation data (N=775 349) 
  Index of Multiple Deprivation Quintile  
Sex  Q1 
(most deprived) 
Q2 Q3 Q4 Q5 
(least deprived) 
Overall 
Female 
% 
 73 881 85 403 91 695 97 335 90 282 438 596 
 9.5% 11.0% 11.8% 12.6% 11.6% 57.0% 
Male 
% 
 57 586 66 864 69 230 74 501 68 572 336 753 
 7.4% 8.6% 8.9% 9.6% 8.8% 43.0% 
Overall 
% 
 131 467 152 267 160 925 171 836 158 854 775 349 
 16.9% 19.6% 20.7% 22.2% 20.4% 100% 
 
Rejected by grouper due to 
incompatible clinical coding 
(704 918) 
 
Successfully 
grouped for costs 
17 147 086 
 
HES Inpatient 
episodes 2011/12 
18 808 903 
 
With age, sex and 
deprivation data 
17 922 004 
 
Missing age (76 129) 
Missing sex (2 333) 
Missing deprivation (844 301) 
Missing one or more (886 899) 
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Table A2.2 Non missing hospital episodes (N=17 147 086) 
  Index of Multiple Deprivation Quintile  
Sex  Q1 
(most deprived) 
Q2 Q3 Q4 Q5 
(least deprived) 
Overall 
Female 
% 
 2 265 302 2 014 667 1 858 579 1 718 387 1 556 750 9 413 685 
 13.2% 11.7% 10.8% 10.0% 9.1% 54.8% 
Male 
% 
 1 795 280 1 591 580 1 544 481 1 458 715 1 343 345 7 733 401 
 10.5% 9.3% 9.0% 8.5% 7.8% 45.1% 
Overall  
% 
 4 060 582 3 606 247 3 403 060 3 177 102 2 900 095 17 147 086 
 23.7% 21.0% 19.8% 18.5% 16.9% 100% 
 
Key points to note from this exploration of the missing data are that for approximately half the 
missing data for which we have information on sex and deprivation the distribution of missing 
data is very similar to that of the non-missing data. Looking more closely we see that data is 
marginally more likely to be missing from less deprived groups than from more deprived groups. 
The implication of using the assumption that the data are missing at random and inflating all 
costs by the proportion of missing data is that should the pattern we observed in the tables 
above also hold in the other half of the missing data then we will be over inflating costs in the 
more deprived populations and under inflating costs in the least deprived populations. Should 
this be the case then our estimate of the cost of inequality will be biased upwards i.e. may be an 
overestimate. 
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 Appendix B: Paper 2 - Unequal socioeconomic distribution of the primary 
care workforce: whole-population small area longitudinal study 
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ABSTRACT
Objective: To measure changes in socioeconomic
inequality in the distribution of family physicians
(general practitioners (GPs)) relative to need in
England from 2004/2005 to 2013/2014.
Design: Whole-population small area longitudinal data
linkage study.
Setting: England from 2004/2005 to 2013/2014.
Participants: 32 482 lower layer super output areas
(neighbourhoods of 1500 people on average).
Main outcome measures: Slope index of inequality
(SII) between the most and least deprived small areas
in annual full-time equivalent GPs (FTE GPs) per
100 000 need adjusted population.
Results: In 2004/2005, inequality in primary care supply
as measured by the SII in FTE GPs was 4.2 (95% CI 3.1
to 5.3) GPs per 100 000. By 2013/2014, this SII had
fallen to −0.7 (95% CI −2.5 to 1.1) GPs per 100 000.
The number of FTE GPs per 100 000 serving the most
deprived fifth of small areas increased over this period
from 54.0 to 60.5, while increasing from 57.2 to 59.9 in
the least deprived fifth, so that by the end of the study
period there were more GPs per 100 000 need adjusted
population in the most deprived areas than in the least
deprived. The increase in GP supply in the most deprived
fifth of neighbourhoods was larger in areas that received
targeted investment for establishing new practices under
the ‘Equitable Access to Primary Medical Care’.
Conclusions: There was a substantial reduction in
socioeconomic inequality in family physician supply
associated with national policy. This policy may not have
completely eliminated socioeconomic inequality in family
physician supply since existing need adjustment formulae
do not fully capture the additional burden of
multimorbidity in deprived neighbourhoods. The small
area approach introduced in this study can be used
routinely to monitor socioeconomic inequality of access
to primary care and to indicate workforce shortages in
particular neighbourhoods. http://creativecommons.org/
licenses/by/4.0
INTRODUCTION
There is long-standing international policy
concern about unequal socioeconomic distri-
bution of the primary care workforce, which
can harm population health and contribute
to wider socioeconomic inequalities in
health.1–3 As the UK Chair of the Royal
College of General Practitioners recently
wrote, “The general practice workforce is
unevenly spread across the country, with the
fewest doctors in the most deprived areas,
exacerbating health inequalities”.4 This
problem may grow in future, as substantial
future primary care workforce shortages are
projected over the next two decades in the
UK, USA and elsewhere.4–6 Demand for
primary care is increasing due to increasing
numbers of people with multiple chronic
conditions (multimorbidity), especially in
deprived populations,7–9 and attempts by pol-
icymakers to shift care from secondary to
primary care settings.10 Workload is also
increasing due to the increasing complexity
of care and associated administrative
burdens.11 In England, for example, the
Royal College of General Practitioners esti-
mates that 8000 more full-time equivalent
(FTE) primary care physicians (general
Strengths and limitations of this study
▪ Our study introduces a new small area level
method for measuring inequality in general prac-
titioner supply that focuses specifically on socio-
economic inequality and captures inequality
within National Health Service (NHS) administra-
tive areas as well as between them.
▪ The main limitation of this study is the lack of a
generally accepted and up-to-date measure of
relative need for primary care in deprived small
areas.
▪ Currently, the best available measure is the work-
load adjustment recommended in the 2007
review of the Carr-Hill formula for allocating
primary care funding. However, concerns have
been raised that the Carr-Hill formula may not
fully reflect the additional needs for primary care
in deprived populations.
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practitioners (GPs)) will be needed by 2020,12 while
worryingly recent trends indicate a fall in applications
for medical training in primary care.13
Previous studies have found substantial geographical
inequalities in family physician supply between large
subnational areas, even in high-income countries with
universal health coverage.14–21 However, because these
studies have focused on large areas they have not been
able to accurately describe socioeconomic inequality in
primary care supply by pinpointing primary care
shortages in speciﬁc disadvantaged neighbourhoods.
Studies in England using data from 1974 to 2006 have
found substantial and persistent geographical inequality
in GP supply relative to need between National Health
Service (NHS) administrative areas—Family Practitioner
Committees until 1990, then Family Health Service
Authorities until 2000, then Primary Care Trusts
(PCTs).22–26 Historically, these inequalities have been
largely impervious to NHS policy initiatives designed to
reduce them, such as the deprivation-weighted capita-
tion payments introduced in 1990. There is also evi-
dence that some policies may have increased large area
inequality, such as the abolition of entry controls in
‘overdoctored’ areas in England in 2002.22
In the late 2000s following the 2006 White Paper ‘Our
Health, Our Care, Our Say’, a renewed effort was made
to increase GP supply in deprived areas as part of wider
attempts to meet government targets for reducing
health inequality.24 27–29 Most notably, the ‘Equitable
Access to Primary Medical Care’ (EAPMC) programme
that invested £250 million towards establishing new
general practices and GP-led heath centres as well as
extending opening hours and expanding services in the
38 most ‘underdoctored’ PCT areas.28 This programme
was announced by a Labour government in the 2006
White Paper, funded from 2008,28 and wound down
from 2011, a year or so after the new Coalition govern-
ment came to power.30 Our study aims to measure socio-
economic inequality in GP supply from 2004/2005 to
2013/2014, and to examine whether the EAPMC pro-
gramme was associated with any beneﬁcial impact on
reducing socioeconomic inequality. Our study intro-
duces a new way of measuring inequality in GP supply,
based on small area variations, which focuses speciﬁcally
on socioeconomic inequality. Studies based on large
area variations may mask important changing patterns
of socioeconomic inequality within administrative areas.
Our study examines variation between small area popu-
lations of approximately 1500 people, allowing us to
capture changing patterns of socioeconomic inequality
in much more ﬁne-grained detail than previous studies.
DATA AND METHODS
We constructed whole-population national data sets at
both small area level and practice level. Using the NHS
Attribution Data Set of GP-registered populations, we
linked practice level data on primary care supply for
the 10 years, 2004/2005 through 2013/2014, with corre-
sponding small area level data on population and
deprivation. We use data from all 9092 general practices
in the English NHS that were open for at least 1 year of
the study period. Our data on primary care supply were
obtained from the annual NHS General and Personal
Medical Services workforce census, taken at 30
September each year, midway through the ﬁnancial year.
In line with previous research studies and ofﬁcial
reports, the primary indicator of GP supply reported in
this study is the FTE number of GP principals and salar-
ied GPs, who make up the vast majority of the GP work-
force.4 22 23 27 31 We also conducted robustness checks
using other GP supply variables, including (1) head-
count of GP principals and salaried GPs; (2) GP regis-
trars (trainee doctors on short-term placements having
‘supernumerary’ contracts, designed primarily for train-
ing rather than delivering patient care);32 and (3) GP
retainers (sessional GPs who only work a maximum of
four sessions of approximately half a day each week, and
only make up a small fraction of the workforce).33 34 We
also conducted robustness checks using the limited avail-
able data on practice nurse supply, available at practice
level for 2013/2014 but only at PCT level before that.
Our data do not include locum GPs or supply of emer-
gency primary care services outside normal ofﬁce hours.
The small area unit of analysis was the 2001 lower
super output area (LSOA)—a geographical unit deﬁned
by the 2001 census. There are 32 482 of these small
areas in England each with a mean population of
approximately 1500 people. Data on the LSOA of resi-
dence of each practice-registered patient for each year
were used to attribute GP supply from practice level to
LSOA level, using population-weighted averages. LSOAs
were ranked by deprivation according to their Index of
Multiple Deprivation (IMD) 2010 ranks, and split into
deprivation quintile and decile groups with equal
numbers of LSOAs in each group. Ofﬁce for National
Statistics (ONS) mid-year population estimates at LSOA
level were used to derive the population of each depriv-
ation group. We used ONS population estimates because
GP practice list data are less thoroughly cleaned and vali-
dated and tends to overestimate population size, for
example, due to people leaving the area without notify-
ing their GP. LSOA populations were adjusted for their
relative needs for primary care using the workload
adjustment aspect of the most recently updated version
of the Carr-Hill formula for primary care resource allo-
cation.35 This version of the formula was recommended
in 2007 by the Formula Review Group established by
NHS employers and the British Medical Association
(BMA), and though never implemented in practice it
remains the most authoritative and up-to-date analysis of
the determinants of primary care workload in England.
This adjustment takes into consideration the age and
sex structure and IMD health deprivation score of each
LSOA to upscale populations that are expected to
require more primary care and downscale populations
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expected to require less. We report both adjusted and
unadjusted results, and also conduct robustness checks
using an alternative need formula: the 2013/2014
Nufﬁeld index of general and acute hospital need.36 As
a further robustness check, the analysis was repeated at
practice level by reverse attributing LSOA population
and deprivation variables to GP practices and aggregat-
ing GP supply numbers by population-weighted practices
into ﬁve approximately equally sized deprivation-based
groups. To provide insight into the components of
change in GP supply, we also produced descriptive statis-
tics by deprivation group and year on the numbers of
practices opening and closing, the average size of GP
practices, and the average number of small areas served
by each practice as an indication of whether increases in
GP supply can be attributed to patients travelling
further.
The primary measures of inequality were the slope
index of inequality (SII) and relative index of inequality
(RII), both based on linear regression analysis at the
level of IMD decile group. This involves modelling GP
supply as a linear function of deprivation decile, entered
as a continuous variable scaled from 0 to 1. The SII is
the coefﬁcient in this regression; the RII is that coefﬁ-
cient divided by the mean GP supply. The SII can be
interpreted as the modelled difference in the number of
FTE GPs per 100 000 population between the most and
least deprived small areas (the absolute gap); while the
RII can be interpreted as this difference as a proportion
of the national average (the proportionate gap).
Regression models using pooled data for multiple years
were used to test whether observed changes in inequality
between years were statistically signiﬁcant, based on
interaction terms between year and deprivation.
To examine associations between change in GP supply
inequality and the EAPMC programme, we identiﬁed
the 38 PCTs that were considered to be ‘underdoctored’
and hence eligible to receive funding from this pro-
gramme from a Department of Health press release on
the policy.37 We then compared changes in GP supply
by deprivation group of LSOAs within these
‘underdoctored’ PCTs (which cover a population of
approximately 10 million people) with changes in GP
supply in deprivation groups of LSOAs within the
remaining PCTs (which cover a population of approxi-
mately 43 million people), focusing on change between
the year the policy was announced, in 2006, and the
year the policy was wound down, in 2011.
RESULTS
Total numbers of GPs in England by year are reported
in table 1, in terms of both headcount and FTE, along
with total population ﬁgures. Although the total head-
count of GPs continued to increase throughout the
period, FTE numbers have been approximately ﬂat
since 2009/2010 while the patient population has con-
tinued to grow. In England as a whole, GP supply
increased from 55.1 to 60.2 FTE GPs per 100 000 popu-
lation from 2004/2005 to 2006/2007, but remained
approximately stable thereafter, rising to 60.7 in 2009/
2010 then falling to 59.4 by 2013/2014. Crude trends in
total numbers of FTE GPs split by small area level
deprivation are shown in ﬁgure 1 (these are not adjusted
for population change). Total numbers of FTE GPs have
grown much faster in the most deprived ﬁfth of English
small areas than elsewhere, with GP supply in the most
afﬂuent ﬁfth growing at the slowest pace over the past
10 years. This pattern is also reﬂected in the raw head-
count of GPs (see online supplementary appendix
ﬁgure A4.3).
Figure 2 shows these trends adjusted for population
size and need. In England as a whole, GP supply
increased relative to population need from 2004/2005
to 2006/2007 but remained approximately stable there-
after. The geographical distribution of this GP supply in
relation to the deprivation of the areas served by GPs,
however, changed substantially over the study period. In
2004/2005, there was ‘prorich’ inequality in GP supply
relative to need, with 54.0 FTE GPs per 100 000 of
need adjusted population in the most deprived ﬁfth of
small areas and 57.2 FTE GPs per 100 000 of need
Table 1 Total GP workforce in England from 2004/2015 to 2013/2014*
GP headcount GP full-time equivalent
Year Total population Total Per 100 000 population Total Per 100 000 population
2004/2005 50 109 707 30 751 61.37 27 621 55.12
2005/2006 50 466 162 31 924 63.26 28 540 56.55
2006/2007 50 763 893 32 646 64.31 30 557 60.19
2007/2008 51 106 181 32 995 64.56 30 609 59.89
2008/2009 51 464 646 33 911 65.89 30 603 59.46
2009/2010 51 807 127 35 072 67.70 31 422 60.65
2010/2011 52 234 045 36 073 69.06 31 173 59.68
2011/2012 52 690 703 36 628 69.52 31 197 59.21
2012/2013 53 488 001 36 771 68.75 31 418 58.74
2013/2014 53 859 917 36 849 68.42 31 993 59.40
*Excluding GP registrars, retainers and locums.
GP, general practitioner.
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adjusted population in the least deprived ﬁfth of areas
resulting in an SII of 4.2 (95% CI 3.1 to 5.3). By the
end of the study period, this inequality had reversed
with 60.5 and 59.9 FTE GPs per 100 000 need adjusted
population in the most deprived and least deprived
ﬁfths of small areas, respectively, and an SII of −0.7
(95% CI −2.5 to 1.1).
This decrease in socioeconomic inequality in GP
supply relative to need occurred between 2006/2007
and 2011/2012, a period over which the SII fell from 5.2
(95% CI 4.7 to 5.8) to −2.1 (95% CI −4.4 to 0.2).
During this 5-year period, people living in the most
deprived ﬁfth of English small areas experienced a
steady increase in GP supply relative to need, which was
particularly rapid from 2008/2009 to 2010/2011, while
people living in the least deprived three-ﬁfths experi-
enced a decline. By 2010/2011, the ‘prorich’ inequality
in GP supply relative to need appeared to have disap-
peared. Nationally, the increase in GP supply relative to
need in deprived small areas from 2006/2007 to 2011/
2012 was offset by a corresponding reduction in other
areas—resulting in a slight overall decline in national
GP supply relative to need from 60.2 to 59.2 FTE GPs
per 100 000. These inequality trends were driven largely
by change in the most and least deprived quintile
groups: GP supply in the middle three quintile groups
changed little, and remained lower than in the most
afﬂuent quintile group.
By 2013/2014, the trend in GP supply per need
weighted population appeared to have reversed with GP
supply in the most afﬂuent areas growing faster than in
the most deprived areas.
Cross-sectional results for 2006/2007 and 2011/2012,
before and after the EAPMC programme, are presented
in ﬁgure 3. This highlights the reversal of the gradient
in GP supply from favouring the least deprived areas in
2006/2007 to favouring the most deprived areas in
2011/2012.
Figure 4 shows changes in GP supply between these
years, comparing LSOAs in ‘underdoctored’ PCTs that
received funding under the EAMPC programme with
those in the other PCTs that did not receive this funding.
PCTs classiﬁed as ‘underdoctored’ experienced larger
increases in GP supply than PCTs not classiﬁed as ‘under-
doctored’. Furthermore, these larger increases were con-
centrated in the poorest ﬁfth of LSOAs in England.
The reduction in the SII between 2006/2007 and
2011/2012 when measured at LSOA level (average popu-
lation 1500) was 7.3 (95% CI 4.9 to 9.7). The same reduc-
tion in SII when measured at the much larger CCG level
(average population 250 000) was 6.9 (95% CI 1.7 to
12.1). The greater value of the change in SII found when
Figure 1 Total GP workforce1 by Deprivation Quintile Group, from 2004/2005 to 2013/2014. Note: Number of FTE GPs,
excluding registrars and retainers. FTE, full time equivalent; GP, general practitioner; IMD, Index of Multiple Deprivation.
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using the ﬁner grained geography demonstrates that by
conducting our analysis at the small area level, we are
able to identify both changes in within CCG inequality as
well as changes in between CCG inequality, the ﬁrst of
which would have been overlooked had the analysis been
conducted at the larger unit of analysis.
Our main ﬁnding of a reduction in socioeconomic
inequality in GP supply from 2006/2007 to 2011/2012
was robust to extensive sensitivity analyses using different
deﬁnitions of primary care supply (headcount and FTE,
with and without adjustment for population size (see
online supplementary appendix ﬁgure A4.3) and need
(see online supplementary appendix ﬁgure A4.4), with
and without GP registrars and retainers (see online sup-
plementary appendix ﬁgures A4.1 and A5.1), with and
without practice nurses at PCT level (see online supple-
mentary appendix ﬁgures A14.1 and A14.3), different
units of analysis small area (see online supplementary
appendix ﬁgure A4.1), practice (see online supplemen-
tary appendix ﬁgure A8.1), PCT (see online supplemen-
tary appendix ﬁgure A14.1) and CCG (see online
supplementary appendix ﬁgure A15.1) and different
measures of inequality (absolute and relative)). This
ﬁnding was also robust to using a different need adjust-
ment formula: the Nufﬁeld general and acute hospital
need index for 2013/2014 (see online supplementary
appendix ﬁgure A17.3).36
The greater increase in GP supply in deprived small
areas appears primarily to have been driven by the
opening of new practices, rather than recruitment into
existing practices. In 2009/2010, 2010/2011 and 2011/
2012, there were substantial net increases in GP supply
in deprived areas of around 28, 167 and 26 FTE GPs,
respectively, resulting from the opening and closing of
practices (see online supplementary appendix table
1.7). However, this was followed by substantial net falls in
both subsequent years of around 55 and 65 FTE GPs,
respectively, as more practices closed than opened.
Meanwhile, average practice size grew at similar rates in
all deprivation groups (see online supplementary appen-
dix ﬁgure 8.6). There does not appear to be any evi-
dence of patients living in deprived areas travelling
further to increase their access to GPs, on the contrary
average numbers of LSOAs per practice remained stable
Figure 2 Socioeconomic inequality in GP supply in England 2003/2004 to 2013/2014. Note: (1). The upper panel shows FTE
GPs per 100 000 need adjusted population by deprivation quintile group of small areas by year; the two lower panels show
inequality indices by year, with 95% CIs. (2). The slope index of inequality can be interpreted as the absolute gap in FTE GPs
per 100 000 need adjusted population between the most and least deprived small area, and the relative index of inequality as the
percentage gap relative to the average area. In each case, a positive index indicates ‘prorich’ inequality favouring less deprived
areas. EAPMC, Equitable Access to Primary Medical Care; FTE, full time equivalent; GP, general practitioner; IMD, Index of
Multiple Deprivation.
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throughout the 10-year period of the study (see online
supplementary appendix ﬁgure 8.5). Full details of these
results as well as further breakdowns of the results pre-
sented in the paper can be found in the accompanying
online supplementary appendix.
DISCUSSION
Statement of principal findings
We found a substantial reduction in socioeconomic
inequality in GP supply in England from 2006/2007 to
2011/2012. This can partly be attributed to national
policy in the form of the EAPMC programme, which
provided additional funding for new GP practices in
‘underdoctored’ areas of the country. The greater
increase in GP supply in deprived small areas appears
primarily to have been driven by the opening of new
practices, rather than recruitment into existing practices.
Socioeconomic inequality in GP supply subsequently
increased slightly in 2012/2013 and 2013/2014, as the
NHS funding situation tightened and practices started
closing more rapidly in deprived areas.
Strengths and weaknesses of the study
Our study introduces a new small area level method for
measuring inequality in GP supply that focuses speciﬁcally
on socioeconomic inequality and captures inequality within
NHS administrative areas as well as between them. Previous
large area level methods can only tell policymakers which
Clinical Commissioning Groups (CCGs) are the most
‘underdoctored’. As well as this, our new method also
allows policymakers to take a close-up look at the situation
within CCGs and identify which individual neighbourhoods
and GP practices are the most deprived and underdoc-
tored. This ability could potentially be used to redirect
funding for new practices and new GPs more accurately
towards the neighbourhoods that need them most.
The main limitation of this study is the lack of a gener-
ally accepted and up-to-date measure of relative need for
primary care in deprived small areas. Currently, the best
available measure is the workload adjustment recom-
mended in the 2007 review of the Carr-Hill formula for
allocating primary care funding.35 This adjustment is
based on regression analysis of the determinants of con-
sultation rates in a sample of 454 practices serving 3.8
million patients from April 2003 to April 2004.38
However, concerns have been raised that the Carr-Hill
formula may not fully reﬂect the additional needs for
primary care in deprived populations.39 In our imple-
mentation of this formula, the average individual living
in the most deprived ﬁfth of English small areas was esti-
mated to have 3.8% more need than the average individ-
ual living in the least deprived ﬁfth in 2013/2014 (see
online supplementary appendix table A2.7). This
implied additional needs weight for deprived areas may
be an underestimate, for three reasons. First, due to
data constraints, we were unable to implement one
element of the recommended adjustment: temporary
resident status in each age-sex category. Second, the
health deprivation domain of the IMD 2010 does not
fully capture the burden of multimorbidity, which tends
to be greater in deprived populations.9 Third, the adjust-
ment is based on workload patterns in the early 2000s. If
there were substantial unmet needs for primary care in
deprived populations in the early 2000s, the adjustment
may underestimate the appropriate level of workload in
those populations. This limitation means that we cannot
draw ﬁrm conclusions about levels of need, and in par-
ticular we cannot conclude that socioeconomic inequal-
ity in GP supply has now been eliminated. However, we
can still conclude that there was a reduction in socio-
economic inequality in GP supply relative to need from
2006/2007 to 2011/2012. To challenge that conclusion,
one would have to hypothesise an offsetting increase in
relative need for primary care in the most deprived ﬁfth
of small areas relative to other areas. This is implausible,
for two reasons. First, according to the Carr-Hill
formula, relative need for primary care in the most
deprived ﬁfth of small areas actually decreased relative
to need in the most afﬂuent ﬁfth over the 10-year
period of the study, due to gradual changes in age-sex
composition between deprivation groups (see online
supplementary appendix ﬁgure 17.1). Furthermore, it is
not plausible that there was a sudden and substantial
increase in relative needs in the most deprived ﬁfth of
areas between 2006/2007 and 2011/2012 relative to the
second most deprived ﬁfth of areas. A second limitation
is that the ofﬁcial statistics on GP supply do not include
data on the supply of locums.40 41 However, growth in
the use of GP locums in areas struggling to recruit is
unlikely to explain our ﬁndings since historically recruit-
ment appears to be more difﬁcult in deprived areas.42 43
Comparison with previous studies
Two previous studies have examined changing patterns
of inequality in GP supply relative to need in England
using national data. Gravelle and Sutton22 examined
Figure 3 Socioeconomic gradient in GP supply in 2006/
2007 and 2011/2012, before and after the Equitable Access
to Primary Medical Care programme. FTE, full time
equivalent; GP, general practitioner.
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overall inequality in GP supply between Family
Practitioner Committee areas from 1974 to 1990 and
between Family Health Service Authority areas from
1990 to 1995. They found substantial and persistent
overall inequality, with strong within-area correlation
between 1975 and 1995—most of the administrative
areas that were ‘underdoctored’ in 1974 were still
‘underdoctored’ in 1995. Goddard et al extended this
time series by adding the years 1996 to 2006, during
which period PCT areas were introduced.23 They found
that overall variation between administrative areas
increased between 1995 and 2006. Both studies con-
cluded that NHS policy had little impact on overall
inequality in GP supply, though the second concluded
that the abolition of entry controls on ‘overdoctored’
administrative areas in 2002 may have increased overall
inequality. Our ﬁnding of a reduction in GP supply
inequality associated with NHS policy in the late 2000s
may seem surprising in the light of these previous ﬁnd-
ings that inequality in GP supply has not changed much
since the 1970s. However, these previous studies are not
directly comparable to ours since they examined overall
inequality in GP supply between large administrative
areas, rather than socioeconomic inequality between
small areas. Furthermore, they examined earlier time
periods subject to different policy initiatives. For
example, the deprivation-weighted capitation payment
system introduced in 1990 resulted in complex marginal
incentive structures that may have merely shifted GPs
from one deprived area to another.22 By contrast, the
EAPMC programme was speciﬁcally targeted at opening
new GP practices in deprived areas, involved substantial
ﬁnancial expenditure, and was implemented at a time
of vigorous centralised NHS target setting and perform-
ance monitoring. Viewed in that light, it is less surpris-
ing that this programme succeeded in helping to
increase GP supply in deprived areas. Equally, it is
perhaps not surprising that socioeconomic inequality
started to rise again after the programme was wound
down in 2011/2012, as money ran out and practices
started to close.
Meaning of the study: possible explanations and
implications for clinicians and policymakers
The reduction in socioeconomic inequality in GP supply
was associated with national policy to recruit more GPs
in deprived areas of England, as announced in the 2006
White Paper and followed by the EAPMC programme
from 2008 to 2011. GP supply relative to need increased
from 2006/2007 to 2011/2012 in the group of 38 PCTs
that received funding from the EAPMC programme,
especially in the most deprived ﬁfth of small areas
Figure 4 Change in GP supply between 2006/2007 and 2011/2012 by Deprivation Quintile Group, comparing ‘underdoctored’
PCTs and other PCTs (Kernel density plots). FTE, full time equivalent; GP, general practitioner; LSOA, lower super output area;
PCT, Primary Care Trust.
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within those PCTs, while decreasing in other PCTs. The
increase in GP supply in deprived small areas appears
primarily to have been driven by the opening of new
practices, rather than recruitment into existing practices.
While inequality has increased again since the end of
the EAPMC funding it has not yet reached the levels
observed in the early 2000s. However, the ongoing NHS
funding squeeze and difﬁculties in GP recruitment and
retention particularly in deprived areas suggest that
there is a risk of inequality in GP supply continuing to
rise in future years. For example, vacancies in GP train-
ing posts are especially high in the North of England,
where 29% of training posts were unﬁlled in August
2014.44 Retention of GPs is also a signiﬁcant problem,
with one study suggesting that nearly a third of GPs
intend to leave direct patient care within 5 years.31
Unanswered questions and future research
It is not known how much more need for primary care
there is in deprived areas relative to afﬂuent areas. Our
estimates of this are based on the best available measure
of need for primary care: the workload adjustment from
the 2007 revision of the Carr-Hill formula for allocating
primary care resources. Our ﬁgures show that in 2013/
2014, the most recent year available, the most deprived
ﬁfth of areas received slightly more GP supply relative to
need than other areas. However, we cannot conclude
from this that ‘prorich’ inequality in GP supply has dis-
appeared since, as explained above, there are good
reasons for thinking that the Carr-Hill formula may
underestimate need in deprived areas.39
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Section 1 GP supply by IMD quintile
Section 2 Inequality Indices
Section 3 GP supply by PCT in 2006 and 2011
Section 4 Basecase  results - LSOA level deprivation - excluding GP registrars and GP retainers
Section 5 Sensitivity analysis including GP registrars and GP retainers
Section 6 Sensitivity analysis looking only at GP registrars
Section 7 Sensitivity analysis looking only at GP retainers
Appendix to paper: 
This appendix consists of seventeen sections providing further details on and breakdowns of the results in the paper as well 
as results of various sensitivity analyses.
This section presents data tables showing numbers of GPs both in terms of head count and in terms of full time equivalents 
broken down by IMD deprivation quintiles for years 2004/05 to 2013/14. These results are presented for total numbers of 
GPs as well as broken down into the three subgroups GPs excluding registrars and retainers, GP registrars only and GP 
retainers only. For these results GP numbers are attributed to LSOAs and then LSOAs are aggregated according to IMD scores 
calculated at LSOA level. This worksheet also contains results where IMD deprivation scores are attributed to GP practices and 
these are then used to aggregate GP numbers into population weighted fifths by deprivation. Several additional sets of data 
underpinning the plots in various sensitivity analyses are also given in these tables.
This section looks at GP supply by PCT in 2006/07 and 2011/12 the two years that we compare to evaluate whether the 
investment in underdoctored areas had any effect. PCTs are marked by underdoctored status as identified in the policy 
documents that defined where this investment would be targeted. Numbers are presented for all LSOAs as well as for only 
the most deprived fifth of LSOAs and least deprived fifth of LSOAs in each PCT. PCTs that do not include any LSOAs in the most 
or least deprived fifths have NAs in place of numbers in the relevant fields. There is also a second table in this worksheet 
showing similar results for GPs excluding registrars and retainers.
This section presents a full set of results expanding on those presented in the paper. The results are for GPs excluding 
registrars and retainers, these are attributed to LSOAs and then aggregated by LSOA level IMD scores into deprivation 
quintiles. The results show: 
(1) the trend over time by deprivation quintile in need adjusted full time equivalent GP supply per 100,000 of population 
(2) cross- sectional results for 2006/07 and 20011/12 in need adjusted full time equivalent GP supply  per 100,000 of 
population 
(3) the trends in total numbers of GP both in terms of head count and in terms of full time equivalent GPs split by deprivation 
quintile 
(4) unadjusted and adjusted time trends in numbers of GPs in terms of head count and full time equivalents split by 
derpivation quintile 
(5) regression results to test whether there has been a siginificant change in the slope index of inequality between 2006/07 
and 2011/12 
(6) distributions of changes in GP supply between 2006/07 and 2011/12 at PCT level split by under-doctored status looking at 
all LSOAs, the most deprived fifth of LSOAs and the least deprived fifth of LSOAs
(7) distributions of FTE practice nurses in 2013/14
(8) scatter plot of GP FTE in each LSOA plotted against deprivation in 2006/07 and 2011/12
(9) scatter plot of changes in GP FTE in each LSOA against deprivation between 2006/07 and 2011/12
(10) the trend over time in GP FTE by deprivation decile
This section presents the numbers of GP FTE in the richest and poorest fifths of LSOAs as well as the absolute gap, relative 
gap, slope index of inequality and relative index of inequality for years 2004/05 to 2013/14. Results are broken down into the 
same subgroups and sensitivities as in section 1.
Unequal socioeconomic distribution of the primary care workforce: whole-population small area 
longitudinal study
This section shows the first six sets of results as those in section 4 but looking at GP supply including GP registrars and 
retainers
This section shows the first five sets of results as those in section 4 but looking only at the supply of GP registrars
This section shows the first five sets of results as those in section 4 but looking only at the supply of GP registrars
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Section 8
Section 9
Section 10 Sensitivity analysis London NHS CR excluding registrars and retainers
Section 11 Sensitivity analysis North of England NHS CR excluding registrars and retainers
Section 12 Sensitivity analysis Midlands and East of England NHS CR excluding registrars and retainers
Section 13 Sensitivity analysis South of England NHS CR excluding registrars and retainers
Section 14
Section 15
Section 16 Trends in GP practices opening and closing and their impact on GP FTE
Section 17 Need adjustment details and sensitivity analysis
This section is the same as section 4 except it shows results aggregated into deprivation quintiles based on population 
weighted CCGs.
This section shows the numbers of GP practices opening and closing over time by deprivation group and the impact this has 
had in terms of gains and losses of GP FTE excluding registrars and retainers in these groups
This section explains the Carr-Hill Workload need adjustment formula used, explores its impacts on the results over time and 
explores the sensitivity of the results to using an alternative Nuffield person based resource allocation formula on the results.
This section shows the first five sets of results as those in section 4 but looking only at LSOAs in the London NHS CR
This section shows the first five sets of results as those in section 4 but looking only at LSOAs in the North of England NHS CR
This section shows the first five sets of results as those in section 4 but looking only at LSOAs in the Midland and East of 
England NHS CR
This section shows the first five sets of results as those in section 4 but looking only at LSOAs in the South of England NHS CR
This section shows trends in Nurse FTE and GP FTE with deprivation quintiles derived from population weighted PCTs. 
Historical data for nurse FTE was only available to us at PCT level.
Sensitivity analysis PCT level looking at trends in Nurse and GP FTE excluding registrars and retainers
Sensitivity analysis looking at CCG level deprivation quintiles excluding registrars and retainers
This section is the same as section 8 except it shows results for  GP numbers including registrars and retainers rather than all 
GPs as shown in section 8.
This section shows the first five sets of results as those in section 4 but with attibution of IMD score to GP practice and 
aggregation into deprivation quintiles at practice level rather than attribution of the GP supply to LSOA level and aggregation 
at LSOA level as done in the base case. Inaddition to this there are also plots of:
(6) trends in numbers of LSOA that practices draw their patients from over time by deprivation quintile
(7) trends in mean numbers of GPs per practice over time by deprivation quintile
Sensitivity analysis looking at practice level deprivation quintiles rather than LSOA level deprivation quintiles 
excluding GP registrars and GP retainers
Sensitivity analysis looking at practice level deprivation quintiles including registrars and  retainers
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Appendix Section 2
Table A2.1: Inequality Indices GPs FTE Including Registrars and Retainers
Year Q1 Q5 ABS_GAP REL_GAP SII RII
2004 58.54 63.85 5.31 8% 6.90 11.39%
2005 59.63 65.06 5.43 8% 7.08 11.46%
2006 62.47 68.21 5.74 8% 7.40 11.38%
2007 62.36 65.86 3.50 5% 4.50 7.06%
2008 64.41 67.97 3.56 5% 4.72 7.19%
2009 66.96 70.62 3.66 5% 4.75 7.00%
2010 67.80 68.57 0.77 1% 1.32 1.98%
2011 67.17 68.34 1.17 2% 1.66 2.49%
2012 66.37 67.83 1.46 2% 1.99 3.00%
2013 65.85 66.46 0.61 1% 0.77 1.18%
Table A2.2: Inequality Indices GPs FTE Excluding Registrars and Retainers
Year Q1 Q5 ABS_GAP REL_GAP SII (95% CI) RII  (95% CI)
2004 54.00 57.19 3.19 6% 4.19 (3.10 to 5.28) 7.60% (5.63 to 9.57)
2005 55.37 58.79 3.42 6% 4.44 (3.26 to 5.62) 7.85% (5.77 to 9.94)
2006 58.41 62.49 4.08 7% 5.22 (4.66 to 5.77) 8.66% (7.74 to 9.58)
2007 58.99 61.70 2.71 4% 3.45 (2.53 to 4.36) 5.75% (4.22 to 7.28)
2008 59.05 60.87 1.82 3% 2.42 (1.38 to 3.46) 4.07% (2.32 to 5.82)
2009 60.84 61.97 1.13 2% 1.59 (0.02 to 3.16) 2.62% (0.03 to 5.21)
2010 61.47 59.89 -1.58 -3% -1.65 (-3.87 to 0.57) -2.77% (-6.49 to 0.95)
2011 61.16 59.33 -1.83 -3% -2.10 (-4.41 to 0.21) -3.55% (-7.45 to 0.35)
2012 59.83 59.08 -0.75 -1% -0.75 (-2.38 to 0.88) -1.28% (-4.06 to 1.50)
2013 60.53 59.90 -0.63 -1% -0.68 (-2.46 to 1.11) -1.14% (-4.15 to 1.87)
All GPs (Including Registrars and Retainers)
This section presents the numbers of GP FTE in the richest and poorest fifths of areas as well as the absolute 
gap, relative gap, slope index of inequality and relative index of inequality for years 2004/05 to 2013/14.
In the tables that follow Q1 refers to the most deprived fifth of areas and Q5 refers to the least deprived fifth 
of areas. ABS_GAP referes to the absolute gap between these two groups of areas i.e. Q5 - Q1 this is similar to 
the slope index of inequality (SII) which models this gap but also takes into account the levels observed in the 
other three fifths of the distribution. REL_GAP refers to the relative gap between the most and least deprived 
groups calculated as ABS_GAP/Q5 and is somewhat similar to the relative index of inequality (RII) which 
expresses the SII as a proportion of the national average.
Excluding Registrars and Retainers
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Table A2.3: Inequality Indices GPs FTE Registrars Only
Year Q1 Q5 ABS_GAP REL_GAP SII RII
2004 4.26 5.85 1.59 27% 2.05 42.08%
2005 4.04 5.62 1.58 28% 2.12 44.10%
2006 3.80 4.88 1.08 22% 1.46 34.14%
2007 2.95 2.95 0.00 0% 0.09 2.94%
2008 5.03 6.07 1.04 17% 1.46 26.20%
2009 5.81 7.62 1.81 24% 2.30 34.60%
2010 6.17 8.15 1.98 24% 2.54 36.03%
2011 5.85 8.59 2.74 32% 3.43 47.97%
2012 6.38 8.30 1.92 23% 2.40 32.04%
2013 5.17 6.21 1.04 17% 1.21 20.73%
Table A2.4: Inequality Indices GPs FTE Retainers Only
Year Q1 Q5 ABS_GAP REL_GAP SII RII
2004 0.28 0.81 0.53 65% 0.66 127.43%
2005 0.22 0.65 0.43 66% 0.51 122.80%
2006 0.26 0.85 0.59 69% 0.73 140.95%
2007 0.42 1.21 0.79 65% 0.96 127.32%
2008 0.33 1.02 0.69 68% 0.83 136.07%
2009 0.32 1.03 0.71 69% 0.87 142.08%
2010 0.17 0.52 0.35 67% 0.44 134.83%
2011 0.16 0.42 0.26 62% 0.32 117.20%
2012 0.17 0.45 0.28 62% 0.35 120.38%
2013 0.15 0.35 0.20 57% 0.24 102.56%
Table A2.5: Inequality Indices GPs FTE Including Registrars and Retainers Practice Level Aggregation
Year Q1 Q5 ABS_GAP REL_GAP SII RII
2004 58.01 64.88 6.87 11% 8.63 14.26%
2005 59.00 66.08 7.08 11% 9.15 14.81%
2006 61.49 68.82 7.33 11% 10.06 15.46%
2007 61.79 66.29 4.50 7% 6.00 9.42%
2008 63.35 68.70 5.35 8% 6.48 9.86%
2009 66.29 71.61 5.32 7% 7.06 10.39%
2010 67.34 69.26 1.92 3% 2.69 4.02%
2011 66.78 69.66 2.88 4% 3.48 5.23%
2012 66.23 68.39 2.16 3% 2.82 4.24%
2013 66.00 67.21 1.21 2% 1.51 2.31%
 ALL GPs (Practice Level Aggregation)
 Registrars Only
 Retainers Only
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Table A2.6: Inequality Indices GPs FTE Excluding Registrars and Retainers Practice Level Aggregation
Year Q1 Q5 ABS_GAP REL_GAP SII RII
2004 53.94 57.67 3.73 6% 4.97 9.02%
2005 55.25 59.33 4.08 7% 5.58 9.86%
2006 57.81 62.83 5.02 8% 7.05 11.71%
2007 58.84 61.90 3.06 5% 4.53 7.56%
2008 58.72 61.04 2.32 4% 3.25 5.46%
2009 60.85 62.22 1.37 2% 2.56 4.21%
2010 61.89 59.93 -1.96 -3% -1.57 -2.62%
2011 61.79 59.84 -1.95 -3% -1.96 -3.30%
2012 60.35 59.25 -1.10 -2% -1.09 -1.86%
2013 60.99 60.28 -0.71 -1% -0.73 -1.23%
Table A2.7: Inequality Indices GPs FTE Excluding Registrars and Retainers CCG Level Aggregation
Year Q1 Q5 ABS_GAP REL_GAP SII (95% CI) RII  (95% CI)
2004 54.17 57.34 3.17 6% 4.63 (2.07 to 7.19) 0.08 (0.04 to 0.13)
2005 55.97 58.81 2.84 5% 4.82 (1.66 to 7.98) 0.08 (0.03 to 0.14)
2006 58.16 62.72 4.56 7% 6.49 (3.79 to 9.18) 0.11 (0.06 to 0.15)
2007 59.00 61.88 2.88 5% 4.37 (2.17 to 6.58) 0.07 (0.04 to 0.11)
2008 58.88 61.12 2.24 4% 3.11 (0.53 to 5.70) 0.05 (0.01 to 0.10)
2009 60.49 62.87 2.38 4% 3.06 (-0.62 to 6.75) 0.05 (-0.01 to 0.11)
2010 61.22 60.69 -0.53 -1% -0.35 (-4.55 to 3.86) -0.01 (-0.08 to 0.06)
2011 60.80 60.53 -0.27 0% -0.40 (-4.81 to 4.01) -0.01 (-0.08 to 0.07)
2012 59.29 59.37 0.08 0% -0.18 (-4.40 to 4.04) 0.00 (-0.07 to 0.07)
2013 60.21 59.98 -0.23 0% -0.32 (-5.61 to 4.98) -0.01 (-0.09 to 0.08)
Table A2.8: Carr-Hill Adjustment Relative Need Gap Compared to Most Affluent Fifth
YEAR Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4
2004 8.47% 5.86% 5.05% 3.36%
2005 8.14% 5.56% 4.86% 3.27%
2006 7.83% 5.34% 4.73% 3.20%
2007 7.51% 5.09% 4.59% 3.16%
2008 7.13% 4.81% 4.43% 3.13%
2009 6.66% 4.46% 4.24% 3.07%
2010 6.13% 4.10% 4.04% 2.99%
2011 5.58% 3.69% 3.83% 2.90%
2012 4.23% 2.88% 3.29% 2.73%
2013 3.75% 2.54% 3.11% 2.67%
Excluding Registrars and Retainers
Relative Need Gap Compared to Q5
 Excluding Registrars and Retainers (Practice Level Aggregation)
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Appendix Section 4
Figure A4.1: Trend in FTE GP supply over time excluding registrars and retainers
Figure A4.2: FTE GP supply in 2006/07 and 2011/12 excluding registrars and retainers
Figure A4.3: Trend in total headcount and FTE GP supply over time excluding registrars and retainers
Results calculated by attributing GP supply to LSOAs and aggregating based on fifths of LSOAs ranked by IMD score - GP registrars and 
retainers excluded from the calculation - these are the basecase results used in the paper
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Figure A4.4: Trend in unadjusted and adjusted headcount and FTE GP supply over time excluding registrars and retainers
Regression A4.1: Test for difference in slope index of inequality between 2006/07 and 2011/12
Call:
lm(formula = FTE_PER100K_ADJ ~ YEAR * IMD_DECILE, data = subset(deciles, 
    YEAR %in% c("2006", "2011")))
Residuals:
     Min       1Q   Median       3Q      Max 
-1.27994 -0.31105  0.01673  0.26021  1.44945 
Coefficients:
                    Estimate Std. Error t value Pr(>|t|)    
(Intercept)          57.3527     0.5315 107.910  < 2e-16 ***
YEAR2011              3.0080     0.7516   4.002  0.00103 ** 
IMD_DECILE            5.2152     0.8566   6.088 1.57e-05 ***
YEAR2011:IMD_DECILE  -7.3164     1.2114  -6.040 1.72e-05 ***
---
Signif. codes:  0 '***' 0.001 '**' 0.01 '*' 0.05 '.' 0.1 ' ' 1
Residual standard error: 0.778 on 16 degrees of freedom
Multiple R-squared:  0.7634,Adjusted R-squared:  0.719 
F-statistic:  17.2 on 3 and 16 DF,  p-value: 2.917e-05
Figure A4.5: Distribution of change in FTE GP supply in PCTs between 2006/07 and 2011/12 by underdoctored status excluding registrars and retainers
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Figure A4.6: Distribution of GP Supply and Practices Nurses in 2013/14
Figure A4.7: Distribution of GP Supply and Practices Nurses in 2013/14 (zeroed scale)
Figure A4.8: GP FTE per 100,000 at LSOA level in 2006/07 and 2011/12
Figure A4.9: Change in GP FTE per 100,000 at LSOA level between 2006/07 and 2011/12
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Figure A4.10: GP FTE by IMD Decile
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Appendix Section 5
Figure A5.1: Trend in FTE GP supply over time including registrars and retainers
Figure A5.2: FTE GP supply in 2006/07 and 2011/12 including registrars and retainers
Figure A5.3: Trend in total headcount and FTE GP supply over time including registrars and retainers
Results calculated by attributing GP supply to LSOAs and aggregating based on fifths of LSOAs ranked by IMD score - all GPs including 
registrars and retainers used in the calculations 
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Figure A5.4: Trend in unadjusted and adjusted headcount and FTE GP supply over time including registrars and retainers
Regression A5.1: Test for difference in slope index of inequality between 2006/07 and 2011/12
Call:
lm(formula = FTE_PER100K_ADJ ~ YEAR * IMD_DECILE, data = subset(deciles, 
    YEAR %in% c("2006", "2011")))
Residuals:
     Min       1Q   Median       3Q      Max 
-1.16200 -0.40845 -0.07703  0.42570  1.49800 
Coefficients:
                    Estimate Std. Error t value Pr(>|t|)    
(Intercept)          60.9533     0.5718 106.607  < 2e-16 ***
YEAR2011              4.7587     0.8086   5.885 2.30e-05 ***
IMD_DECILE            7.4012     0.9215   8.032 5.27e-07 ***
YEAR2011:IMD_DECILE  -5.7412     1.3031  -4.406 0.000442 ***
---
Signif. codes:  0 '***' 0.001 '**' 0.01 '*' 0.05 '.' 0.1 ' ' 1
Residual standard error: 0.837 on 16 degrees of freedom
Multiple R-squared:  0.8432,Adjusted R-squared:  0.8138 
F-statistic: 28.68 on 3 and 16 DF,  p-value: 1.131e-06
Figure A5.5: Distribution of change in FTE GP supply in PCTs between 2006/07 and 2011/12 by underdoctored status including registrars and retainers
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Figure A6.1: Trend in FTE GP supply over time registrars only
Figure A6.2: FTE GP supply in 2006/07 and 2011/12 registrars only
Results calculated by attributing GP supply to LSOAs and aggregating based on fifths of LSOAs ranked by IMD score - only looking at GP 
registrars
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Figure A6.3: Trend in total headcount and FTE GP supply over time registrars only
Figure A6.4: Trend in unadjusted and adjusted headcount and FTE GP supply over time registrars only
Regression A6.1: Test for difference in slope index of inequality between 2006/07 and 2011/12
Call:
lm(formula = FTE_PER100K_ADJ ~ YEAR * IMD_DECILE, data = subset(deciles, 
    YEAR %in% c("2006", "2011")))
Residuals:
     Min       1Q   Median       3Q      Max 
-0.21273 -0.06820 -0.01009  0.07977  0.16139 
Coefficients:
                    Estimate Std. Error t value Pr(>|t|)    
(Intercept)          3.47800    0.07755   44.85  < 2e-16 ***
YEAR2011             1.78467    0.10967   16.27 2.24e-11 ***
IMD_DECILE           1.46182    0.12498   11.70 2.98e-09 ***
YEAR2011:IMD_DECILE  1.96788    0.17674   11.13 6.04e-09 ***
---
Signif. codes:  0 '***' 0.001 '**' 0.01 '*' 0.05 '.' 0.1 ' ' 1
Residual standard error: 0.1135 on 16 degrees of freedom
Multiple R-squared:  0.9961,Adjusted R-squared:  0.9954 
F-statistic:  1360 on 3 and 16 DF,  p-value: < 2.2e-16
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Figure A7.1: Trend in FTE GP supply over time retainers only
Figure A7.2: FTE GP supply in 2006/07 and 2011/12 retainers only
Results calculated by attributing GP supply to LSOAs and aggregating based on fifths of LSOAs ranked by IMD score - only looking at GP 
retainers
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Figure A7.3: Trend in total headcount and FTE GP supply over time retainers only
Figure A7.4: Trend in unadjusted and adjusted headcount and FTE GP supply over time retainers only
Regression A7.1: Test for difference in slope index of inequality between 2006/07 and 2011/12
Call:
lm(formula = FTE_PER100K_ADJ ~ YEAR * IMD_DECILE, data = subset(deciles, 
    YEAR %in% c("2006", "2011")))
Residuals:
      Min        1Q    Median        3Q       Max 
-0.049273 -0.022864 -0.010758  0.008636  0.121818 
Coefficients:
                    Estimate Std. Error t value Pr(>|t|)    
(Intercept)          0.11667    0.03033   3.847  0.00143 ** 
YEAR2011            -0.02000    0.04289  -0.466  0.64730    
IMD_DECILE           0.73152    0.04888  14.965 7.91e-11 ***
YEAR2011:IMD_DECILE -0.41273    0.06913  -5.970 1.96e-05 ***
---
Signif. codes:  0 '***' 0.001 '**' 0.01 '*' 0.05 '.' 0.1 ' ' 1
Residual standard error: 0.0444 on 16 degrees of freedom
Multiple R-squared:  0.9634,Adjusted R-squared:  0.9565 
F-statistic: 140.4 on 3 and 16 DF,  p-value: 1.056e-11
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Figure A8.1: Trend in FTE GP supply over time excluding registrars and retainers practice level aggregation
Figure A8.2: FTE GP supply in 2006/07 and 2011/12 excluding registrars and retainers practice level aggregation
Figure A8.3: Trend in total headcount and FTE GP supply over time excluding registrars and retainers practice level aggregation
Results calculated by attributing IMD scores to practices excluding registrars and retainers and aggregating based on fifths of 
population weighted practices ranked by IMD score
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Figure A8.4: Trend in unadjusted and adjusted headcount and FTE GP supply over time excluding registrars and retainers practice level aggregation
Regression A8.1: Test for difference in slope index of inequality between 2006/07 and 2011/12
Call:
lm(formula = FTE_PER100K_ADJ ~ YEAR * IMD_DECILE, data = subset(deciles, 
    YEAR %in% c("2006", "2011")))
Residuals:
    Min      1Q  Median      3Q     Max 
-2.6158 -0.6283 -0.2555  0.8089  3.3422 
Coefficients:
                    Estimate Std. Error t value Pr(>|t|)    
(Intercept)           56.349      0.992  56.803  < 2e-16 ***
YEAR2011               3.934      1.403   2.804 0.012732 *  
IMD_DECILE             7.054      1.599   4.412 0.000436 ***
YEAR2011:IMD_DECILE   -9.009      2.261  -3.985 0.001066 ** 
---
Signif. codes:  0 '***' 0.001 '**' 0.01 '*' 0.05 '.' 0.1 ' ' 1
Residual standard error: 1.452 on 16 degrees of freedom
Multiple R-squared:  0.5943,Adjusted R-squared:  0.5182 
F-statistic: 7.811 on 3 and 16 DF,  p-value: 0.00196
Figure A8.5 Numbers of LSOA per GP Practice over Time
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Figure A8.6 Numbers of FTE GPs per Practice over Time
99
Appendix Section 9
Figure A9.1: Trend in FTE GP supply over time including registrars and retainers practice level aggregation
Figure A9.2: FTE GP supply in 2006/07 and 2011/12 including registrars and retainers practice level aggregation
Figure A9.3: Trend in total headcount and FTE GP supply over time including registrars and retainers practice level aggregation
Results calculated by attributing IMD scores to practices and aggregating based on fifths of population weighted practices ranked by IMD 
score - all GPs including registrars and retainers included in the calculation
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Figure A9.4: Trend in unadjusted and adjusted headcount and FTE GP supply over time including registrars and retainers practice level aggregation
Regression A9.1: Test for difference in slope index of inequality between 2006/07 and 2011/12
Call:
lm(formula = FTE_PER100K_ADJ ~ YEAR * IMD_DECILE, data = subset(deciles, 
    YEAR %in% c("2006", "2011")))
Residuals:
    Min      1Q  Median      3Q     Max 
-2.9198 -0.8870 -0.2299  1.1036  3.7836 
Coefficients:
                    Estimate Std. Error t value Pr(>|t|)    
(Intercept)           59.508      1.127  52.782  < 2e-16 ***
YEAR2011               5.210      1.594   3.268  0.00484 ** 
IMD_DECILE            10.056      1.817   5.535 4.53e-05 ***
YEAR2011:IMD_DECILE   -6.573      2.570  -2.558  0.02107 *  
---
Signif. codes:  0 '***' 0.001 '**' 0.01 '*' 0.05 '.' 0.1 ' ' 1
Residual standard error: 1.65 on 16 degrees of freedom
Multiple R-squared:  0.709,Adjusted R-squared:  0.6544 
F-statistic: 12.99 on 3 and 16 DF,  p-value: 0.0001479
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Figure A10.1: Trend in FTE GP supply over time excluding registrars and retainers
Figure A10.2: FTE GP supply in 2006/07 and 2011/12 excluding registrars and retainers
Results calculated by attributing GP supply to LSOAs and aggregating based on fifths of LSOAs ranked by IMD score - GP registrars and 
retainers excluded from the calculation - results for London
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Figure A10.3: Trend in total headcount and FTE GP supply over time excluding registrars and retainers
Figure A10.4: Trend in unadjusted and adjusted headcount and FTE GP supply over time excluding registrars and retainers
Regression A10.1: Test for difference in slope index of inequality between 2006/07 and 2011/12
Call:
lm(formula = FTE_PER100K_ADJ ~ YEAR * IMD_DECILE, data = subset(deciles, 
    YEAR %in% c("2006", "2011")))
Residuals:
    Min      1Q  Median      3Q     Max 
-2.4398 -1.1211 -0.2092  1.3358  3.4882 
Coefficients:
                    Estimate Std. Error t value Pr(>|t|)    
(Intercept)           63.687      1.257  50.664  < 2e-16 ***
YEAR2011               5.789      1.778   3.257  0.00495 ** 
IMD_DECILE            -1.215      2.026  -0.600  0.55704    
YEAR2011:IMD_DECILE   -9.830      2.865  -3.431  0.00343 ** 
---
Signif. codes:  0 '***' 0.001 '**' 0.01 '*' 0.05 '.' 0.1 ' ' 1
Residual standard error: 1.84 on 16 degrees of freedom
Multiple R-squared:  0.6544,Adjusted R-squared:  0.5896 
F-statistic:  10.1 on 3 and 16 DF,  p-value: 0.0005652
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Figure A11.1: Trend in FTE GP supply over time excluding registrars and retainers
Figure A11.2: FTE GP supply in 2006/07 and 2011/12 excluding registrars and retainers
Results calculated by attributing GP supply to LSOAs and aggregating based on fifths of LSOAs ranked by IMD score - GP registrars and 
retainers excluded from the calculation - results for North of England
104
Figure A11.3: Trend in total headcount and FTE GP supply over time excluding registrars and retainers
Figure A11.4: Trend in unadjusted and adjusted headcount and FTE GP supply over time excluding registrars and retainers
Regression A11.1: Test for difference in slope index of inequality between 2006/07 and 2011/12
Call:
lm(formula = FTE_PER100K_ADJ ~ YEAR * IMD_DECILE, data = subset(deciles, 
    YEAR %in% c("2006", "2011")))
Residuals:
     Min       1Q   Median       3Q      Max 
-1.38648 -0.67520 -0.01955  0.44667  2.18964 
Coefficients:
                    Estimate Std. Error t value Pr(>|t|)    
(Intercept)          55.5367     0.6595  84.211  < 2e-16 ***
YEAR2011              3.1447     0.9327   3.372 0.003885 ** 
IMD_DECILE            5.8152     1.0629   5.471 5.13e-05 ***
YEAR2011:IMD_DECILE  -7.6248     1.5031  -5.073 0.000113 ***
---
Signif. codes:  0 '***' 0.001 '**' 0.01 '*' 0.05 '.' 0.1 ' ' 1
Residual standard error: 0.9654 on 16 degrees of freedom
Multiple R-squared:  0.7077,Adjusted R-squared:  0.6529 
F-statistic: 12.91 on 3 and 16 DF,  p-value: 0.0001531
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Figure A12.1: Trend in FTE GP supply over time excluding registrars and retainers
Figure A12.2: FTE GP supply in 2006/07 and 2011/12 excluding registrars and retainers
Results calculated by attributing GP supply to LSOAs and aggregating based on fifths of LSOAs ranked by IMD score - GP registrars and 
retainers excluded from the calculation - results for Midlands and East of England
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Figure A12.3: Trend in total headcount and FTE GP supply over time excluding registrars and retainers
Figure A12.4: Trend in unadjusted and adjusted headcount and FTE GP supply over time excluding registrars and retainers
Regression A12.1: Test for difference in slope index of inequality between 2006/07 and 2011/12
Call:
lm(formula = FTE_PER100K_ADJ ~ YEAR * IMD_DECILE, data = subset(deciles, 
    YEAR %in% c("2006", "2011")))
Residuals:
    Min      1Q  Median      3Q     Max 
-1.2693 -0.5681 -0.2970  0.3750  2.8982 
Coefficients:
                    Estimate Std. Error t value Pr(>|t|)    
(Intercept)          52.9693     0.7386  71.718  < 2e-16 ***
YEAR2011              2.9867     1.0445   2.859 0.011358 *  
IMD_DECILE            9.0067     1.1903   7.567 1.13e-06 ***
YEAR2011:IMD_DECILE  -6.9485     1.6834  -4.128 0.000789 ***
---
Signif. codes:  0 '***' 0.001 '**' 0.01 '*' 0.05 '.' 0.1 ' ' 1
Residual standard error: 1.081 on 16 degrees of freedom
Multiple R-squared:  0.798,Adjusted R-squared:  0.7602 
F-statistic: 21.07 on 3 and 16 DF,  p-value: 8.368e-06
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Figure A13.1: Trend in FTE GP supply over time excluding registrars and retainers
Figure A13.2: FTE GP supply in 2006/07 and 2011/12 excluding registrars and retainers
Results calculated by attributing GP supply to LSOAs and aggregating based on fifths of LSOAs ranked by IMD score - GP registrars and 
retainers excluded from the calculation - results for South of England
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Figure A13.3: Trend in total headcount and FTE GP supply over time excluding registrars and retainers
Figure A13.4: Trend in unadjusted and adjusted headcount and FTE GP supply over time excluding registrars and retainers
Regression A13.1: Test for difference in slope index of inequality between 2006/07 and 2011/12
Call:
lm(formula = FTE_PER100K_ADJ ~ YEAR * IMD_DECILE, data = subset(deciles, 
    YEAR %in% c("2006", "2011")))
Residuals:
     Min       1Q   Median       3Q      Max 
-1.38576 -0.55121  0.08591  0.48395  1.16764 
Coefficients:
                    Estimate Std. Error t value Pr(>|t|)    
(Intercept)          61.0387     0.5336 114.399  < 2e-16 ***
YEAR2011             -0.2180     0.7546  -0.289  0.77636    
IMD_DECILE            3.1170     0.8599   3.625  0.00228 ** 
YEAR2011:IMD_DECILE  -4.0000     1.2161  -3.289  0.00462 ** 
---
Signif. codes:  0 '***' 0.001 '**' 0.01 '*' 0.05 '.' 0.1 ' ' 1
Residual standard error: 0.7811 on 16 degrees of freedom
Multiple R-squared:  0.7952,Adjusted R-squared:  0.7568 
F-statistic:  20.7 on 3 and 16 DF,  p-value: 9.354e-06
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Appendix Section 14
Figure A14.1: Trend in FTE GP supply over time excluding registrars and retainers
Figure A14.2: Trend in FTE nurse supply over time
Results calculated by attributing GP supply to PCTs and aggregating based on population weighted fifths of PCTs ranked by IMD score - GP 
registrars and retainers excluded from the calculation
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Figure A14.3: Combined trend in FTE GP and nurse supply over time
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Appendix Section 15
Figure A15.1: Trend in FTE GP supply over time excluding registrars and retainers
Figure A15.2: FTE GP supply in 2006/07 and 2011/12 excluding registrars and retainers
Results calculated by attributing GP supply to CCGs and aggregating based on population weighted fifths of CCGs ranked by IMD score - GP 
registrars and retainers excluded from the calculation
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Figure A15.3: Trend in total headcount and FTE GP supply over time excluding registrars and retainers
Figure A15.4: Trend in unadjusted and adjusted headcount and FTE GP supply over time excluding registrars and retainers
Regression A15.1: Test for difference in slope index of inequality between 2006/07 and 2011/12
Call:
lm(formula = FTE_PER100K_ADJ ~ YEAR * IMD_DECILE, data = subset(deciles, 
    YEAR %in% c("2006", "2011")))
Residuals:
    Min      1Q  Median      3Q     Max 
-3.9218 -0.9508  0.3906  1.1253  2.2385 
Coefficients:
                    Estimate Std. Error t value Pr(>|t|)    
(Intercept)           56.880      1.158  49.140  < 2e-16 ***
YEAR2011               2.683      1.637   1.639  0.12076    
IMD_DECILE             6.487      1.865   3.478  0.00311 ** 
YEAR2011:IMD_DECILE   -6.888      2.638  -2.611  0.01891 *  
---
Signif. codes:  0 '***' 0.001 '**' 0.01 '*' 0.05 '.' 0.1 ' ' 1
Residual standard error: 1.694 on 16 degrees of freedom
Multiple R-squared:  0.4714,Adjusted R-squared:  0.3723 
F-statistic: 4.757 on 3 and 16 DF,  p-value: 0.0148
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Appendix Section 16
Figure A16.1: Trend in GP practices opening
Figure A16.2: Trend in GP FTE due to GP practices opening
Results calculated looking at opening and closing GP practices and their impact on GP FTE numbersby IMD score - GP registrars and retainers 
excluded from the calculation
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Figure A16.3: Trend in GP practices closing
Figure A16.4: Trend in GP FTE due to GP practices closing
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Figure A16.5: Trend in net change in GP practices
Figure A16.6: Trend in net change in GP FTE due to net change in practices
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Appendix Section 17
Table A17.1: Carr-Hill Need Adjustment Workload Weights 
We were unable to get data on duration of registration with practice so this part of the calculation is ommited from our results
The formula was applied at LSOA level populations and adjusted populations were re-normalised to sum to the pre-adjusted total 
The IMD Health Domain score ranges from -3.10 to 3.79 corresponding to pre-normalisation deprivation adustment weights of 0.85 and 1.22.
The biggest increase in LSOA population due to adjustment over the period of analysis was 165% and the smallest increase was 8%
After normalisation these changes reduced to an increase of 50% and a decrease of 38% respectively
Figure A17.1: Trend in Carr-Hill Relative Need Index Over Time - LSOA level IMD Quintile Aggregation
Exploring the impact of need adjustment over time for the deprivation quintiles
Source: Review of the Generla Medical Services global sum formula (2007) - Table 1 - 
http://www.nhsemployers.org/~/media/Employers/Documents/Primary%20care%20contracts/GMS/GMS%20Finance/Global%20Sum/frg_rep
ort_final_cd_090207.pdf
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Figure A17.2: Comparing Carr-Hill and Nuffield PBRA Relative Need Index 2013/14 - Practice Level IMD Quintile Aggregation
Figure A17.3: Impact of Carr-Hill and Nuffield PBRA Need Adjustment on GP FTE Excluding Registrars and Retianers 2013/14
Source: Nuffield Person Based Resource Allocation - Technical Guide to Clinical Commissioning Group and Area Team 
allocations 2014-15 and 2015-16: http://www.england.nhs.uk/2014/03/27/allocations-tech-guide/ speadsheet: 
http://www.england.nhs.uk/wp-content/uploads/2014/03/c-nph-gen-acute.xlsx 
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ABSTRACT
Background Provision of universal coverage is
essential for achieving equity in healthcare, but
inequalities still exist in universal healthcare systems.
Between 2004/2005 and 2011/2012, the National
Health Service (NHS) in England, which has provided
universal coverage since 1948, made sustained efforts to
reduce health inequalities by strengthening primary care.
We provide the ﬁrst comprehensive assessment of trends
in socioeconomic inequalities of primary care access,
quality and outcomes during this period.
Methods Whole-population small area longitudinal
study based on 32 482 neighbourhoods of
approximately 1500 people in England from 2004/2005
to 2011/2012. We measured slope indices of inequality
in four indicators: (1) patients per family doctor, (2)
primary care quality, (3) preventable emergency hospital
admissions and (4) mortality from conditions considered
amenable to healthcare.
Results Between 2004/2005 and 2011/2012, there
were larger absolute improvements on all indicators in
more-deprived neighbourhoods. The modelled gap
between the most-deprived and least-deprived
neighbourhoods in England decreased by: 193 patients
per family doctor (95% CI 173 to 213), 3.29 percentage
points of primary care quality (3.13 to 3.45), 0.42
preventable hospitalisations per 1000 people (0.29 to
0.55) and 0.23 amenable deaths per 1000 people (0.15
to 0.31). By 2011/2012, inequalities in primary care
supply and quality were almost eliminated, but
socioeconomic inequality was still associated with
158 396 preventable hospitalisations and 37 983 deaths
amenable to healthcare.
Conclusions Between 2004/2005 and 2011/2012, the
NHS succeeded in substantially reducing socioeconomic
inequalities in primary care access and quality, but made
only modest reductions in healthcare outcome
inequalities.
INTRODUCTION
Equity is widely accepted by the medical profes-
sions as a fundamental element of quality,1 2 and
providing equitable care is a priority for most
national healthcare systems.3 Provision of universal
coverage is a necessary, but not sufﬁcient, require-
ment for achieving this goal. In the USA, the
Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act aims to
provide near-universal access to healthcare coverage
and to improve quality and value.4 Recent state-
level expansions of healthcare coverage have
improved access to care for disadvantaged
populations,5 and have been associated with
improvements in mortality for causes amenable to
healthcare.6 However, failure to address inequal-
ities in care within the covered population will
ultimately undermine wider programmes to
improve quality of care and patient outcomes.7
In the UK, the National Health Service (NHS)
has provided universal, comprehensive healthcare
free at the point of delivery since 1948. Despite
this, there are clear inequities in healthcare in the
UK, and poorer access and worse patient outcomes
remain strongly associated with social disadvan-
tage.8 9 Recognising this, in 2003 the UK
Government made reducing health inequality a pri-
ority for the NHS in England, as part of a cross-
governmental strategy with explicit national targets
for reducing health inequality by 201010—the
world’s ﬁrst national strategy of this kind.11
Strengthening primary care was central to these
efforts, which included: (1) major investments in
primary care supply and quality from 2004, includ-
ing the world’s largest primary care
pay-for-performance programme12; (2) targeted
investment in primary care supply in under-
doctored areas of the country from 200813 and (3)
national guidance and support for effective primary
care interventions for chronic conditions in disad-
vantaged adults from 2007 to 2009.14
It is not known how far the NHS contributed to
reducing health inequalities during this key period
because socioeconomic inequalities in primary care
access, quality and outcomes have not been rou-
tinely monitored.15 This hampers efforts to improve
equity, since what is not measured may be margina-
lised.16 National health inequality targets intro-
duced in the 2000s were limited from a healthcare
quality perspective as they are related to local gov-
ernment areas, thus masking important inequalities
within these areas. They also focused on life expect-
ancy and infant mortality, over which healthcare
providers have little direct control since they are
strongly inﬂuenced by social and economic factors
(eg, living and working conditions), and related life-
style behaviours (eg, smoking, diet and exercise).
In this paper, we address these weaknesses by
constructing a suite of four key summary measures
relating to trends in socioeconomic inequality in
healthcare access, quality and outcomes for which
the healthcare system can plausibly be held to
account. We present data describing trends in abso-
lute as well as relative inequality in these indicators
at small area level, and provide the ﬁrst comprehen-
sive assessment of trends in healthcare equity
Open Access
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performance during a key period of sustained effort by a
national healthcare system to reduce socioeconomic inequalities
in primary care access, quality and outcomes.
METHODS
Data sources
We extracted health data from four national administrative data-
bases for ﬁnancial years 2004/2005 to 2011/2012: (1) the
annual NHS General and Personal Medical Services workforce
census (physician supply); (2) the Quality and Outcomes
Framework (QOF)—the national primary care
pay-for-performance programme (primary care quality); (3) hos-
pital episode statistics (hospital admissions) and (4) the Ofﬁce
for National Statistics (mortality). Data on physician supply and
primary care quality were attributed from practice level to small
area level using the NHS Attribution Data Set of GP-registered
populations. Data on hospital activity and mortality were aggre-
gated to small area level from individual level.
The basic geographical unit of analysis was the 2001 ‘lower
super output area’ (LSOA). There are 32 482 of these small area
neighbourhoods, covering approximately 1500 people each
(minimum 1000 and maximum 3000). We measured the popula-
tion size of each neighbourhood by age–sex group using
mid-year population estimates from the Ofﬁce for National
Statistics (ONS) for years 2004–2011. We measured the socio-
economic status of each neighbourhood using the index of mul-
tiple deprivation (IMD 2010).
Indicators
We aimed to provide a comprehensive assessment of socio-
economic inequalities of primary care access, quality and out-
comes for which the NHS can be held accountable in its efforts to
tackle health inequality. The indicator selection process included:
reviewing existing indicators used by the NHS to monitor health-
care performance; consulting with health indicator experts about
technical feasibility, and with clinical and policy experts about clin-
ical and policy relevance; and a small-scale public consultation
exercise. Four key indicators were selected:
1. Primary care supply
We deﬁned primary care supply as patients per full-time
equivalent (FTE) general practitioner (GP), excluding registrars
and retainers. In line with previous studies, we focused on FTE
GP principals and salaried GPs, who make up the vast majority
of the workforce.17 Neighbourhood populations were adjusted
for their relative needs for primary care using the workload
adjustment aspect of the Carr-Hill formula for primary care
resource allocation.18 This adjustment takes into consideration
the age and sex structure and IMD 2010 ‘health deprivation
and disability’ score of each LSOA.
2. Primary care quality
We deﬁned primary care quality using a modiﬁed version of
the QOF-based public health impact score proposed by
Ashworth et al.19 Our indicator is a score between 0 and 100
calculated as a weighted average of clinical process quality from
16 QOF indicators that were collected on a consistent basis
throughout our study period. Each of these QOF indicators
measures the percentage of the relevant patient population
achieving a particular clinical quality target. Weights used to
combine these indicators into an overall score were proportional
to their relative importance in terms of the estimated mortality
reduction impact associated with improvement on the indicator.
We measured practice-reported performance, which excludes
patients reported as ‘exceptions’ (and therefore considered not
to be appropriate for the quality targets).20 In sensitivity analysis
we included exception reported patients (see online
supplementary appendix 3 for details).
3. Preventable hospitalisation
We deﬁned preventable hospitalisation as the proportion of
people with an emergency admission for a chronic ambulatory care
sensitive condition—admissions that are potentially avoidable if
these chronic conditions are appropriately managed in primary care
—examples of such hospital admissions are those associated with
asthma and diabetes.21 We focused on chronic rather than acute
ambulatory care sensitive conditions, as the former are likely to be
more sensitive to changes in primary care supply and quality. We
used the same list of chronic ambulatory care sensitive conditions as
the NHS Outcomes Framework (Indicator 2.3i).22 We indirectly
standardised each year of data for age and sex at LSOA level.
4. Amenable mortality
We deﬁned amenable mortality as the proportion of people
dying from causes considered amenable to healthcare. We used
the list of causes of death and age ranges where deaths from
these causes are considered amenable to healthcare from the
NHS Outcomes Framework (Indicator 1.1).23 As with prevent-
able hospitalisation, we indirectly standardised amenable mortal-
ity for age and sex at LSOA level.
The two healthcare outcome indicators are widely used, inter-
nationally, to monitor the performance of whole healthcare
systems, and are particularly useful for monitoring the perform-
ance of primary care and the coordination of care between
primary and secondary services.24 25 Full details of the indicator
deﬁnitions and the standardisation processes are provided in
online supplementary appendices 1 and 2, respectively.
Analysis
Our primary measures of inequality were the slope index of
inequality (SII) and relative index of inequality (RII), based on
linear regression analysis at LSOA level. Each indicator was
modelled as a linear function of LSOA level deprivation,
entered as a continuous variable scaled from 0 to 1. The SII is
the coefﬁcient in this regression; the RII is that coefﬁcient
divided by the mean. The SII can be interpreted as the modelled
absolute gap between the most and least-deprived small area,
allowing for the whole socioeconomic gradient; the RII can be
interpreted as the proportionate gap relative to the average.
Alongside these quantitative measures we also visualised the
relationship between deprivation and inequality graphically to
aid in the understanding and interpretation of these measures.
We also computed the ‘inequity gap’, based on a counterfac-
tual situation of full equality in which all neighbourhoods do as
well as the least-deprived neighbourhood in terms of modelled
achievement on the indicator. For primary care supply, the
‘inequity gap’ is calculated as the number of additional physi-
cians required to achieve full equality. For primary care quality,
it is the average deﬁcit in quality attributable to socioeconomic
inequality. For rates of preventable hospitalisation and amenable
mortality it is the number of avoidable hospitalisations and
deaths attributable to socioeconomic inequality.
Linear regression models were computed using pooled data
for the ﬁrst and last years, including interaction terms between
year and deprivation to determine the magnitude of—and test
for the statistical signiﬁcance of—changes in inequality between
the beginning and end of the analysis period.
RESULTS
Inequalities in 2004/2005
There were clear and substantial socioeconomic gradients in all
four indicators in 2004/2005 (ﬁgure 1), with less favourable
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Figure 1 Scatter plots of indicators in 2004/2005 and 2011/2012. The black dots show deprivation decile groups of neighbourhoods
(approximately 3200 neighbourhoods per dot); the solid black line shows a linear regression through all 32 482 neighbourhoods; the shaded area
shows the inequality gap; and the dashed red line shows the national average level for the indicator. *Inverted axis on primary care quality to ease
comparisons with other indicators, where decreasing implies improvement (GP, general practitioner).
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primary care provision and health outcomes in more-deprived
areas. For primary care supply, there were fewer GPs relative to
measured need (and therefore, more patients per GP) in
deprived neighbourhoods than in less-deprived neighbourhoods.
This socioeconomic inequality was associated with a deﬁcit of
1008 GPs (924 to 1093) nationally (table 1). In other words,
equalising GP provision in all neighbourhoods to the modelled
level of GP provision in the least-deprived neighbourhood
would require an additional 1008 GPs in relatively deprived
neighbourhoods. Socioeconomic inequality was also associated
with a deﬁcit of 1.86 percentage points (1.79 to 1.94) in
primary care quality, 160 397 (158 090 to 162 703) preventable
hospitalisations, and 41 433 (39 899 to 42 966) amenable
deaths.
Changes in inequality between 2004/2005 and 2011/2012
All four indicators improved on average (ie, inequalities reduced)
between 2004/2005 and 2011/2012. Inequalities in primary care
supply and quality decreased substantially, to the extent of being
virtually eliminated by the end of the period, whereas changes in
the social gradient in preventable hospitalisation and amenable
mortality were less pronounced (ﬁgure 1). By 2011/2012, the
numbers of GPs had increased in all areas, with the greatest
increases in the most-deprived areas, leaving neighbourhoods in
the middle of the deprivation range with the fewest GPs per
patient. Socioeconomic inequality had been reduced to such an
extent that deprived neighbourhoods had slightly more GPs rela-
tive to need than less-deprived neighbourhoods, and socio-
economic inequality was associated with a surplus of 335 GPs
(233 to 436), that is, equalising GP provision in all neighbour-
hoods to the level of the least-deprived neighbourhood would
require losing 335 GPs from relatively deprived neighbourhoods.
By 2011/2012, socioeconomic inequality was also associated
with an average deﬁcit in primary care quality of 0.22 percent-
age points (0.18 to 0.26), 158 396 excess preventable hospitali-
sations (155 995 to 160 797), and 37 983 excess amenable
deaths (36 552 to 39 415). Looking more closely at the trends
in inequality in the indicators over the period (table 1 and
ﬁgure 2) there is a clear trend of decreasing inequality in both
absolute and relative terms for both primary care supply and
primary care quality. By contrast, preventable hospitalisation
and amenable mortality show a mixed pattern of decreasing
absolute inequality but increasing relative inequality.
DISCUSSION
Our study presents the ﬁrst comprehensive national picture of
how far the NHS in England succeeded in reducing socio-
economic inequalities in primary care supply, quality and out-
comes from 2004/2005 to 2011/2012. During this period,
primary care supply, quality and outcomes for the average
patient all improved. We ﬁnd that socioeconomic inequalities in
both primary care supply relative to need and primary care
quality decreased substantially in absolute and relative terms. By
the end of the period, inequality in primary care supply had
been eliminated, and inequality in primary care quality had
been nearly eliminated. By contrast, inequality trends in prevent-
able hospitalisation and amenable mortality were mixed,
showing decreasing absolute inequality but increasing relative
inequality. By 2011/2012, deprived neighbourhoods had slightly
better primary care supply than less-deprived neighbourhoods
(relative inequality –2%), and only slightly worse primary care
quality (relative inequality 1%). However, there remained large
inequalities in preventable hospitalisation (relative inequality
106%) and amenable mortality (relative inequality 57%).
Strengths and weaknesses of the study
We used data on the entire population of England, including
workload and quality data on virtually all primary care practices
in England, and outcomes data on virtually all individuals in
England. We used comprehensive indicators spanning the entire
range of activities of the healthcare system, and inequality mea-
sures based on the entire socioeconomic gradient across all
32 482 small areas of England. We examined inequality in abso-
lute and relative terms, because absolute and relative inequality
can change in opposite directions when the mean is changing
over time.26 One of our measures—the RII—can also be
Table 1 Socioeconomic healthcare inequalities in England, comparing 2004/2005 with 2011/2012
Indicator England mean (95% CI) RII (95% CI) SII (95% CI) Inequality gap (95% CI)
Primary care supply
2004 1814 (1814 to 1814) 0.09 (0.08 to 0.09) 156.1 (141.29 to 170.91) 1008 (924 to 1093)
2011 1689 (1689 to 1689) –0.02 (−0.03 to −0.01) –36.61 (−49.8 to −23.42) –335 (−436 to −233)
Change 2011–2004 –125 (−125 to −125) –0.11 (−0.12 to −0.1) –192.71 (−212.55 to −172.87) –1343 (−1473 to −1213)
Primary care quality
2004 76.91 (76.91 to 76.91) 0.05 (0.05 to 0.05) 3.73 (3.58 to 3.87) 1.86 (1.79 to 1.94)
2011 86.34 (86.34 to 86.34) 0.01 (0.00 to 0.01) 0.44 (0.37 to 0.51) 0.22 (0.18 to 0.26)
Change 2011–2004 9.44 (9.44 to 9.44) –0.04 (−0.05 to −0.04) –3.29 (−3.45 to −3.13) –1.64 (−1.72 to −1.56)
Preventable hospitalisation
2004 6.43 (6.43 to 6.44) 1.01 (0.99 to 1.02) 6.48 (6.39 to 6.58) 160 397 (158 090 to 162 703)
2011 5.73 (5.73 to 5.74) 1.06 (1.04 to 1.07) 6.07 (5.97 to 6.16) 158 396 (155 995 to 160 797)
Change 2011–2004 –0.7 (−0.71 to −0.69) 0.05 (0.03 to 0.07) –0.42 (−0.55 to −0.29) –2000 (−5270 to 1284)
Amenable mortality
2004 3.21 (3.21 to 3.22) 0.52 (0.5 to 0.54) 1.68 (1.62 to 1.74) 41 433 (39 899 to 42 966)
2011 2.53 (2.53 to 2.54) 0.57 (0.55 to 0.59) 1.45 (1.4 to 1.5) 37 983 (36 552 to 39 415)
Change 2011–2004 –0.68 (−0.69 to −0.67) 0.05 (0.02 to 0.08) –0.23 (−0.31 to −0.15) –3449 (−5516 to −1375)
The England means and the SII indices are measured in terms of patients per physician, average primary care quality, preventable hospitalisation per 1000, and amenable mortality per
1000. The RII indices are the SII indices as a proportion of the England means. The inequality gaps refer to the number of GPs required to eliminate inequality, the average quality loss
attributable to inequality, the total excess hospitalisations attributable to inequality, and the total excess mortality attributable to inequality.
GP, general practitioners; RII, relative index of inequality; SII, slope index of inequality.
640 Asaria M, et al. J Epidemiol Community Health 2016;70:637–643. doi:10.1136/jech-2015-206742
Health inequalities
124
compared between indicators measured on different scales to
help assess the relative magnitude of different kinds of inequality.
However, our study does not include data on privately
funded healthcare, which accounts for approximately 15% of
total health expenditure in the UK.27 We also lack detailed
national data on changing patterns of multimorbidity at small
area level. One consequence is that our study may underestimate
additional needs for primary care in deprived neighbourhoods,
which are likely to suffer from a greater burden of multimorbid-
ity.28 We also cannot assess how far observed trends in prevent-
able hospitalisation and amenable mortality are due to trends in
multimorbidity outside the control of the NHS. Another limita-
tion is that the administrative health data sets do not contain
information on individual socioeconomic characteristics. We
therefore used the IMD, which assumes that individuals gener-
ally conform to the socioeconomic proﬁle of their residential
neighbourhood. Finally, our measure of primary care quality is
based on indicators drawn from the UK primary care
pay-for-performance scheme, which only captures part of clin-
ical practice.29 Under this scheme, improvements in quality
were most rapid in practices with low baseline performance,
and these practices were concentrated in more-deprived areas.30
It is possible that aspects of primary care quality that were not
ﬁnancially incentivised and monitored did not follow the same
pattern, and inequalities in these may have persisted or even
widened.
Figure 2 Inequality trends from 2004/2005 to 2011/2012. *Inverted axis on primary care quality to ease comparisons with other indicators, where
decreasing implies improvement (GP, general practitioner; IMD, index of multiple deprivation).
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Findings
The NHS succeeded in reducing inequality in primary care
supply and quality from 2004/2005 to 2011/2012, eliminating
the inequity in primary care supply and almost eliminating the
inequity in primary care quality. These changes can partly be
attributed to the substantial investments in primary care in the
mid-2000s to late 2000s, including the QOF
pay-for-performance programme from 2004/2005, and provi-
sion of additional funding for new GP practices in ‘under-
doctored’ areas of the country from 2006.13 31 However, the
NHS did not have comparable success in reducing socio-
economic inequalities in healthcare outcomes. Although abso-
lute inequalities in healthcare outcomes decreased slightly from
2004/2005 to 2011/2012, relative inequalities increased, and
substantial inequalities remained in 2011/2012 in preventable
hospitalisation and amenable mortality. While not wholly unex-
pected,32 33 this is still perhaps disappointing, given that this
was a period of sustained large-scale expenditure growth in the
NHS in England,34 and that tackling health inequality was a
high priority for the NHS.35 It is possible that non-NHS factors
were acting to increase socioeconomic inequalities in healthcare
outcomes during this period—evidence suggests that socio-
economic inequalities increased between 2003 and 2008 for
smoking, poor diet, physical inactivity and other unhealthy
behaviours.36 It is also possible that changes in primary care
supply and quality have not yet been given sufﬁcient time to
substantially reduce inequalities in healthcare outcomes, or that
the national pay-for-performance programme overemphasised
management of existing chronic diseases over primary
prevention.
Comparison with other studies
One previous national study examined socioeconomic inequality
in preventable hospitalisation in England covering years 2001/
2002–2012/2013.37 This study ﬁnds similar trends to those we
observe, showing a gradual decrease in the rate of chronic
ambulatory care sensitive emergency admissions for the average
patient, and substantial and persistent socioeconomic inequal-
ities in ambulatory care sensitive emergency admissions over the
period. One previous national study examined socioeconomic
trends in amenable mortality38 in England from 2001/2002 to
2011/2012. However, this study was conducted at a large area
level (324 local authorities) which may potentially mask chan-
ging patterns of inequality within these large areas, and it
excluded mortality in people aged over 75 years. This study
found both average levels and absolute measures of inequality in
amenable mortality to have fallen over this period. Our ﬁner
grained analysis looking at much smaller areas (32 482 LSOAs)
and following the ONS deﬁnition of amenable mortality, hence
also including mortality for certain conditions such as HIV/
AIDS and injuries in those over 75 years of age, conﬁrms this
basic pattern, though revealing a widening of relative inequality
that was not apparent in the previous study. Furthermore, our
inclusion of this older section of the population results in a
higher overall rate of amenable mortality, and the more detailed
level of analysis we employ reveals wider socioeconomic
inequalities.
CONCLUSION
Reducing inequality in healthcare outcomes is more complex
and challenging than reducing inequality of access to health-
care.39 Socioeconomic inequalities in preventable hospitalisation
and amenable mortality are not only due to inequalities in the
supply of primary and hospital care. They are also attributable
to socioeconomic-related differences in, and complex interac-
tions between (1) multimorbidity; (2) patient behaviours includ-
ing healthcare seeking, self-care and lifestyle; (3) informal social
support networks; (4) social care supply and quality; (5)
primary care provider behaviour; (6) secondary care provider
behaviour and (7) the coordination of care between primary,
secondary and social care providers. Reducing socioeconomic
inequalities in healthcare outcomes is therefore likely to require
complex interventions to improve the coordination of care
between multiple actors within and outwith the healthcare
system. There is a growing body of evidence about effective
interventions to reduce preventable hospitalisation and amen-
able mortality, but little is known about how to reduce socio-
economic inequalities in these healthcare outcomes.40 41 It is
our hope that the indicators developed in this study can play a
role in helping to develop the evidence base for reducing
inequalities in healthcare outcomes through application to
equity monitoring at local, national and international levels.
What is already known on this subject
▸ There are socioeconomic inequalities in primary care access,
quality and outcomes even in high-income countries with
universal healthcare systems.
▸ Reducing these inequalities by strengthening primary care
was a key priority for the National Health Service (NHS) in
England from 2004/2005 to 2011/2012, as part of the
world’s ﬁrst cross-government strategy for reducing health
inequality.
▸ It is not known how far the NHS succeeded in addressing
this priority, since national trends in healthcare equity are
still not routinely monitored.
What this study adds
▸ This study presents the ﬁrst comprehensive assessment of
national trends in socioeconomic inequalities in primary care
access, quality and outcomes in England from 2004/2005 to
2011/2012.
▸ During this period, there were substantial reductions in
socioeconomic inequalities in primary care supply and quality,
but only modest reductions in preventable emergency
hospitalisation and mortality amenable to healthcare.
▸ We have developed a suite of indicators that could be used
in other countries to monitor the contribution of healthcare
services to tackling wider inequalities in community health.
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Appendix 1: Indicator Definitions 
Primary care supply 
Definition: 
Primary care supply is defined as the number of patients per full time equivalent GP, 
excluding registrars and retainers, adjusted for age, sex and neighbourhood ill-health using the 
Carr-Hill workload adjustment. This version of the formula was recommended in 2007 by the 
Formula Review Group established by NHS Employers and the BMA, and though never 
implemented in practice it remains the most authoritative and up-to-date analysis of the 
determinants of primary care workload in England. 
The numerator is the total number of people alive at mid-point in the current financial year. 
In practice, we use ONS mid-year estimates of population which is equal to the population 
during the middle of the calendar year. The denominator is the number of FTE GPs 
excluding registrars and retainers attributed to each small area in the current indicator year. 
Technical details: 
Our data on primary care supply at GP practice level were obtained from the annual National 
Health Service General and Personal Medical Services workforce census, taken at 30th 
September each year, midway through the financial year. In keeping with standard measures 
of the GP workforce we exclude GP registrars and GP retainers from our measure. 
We used this data to construct a whole-population national data set at small area (LSOA) level 
by using the NHS Attribution Data Set of GP-registered populations to attribute FTE GPs 
from GP practices to LSOAs. The attribution dataset details the LSOAs in which the patients 
registered with the practice live. We use this information to determine the proportion of the 
FTE GP workforce attached to the practice to attribute to each of the LSOAs that the 
patients registered with the practice live in. Applying this attribution calculation to each GP 
practice and then aggregating the GP supply attributed from the different practices at LSOA 
level gives us our measure of primary care supply at LSOA level. We linked practice level data 
on primary care supply for the ten years 2004/05 through 2011/12 with corresponding LSOA 
level data on population and deprivation. We use data from all 9,092 general practices in the 
English NHS that were open for at least one year of the study period.  
We then need-weighted the population for each small area for age, sex and IMD 2010 health 
domain using the Carr-Hill formula workload adjustment (updated 2007 version) to upscale 
populations that are expected to require more primary care and downscale populations 
expected to require less (Formula Review Group 2007; Hippisley-Cox et al 2006). The “Carr-
Hill” formula is used for distributing funding to GP practices. We do not adjust for 
temporary resident population, the fourth and final workload adjustment factor in the Carr-
Hill formula, as the HSCIC were unable to provide us with the patient level data necessary to 
make this adjustment. 
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 Primary care quality 
Definition: 
Primary care quality is a score between 0 and 100 defined as a weighted average of clinical 
process quality from 16 indicators in the national quality and outcomes framework (QOF). 
Each indicator measures the percentage of the relevant patient population for whom the 
quality target is achieved. The weights used to combine these indicators into a primary care 
quality score are proportional to importance of the individual indicators in terms of the 
estimated mortality reduction impact associated with improvement on the indicator. 
Technical details: 
GP practices record the number of patients with each condition who are listed in their 
practice registers. For each clinical indicator, the number of patients deemed appropriate for 
that indicator is the denominator and the number of patients for whom the indicator was met 
is the numerator. The reported achievement on the indicator is the percentage of relevant 
patients for whom the practice met the indicator quality target.  
We started with a group of 20 QOF indicators identified by Ashworth et al [3] based on 
available evidence on mortality reduction. We then selected 16 out of the 20 indicators for 
which data were available throughout our period of analysis in a consistent format. Each 
indicator was then weighted based on importance in terms of the estimated number of lives 
saved per 100,000 patients. These weights were derived from Ashworth et al [3] who 
identified the highest level of evidence for risk reduction in all-cause mortality and converted 
risk reduction estimates into estimated mortality reduction rates per 100,000 population per 
annum (see table A.1.1 for details). 
Numerators and denominators for the QOF indicators were attributed from GP practice to 
LSOA level in an identical manner to that used to attribute primary care supply as described 
above. The QOF indicators were then calculated at LSOA level and these were then 
combined using the weighting process described to give average performance in terms of 
primary care quality score at LSOA level. 
We did not need to standardise this indicator, since it is a nationally comparable performance 
measure that already allows for case mix and other characteristics of the GP practice 
population.  Factors such as the age, sex and disease prevalence of the GP practice population 
are not legitimate justifications for variation in GP performance on these measures. 
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 Table A.1.1: List of conditions in the Quality and Outcomes Framework (QOF) 
QOF 
indicator 
Summary description of 
indicator 
Crude prevalence 
per 100,000 
registered patients, 
mean (SD) 
Annual mortality 
reduction, per 
100,000 registered 
patients 
DM18 Diabetes: influenza 
vaccination 
4420 (1881) 63.7 
CHD12 CHD: influenza vaccination 3448 (1487) 61.6 
BP5a Hypertension: BP ≤150/90 
mmHg 
13 548 (5117) 48.2 
CHD10a CHD: beta-blocker treatment 3448 (1487) 45.9 
STROKE10 Stroke/TIA: influenza 
vaccination 
1649 (967) 28.1 
DM23a Diabetes: HbA1c ≤7.0% 4420 (1881) 26.5 
COPD8 COPD: influenza vaccination 1626 (958) 24.9 
CHD9a CHD: aspirin or other 
antithrombotic therapy 
3448 (1487) 24.8 
CHD8a CHD: cholesterol ≤5.0 
mmol/l 
3448 (1487) 15.8 
STROKE12a Stroke (non-haemorrhagic): 
aspirin or other 
antithrombotic therapy 
1080 (649) 15.8 
DM12 Diabetes: BP ≤145/85 
mmHg 
4420 (1881) 13.5 
CHD6a CHD: BP ≤150/90 mmHg 3448 (1487) 11.3 
SMOKING4 CHD, stroke/TIA, 
hypertension, DM, CKD, 
COPD, asthma, psychosis: 
smoking cessation advice 
3903 (2525) 10.9 
DM25 Diabetes: HbA1c ≤9.0% 4420 (1881) 7.4 
DM15a Diabetes with proteinuria or 
microalbuminuria: ACEI or 
ARB therapy 
505 (513) 3.4 
CHD11a CHD (myocardial infarction): 
ACEI or ARB therapy 
572 (291) 1.5 
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 Preventable hospitalisation 
Definition: 
Preventable hospitalisation is defined as the number of people per 1,000 population having 
one or more emergency hospitalisations for a chronic ambulatory care sensitive condition, 
adjusting for age and sex.  
The numerator is the number of people with emergency hospital admissions (both finished 
and unfinished admission episodes, excluding transfers) for specific long-term conditions which 
should not normally require hospitalisation. This is derived from the Hospital Episode 
Statistics (HES) Admitted Patient Care (APC), provided by the Health and Social Care 
Information Centre (HSCIC). 
The denominator is the total number of people alive at mid-point in the current financial year. 
The Office for National Statistics (ONS) mid-year England population estimates for the 
respective calendar years are used for this purpose. 
Technical details: 
This indicator measures the number of people having an emergency hospital admission per 
1,000 of population for specific long-term conditions considered amenable to health care.  
This is often used as an indicator of the performance of primary care and the interface 
between primary and secondary care.  We use the list of conditions defined in the NHS 
outcomes framework indicator 2.3i (see Table A.1.2 below). Hospital admissions for all ages, 
including young children and people over 75, are included in this indicator. 
We calculate indirectly standardised emergency hospital admission rate for each small area to 
allow for differing age and sex structure by deprivation level. To do so, we start with 
individual level HES data on emergency admissions and aggregate up to small area level. We 
then compute the expected hospitalisation counts for each small area by applying national 
age-sex hospitalisation rates to small area level numbers of people in each age-sex group.  We 
then compute the adjusted rate for each small area as the product of the ratio of observed 
over expected count for the small area and the national rate. We then compute the adjusted 
count for each small area as adjusted rate times the small area population. Finally, we 
aggregate up this adjusted count to quantile group level to present adjusted count per 1,000 
people in each quantile group. The calculations are presented in Appendix 2. 
 
Figure A.1.1 shows trends in preventable hospitalisation for each quintile group by age and 
sex. 
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 Figure A.1.1: Trends in preventable hospitalisation (fixed x-axis for age group 
comparisons, then floating x-axis for deprivation quintile group comparisons) 
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 Table A.1.2: ICD-10 codes for chronic ambulatory care sensitive conditions [4]  
This is based on list produced by the ONS and adopted by the NHS Outcomes Framework. 
 
Infections 
B18.1 Chronic viral hepatitis B without delta-agent 
B18.0 Chronic viral hepatitis B with delta-agent 
Nutritional, endocrine and metabolic 
E10 Insulin-dependent diabetes mellitus 
E11 Non-insulin-dependent diabetes mellitus 
E12 Malnutrition-related diabetes mellitus 
E13 Other specified diabetes mellitus 
E14 Unspecified diabetes mellitus 
Diseases of the blood 
D50.1 Sideropenic dysphagia 
D50.8 Other iron deficiency anaemias 
D50.9 Iron deficiency anaemia, unspecified 
D51 Vitamin B12 deficiency anaemia 
D52 Folate deficiency anaemia 
Mental and behavioural disorders 
F00 Dementia in Alzheimer disease 
F01 Vascular dementia 
F02 Dementia in other diseases classified elsewhere 
F03 Unspecified dementia 
Neurological disorders 
G40 Epilepsy 
G41 Status epilepticus 
Cardiovascular diseases 
I10X Essential (primary) hypertension 
I11.0 Hypertensive heart disease with (congestive) heart failure 
I11.9 Hypertensive heart disease without (congestive) heart failure 
I13.0 Hypertensive heart and renal disease with (congestive) heart failure 
I20 Angina pectoris 
I25 Chronic ischaemic heart disease 
I50 Heart failure 
I48X Atrial fibrillation and flutter 
J81X Pulmonary oedema 
Respiratory diseases 
J20 Acute bronchitis 
J41 Simple and mucopurulent chronic bronchitis 
J42X Unspecified chronic bronchitis 
J43 Emphysema 
J44 Other chronic obstructive pulmonary disease 
J45 Asthma 
J46X Status asthmaticus 
J47X Bronchiectasis 
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 Amenable mortality 
Definition: 
Amenable mortality is defined as the number of deaths per 1,000 people from causes 
considered amenable to healthcare, allowing for age and sex. The numerator is the number of 
people who died in the current financial year due to a cause of death considered amenable to 
health care. The denominator is the total number of people alive at mid-point in the current 
financial year. 
Technical details: 
Amenable mortality was defined according to the conditions listed in the ONS Outcomes 
Framework (see table A.1.3). This includes conditions that are responsible for at least 100 
deaths in a year and that have a clear link between the number of deaths and healthcare 
interventions. The classification takes account of appropriate age limits and each death is 
counted only once.  
We calculate indirectly standardised amenable mortality rate for each small area to allow for 
differing age and sex structure by deprivation level. To do so, we start with individual-level 
ONS mortality data and aggregate up to small area level. We then compute the expected 
number of deaths in each small area by applying national age-sex mortality rates to small area 
level numbers of people in each age-sex group.  We then compute the adjusted rate for each 
small area as the product of the ratio of observed over expected count for the small area and 
the national rate. We then compute the adjusted count for each small area as adjusted rate 
times the small area population. Finally, we aggregate up this adjusted count to quantile group 
level to present adjusted count per 1,000 people in each quantile group. The calculations are 
presented in Appendix 2. 
 
Figure A.1.2 shows trends in amenable mortality for each quintile group by age and sex. 
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 Figure A.1.2: Trends in amenable mortality (fixed x-axis for age group comparisons, 
then floating x-axis for deprivation quintile group comparisons) 
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 Table A.1.3: ONS list of causes of death considered amenable to health care [5] 
Note: ONS produce separate lists for “amenable” and “preventable” deaths, where the latter are 
considered preventable by wider public health activities outside the health care system.  In line 
with the NHS Outcomes Framework, we use the former list i.e. “amenable”. 
 
 Condition group and cause  ICD-10 codes Age 
 Infections     
 Tuberculosis A15-A19, B90 0-74 
 
Selected invasive bacterial and protozoal infections 
A38-A41, A46, A48.1, B50-
B54, G00, G03, J02, L03 
0-74 
 Hepatitis C B17.1, B18.2 0-74 
 HIV/AIDS B20-B24 All 
 Neoplasms     
 
Malignant neoplasm of colon and rectum C18-C21 0-74 
 Malignant melanoma of skin C43 0-74 
 Mesothelioma C45 0-74 
 Malignant neoplasm of breast C50 0-74 
 Malignant neoplasm of cervix uteri C53 0-74 
 Malignant neoplasm of bladder C67 0-74 
 
Malignant neoplasm of thyroid gland C73 0-74 
 Hodgkin's disease C81 0-74 
 Leukaemia C91, C92.0 0-44 
 Benign neoplasms  D10-D36 0-74 
 
Nutritional, endocrine and metabolic     
 Disorders of thyroid gland E00–E07 0–74 
 Diabetes mellitus E10-E14 0-49 
 Neurological disorders     
 Epilepsy and status epilepticus G40-G41 0-74 
 Cardiovascular diseases     
 
Rheumatic and other valvular heart disease I01-I09 0-74 
 Hypertensive diseases I10-I15 0-74 
 Ischaemic heart disease I20-I25 0-74 
 Cerebrovascular diseases I60-I69 0-74 
 Respiratory diseases     
 Influenza (including swine flu) J09-J11 0-74 
 Pneumonia J12-J18 0-74 
 Asthma J45-J46 0-74 
 Digestive disorders     
 Gastric and duodenal ulcer K25-K28 0-74 
 Acute abdomen, appendicitis, intestinal 
obstruction, cholecystitis/lithiasis, pancreatitis, 
hernia 
K35-K38, K40-K46, K80-
K83, K85, K86.1-K86.9, 
K91.5 
0-74 
 Genitourinary disorders     
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Nephritis and nephrosis 
N00-N07, N17-N19, N25-
N27 
0-74 
 
Obstructive uropathy and prostatic hyperplasia 
N13, N20-N21, N35, N40, 
N99.1 
0-74 
 Maternal and infant     
 Complications of perinatal period P00-P96, A33 All 
 
Congenital malformations, deformations and 
chromosomal anomalies 
Q00-Q99 0-74 
 Injuries     
 Misadventures to patients during surgical and 
medical care 
Y60-Y69, Y83-Y84 All 
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Appendix 2: Indirect age, sex standarisation of indi-
cators at LSOA level
The indirect age sex standardisation process used to adjust the preventable hospitalisa-
tion and amenable mortality indicators:
adjusted countlsoa = adjusted ratelsoa × populationlsoa (1)
adjusted ratelsoa =
observedlsoa
expectedlsoa
× ratenational (2)
observedlsoa =
sex∑ age∑
eventslsoa,age,sex (3)
expectedlsoa =
sex∑ age∑
expectedlsoa,age,sex (4)
expectedlsoa,age,sex = ratenational,age,sex × populationlsoa,age,sex (5)
ratenational,age,sex =
lsoa∑
eventslsoa,age,sex
lsoa∑
populationlsoa,age,sex
(6)
ratenational =
lsoa∑ sex∑ age∑
eventslsoa,age,sex
lsoa∑ sex∑ age∑
populationlsoa,age,sex
(7)
populationlsoa =
sex∑ age∑
populationlsoa,age,sex (8)
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Figure 1: Preventable hospitalisation per 1,000 populations
Figure 2: Amenable mortality per 1,000 population
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Appendix 3: Robustness checks 
 
Exception reporting 
 
Figure A.3.1 shows trends in primary care quality in terms of public health impact score, 
relative index of inequality and slope index of inequality. The base case analysis shown in the 
top half of the panel was conducted using reported achievement, which excludes “exception 
reported” patients from the population denominator, the bottom half of the panel reports 
population achievement, which includes exceptions as poor quality.  Data on “exception 
reported” patients was not available in the first year 2004/5 and so in the population 
achievement series average primary care quality for that year is artificially inflated, since 
“exception reported” patients could not be included in that year whereas in all other years 
“exception reported” patients were included as poor quality i.e. not achieving the QOF 
quality measures. Approximately 5% of patients were exception reported in years 2005/6 
through 2011/12. As we can see despite the different absolute levels of performance as 
calculated by the two alternative calculation methods for this indicator the inequality trends in 
both absolute and relative terms are almost identical for the two alternative measures. 
 
Figure A.3.1: Trends in Primary Care Quality 
 
 
Change in neighbourhood deprivation 
 
We used IMD 2010 (published in 2010 using data relating to 2007) for all years to ensure that 
our findings reflected real changes in health care delivery and outcomes, rather than artificial 
changes in the calculation of the deprivation index or the composition of neighbourhoods.  This 
does raise the issue, however, of how accurately the deprivation of a neighbourhood in 2007 
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reflects its deprivation in 2004/5 and 2011/12. To assess this, we looked at cross tabulations of 
change over the seven year period between IMD 2004 (data for 2001) and IMD 2010 (data for 
2007). These show that 84% of LSOAs in the most deprived fifth remained in the most deprived 
fifth, that 88% of neighbourhoods in the least deprived fifth remained in the least deprived fifth, 
and that only 14% of LSOAs changed rank by the equivalent of one quintile group or more. 
 
Alternate model specification 
 
In the paper we compute deprivation gradients across the four outcomes measured using linear 
regression methods. In this appendix we compare the deprivation gradients computed using 
linear regression with more sophisticated negative binomial models that have a closer fit to some 
of the indicators. These models were fit to each indicator in turn for each year of data in order to 
compute the SII and RII. Figures A.3.2 through A.3.5 show the results from this process. For 
the GP supply and GP quality indicators we see that the fit of the two models is 
indistinguishable with neither model fitting the data particularly well (these are displayed in 
figures A.3.2 and A.3.3). For the other two outcomes, preventable hospitalisations and amenable 
mortality, the negative binomial model captures the curvature in the data better than the linear 
model (these are displayed in figures A.3.4 and A.3.5). These results are summarised in figure 
A.3.6 which plots the SII and RII derived from these competing models over time. We can see 
from this figure that whilst the two models are indistinguishable for the primary care supply and 
quality indicators, for the preventable hospitalisation and amenable mortality indicators the 
better fit of the negative binomial model has resulted in a marginally higher measures of 
inequality with smaller confidence intervals. These differences however are small and leave the 
patterns and trends in these indicators unchanged. From this analysis we can conclude that our 
indicators and the conclusions that we draw from them are somewhat robust to model 
specification. 
 
We chose to use the linear regression based indicators in our main analysis in the paper to make 
our measures as easy to compute and interpret as possible and hence maximise the likelihood of 
them being adopted in the NHS. 
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Figure A.3.2 Comparing models to calculate inequality in GP supply 2004-11 
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Figure A.3.3 Comparing models to calculate inequality in PHIS 2004-11 
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Figure A.3.4 Comparing models to calculate inequality in hospital admissions 2004-11 
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Figure A.3.5 Comparing models to calculate inequality in mortality 2004-11 
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Figure A.3.6 Comparing models to plot trends over time in inequality indicators 2004-11 
 
 
 
 
 
149
150
 Appendix D: Paper 4 - Distributional Cost-Effectiveness Analysis of Health 
Care Programmes - A Methodological Case Study of the UK Bowel Cancer 
Screening Programme 
  
151
152
DISTRIBUTIONAL COST-EFFECTIVENESS ANALYSIS OF HEALTH
CARE PROGRAMMES – A METHODOLOGICAL CASE STUDY OF THE
UK BOWEL CANCER SCREENING PROGRAMME
MIQDAD ASARIAa,*, SUSAN GRIFFINa, RICHARD COOKSONa, SOPHIE WHYTEb and PAUL TAPPENDENb
aCentre for Health Economics, University of York, York, UK
bSchool of Health and Related Research, University of Shefﬁeld, Shefﬁeld, UK
ABSTRACT
This paper presents an application of a new methodological framework for undertaking distributional cost-effectiveness
analysis to combine the objectives of maximising health and minimising unfair variation in health when evaluating
population health interventions. The National Health Service bowel cancer screening programme introduced in 2006 is
expected to improve population health on average and to worsen population health inequalities associated with deprivation
and ethnicity – a classic case of ‘intervention-generated inequality’. We demonstrate the distributional cost-effectiveness
analysis framework by examining two redesign options for the bowel cancer screening programme: (i) the introduction
of an enhanced targeted reminder aimed at increasing screening uptake in deprived and ethnically diverse neighbourhoods
and (ii) the introduction of a basic universal reminder aimed at increasing screening uptake across the whole population. Our
analysis indicates that the universal reminder is the strategy that maximises population health, while the targeted reminder is the
screening strategy that minimises unfair variation in health. The framework is used to demonstrate how these two objectives can
be traded off against each other, and how alternative social value judgements inﬂuence the assessment of which strategy is best,
including judgements about which dimensions of health variation are considered unfair and judgements about societal levels of
inequality aversion. © 2014 The Authors. Health Economics published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd.
Received 22 October 2013; Revised 6 March 2014; Accepted 1 April 2014
KEY WORDS: health inequality; equity; cost-effectiveness analysis
1. INTRODUCTION
Cost-effectiveness analysis (CEA) is used to support health sector decisions about the allocation of limited
resources with the objective of maximising health (Drummond et al., 2005). When dealing with population
health interventions, we often have the additional objective of minimising ‘unfair’ health inequality
(Cookson et al., 2009) and to this end are also interested in the social distribution of both health gains and
health opportunity costs due to the intervention. In this paper, we propose a methodology for quantifying
and combining these two objectives within an economic evaluation framework that highlights the social value
judgements underpinning any particular conclusion. This ‘distributional CEA’ (DCEA) is demonstrated through
a case study comparing potential redesign options to increase uptake of the National Health Service (NHS) bowel
cancer screening programme (BCSP) in England.
Colorectal cancer (CRC) is the third most common cancer in the UK with approximately 40 000 new cases
diagnosed annually resulting in almost 16 000 CRC-related deaths per year (ONS, 2012). Research has shown
that using screening to diagnose and treat CRC earlier can signiﬁcantly reduce the number of CRC deaths
(Hewitson et al., 2008). The Department of Health launched the BCSP in 2006 and currently offers biennial
*Correspondence to: Centre for Health Economics, University of York, York, UK. E-mail: miqdad.asaria@york.ac.uk
This is an open access article under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License, which permits use, distribution and reproduction in
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screening with guaiac fecal occult blood test (gFOBT) to persons aged 60–74 years. Variable uptake of
screening has been observed among the ﬁrst 2.6 million invitees to the national BCSP, with overall uptake
averaging only 54% ranging from 61% in the least deprived areas to 35% in the most deprived areas, and
showing a similar gradient in terms of small area-based ethnic diversity measures (Logan et al., 2012;
Von Wagner et al., 2011). Furthermore, for those individuals with positive screening results, there is also
evidence of inequality in the uptake of follow-up colonoscopy (Morris et al., 2012). It is reasonable to expect that
these inequalities in the uptake of the screening programme will exacerbate the already unequal distribution of
health in the population, with the screening programme disproportionately beneﬁting more advantaged groups
(for whom uptake is highest) – a classic case of ‘intervention-generated inequality’ (Lorenc et al., 2012).
Prior to the introduction of the BCSP, a number of possible screening options were evaluated to help NHS
decision makers determine whether a screening programme was worthwhile and if so the form that it should
take. To that end, a model was developed to assess the total resource implications and health impacts of
screening by simulating the natural history of CRC and the impact of screening on that natural history
(Tappenden et al., 2007). This model was later reﬁned and updated to reﬂect data emerging from the BCSP
(Whyte et al., 2012; Whyte et al., 2011). In this paper, we build on the latest version of this economic
evaluation model and use it to estimate the distribution of health associated with alternative screening strate-
gies. We then compare these health distributions using our DCEA framework to determine the strategy that best
addresses the dual objectives of maximising health and minimising health inequality. The focus of our analysis
is on the quantity and distribution of health gains related to increased participation in the screening programme;
other potentially competing objectives of screening programmes such as the promotion of informed choice are
not addressed in this paper.
2. METHODS
2.1. Cost-effectiveness analysis
While recognising that in reality there are an almost inﬁnite number of screening strategies that could be
designed, in order to demonstrate the framework, we simplify the comparison by considering four mutually
exclusive options in our analysis:
• ‘No screening’.
• ‘Standard screening’ as implemented in the BCSP in 2006.
• ‘Targeted reminder’: screening plus a targeted enhanced reminder letter (personal GP-signed letter and
tailored information package) sent only to those living in the most income deprived 40% of small areas
(index of multiple deprivation (IMD) 4 and IMD5) and to those living in areas with the highest proportion
of inhabitants from the Indian subcontinent (IS5). This targeted subgroup comprises of approximately
half of the total population invited for screening. The costs of this strategy per person targeted are
estimated to be £7 resulting in an estimated increase in average uptake of gFOBT among the targeted
population of 12%.
• ‘Universal reminder’: screening plus a universal basic reminder letter (sending a GP-endorsed reminder
letter to all eligible patients). The costs of this strategy per person are estimated to be £3.50 resulting in an
estimated increase in average uptake of gFOBT of 6%.
We characterise the alternative reminder strategies in such a way as to ensure that both have approximately
equal additional intervention costs and equal impact on the total screening uptake, while having very different
distributional impacts. Although these reminder strategies are somewhat stylised constructed to highlight the
trade-offs between health improvement and health inequality, the potential costs and increases in uptake
because of the strategies are estimates based on studies of similar interventions (Shankaran et al., 2007;
Hewitson et al., 2011).
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The economic evaluation model follows a cohort of 1 million 30 year olds through their lifetimes (allowing
it to simulate the adenoma–carcinoma sequence) with screening invitations being sent out biennially to individuals
between the ages of 60 and 74 years. The model is run probabilistically to incorporate the uncertainty around the
input parameters.
2.2. Inequality analysis
The CEA allows us to identify which of the strategies maximises total health. In order to extend this analysis to
allow us to evaluate our other key objective, that of minimising unfair health inequality, we require descriptions
of the estimated distributions of health produced by the interventions being compared. To produce these
estimates, we condition the model input parameters on factors associated with inequalities in health and
inequalities in the effect of screening. We then perform subgroup analyses according to these factors in order
to estimate differential cost and health impacts. The health impact per person within each subgroup is scaled by
the size of the subgroup in order to describe the total population distribution of health.
The distribution of changes in health attributed to an intervention are informed not only by the distribution
of the health gains among recipients of the intervention but also by the distribution of health opportunity costs
among those who would have received the displaced activities that the money spent on this intervention would
otherwise have been spent on. These opportunity costs are unlikely to fall in proportion to the intervention costs
or beneﬁts for particular recipients, and those who would otherwise have beneﬁted from the displaced activities
may also include nonrecipients of the intervention.
2.2.1. Estimating a baseline population health distribution. We estimate baseline inequality in the population
distribution of expected lifetime health by extending the economic model to incorporate differential all-cause
mortality rates by level of socioeconomic deprivation in addition to age and gender. As estimates are based
on the Ofﬁce for National Statistics longitudinal study data (ONS, 2007), we map social class groupings to
deprivation measures. We additionally include the differences in morbidity by using health-related quality of
life data by age and gender based on UK norms for EQ-5D (Kind et al., 1999) and further adjust for deprivation
using the differences between life expectancy and disability-free life expectancy as observed in the Ofﬁce for
National Statistics general lifestyle survey (Smith et al., 2010). Using this data in the model, we estimate a
baseline population health distribution in terms of quality-adjusted life expectancy (QALE) at birth. As the
ethnic diversity measure that we use in this study is not a variable that is routinely included in the administrative
datasets used to estimate baseline QALE, we assume a baseline QALE adjusted for gender and deprivation that
does not further vary by ethnic diversity.
2.2.2. Estimating the distribution of uptake of the bowel cancer screening programme. Analysis of the pilot
study of the BCSP suggests that screening uptake (the proportion of those invited to screening who participate)
varies by area level deprivation, area level ethnic diversity and gender (Weller, 2009). Area level deprivation is
based on quintile groups of the IMD 2004, and ethnic diversity is derived from area-based quintiles measuring
the proportion of people originating from IS. Signiﬁcant differences in uptake are observed in the data between
all IMD quintile groups and between the most ethnically diverse quintile group (IS5) and the four least
ethnically diverse quintile groups (IS1-4). Area level variables are based on data at lower super output area
level; these are small areas containing approximately 1500 individuals. Multivariate analysis of the pilot study
results provides the independent effect of each characteristic on uptake (Weller, 2009), allowing us to calculate
the average uptake of gFOBT and follow-up colonoscopy for each of our 20 distinct subgroups, comprising all
possible combinations of the two genders, ﬁve deprivation levels and two ethnic diversity levels. We are unable
to estimate the proportion of the population in each of the 20 groups from this data as correlation between
characteristics was not reported. Therefore, for the base case analysis, we simply assume independence in
the distribution of the characteristics. Data from the pilot are used to extrapolate to the population at large by
further assuming that the population in the pilot study is representative of the population in general.
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2.2.3. Estimating the distribution of opportunity cost. Additional costs of screening and related downstream
diagnostic and treatment costs come out of a ﬁxed health budget, and the health opportunity cost due to the
disinvestment of these funds from other uses within NHS is assumed to be one quality-adjusted life year
(QALY) per £20 000, in line with current practice in NHS. Owing to the absence of further information on
how these opportunity costs are distributed, in the base case analysis, we assume that they are distributed
equally across all population subgroups. We then perform sensitivity analyses by exploring two extreme
assumptions around the distribution of opportunity cost: ﬁrst, where the entire opportunity cost is borne by
the healthiest of our 20 subgroups (women living in the least deprived and ethnically diverse areas), and
second, where the entire opportunity cost is borne by the least healthy of our 20 subgroups (men living in
the most deprived and ethnically diverse areas).
2.2.4. Assuming all other factors equally distributed. We are able to estimate a modelled distribution of health
net of opportunity costs by incorporating the three sets of adjustments to the model that we have described
previously, namely, the following: (i) the distribution of factors impacting baseline health; (ii) the distribution
of factors impacting screening uptake; and (iii) the distribution of opportunity cost. In so doing, however, we
assume that all other factors in the model remain constant between the different subgroups of interest. In
particular, a key assumption is that CRC incidence and severity levels are equal across the relevant subgroups.
This assumption was made because of data limitations and is supported by limited evidence suggesting that
variation in CRC incidence by social class is small (National Cancer Intelligence Network, 2004).1
2.2.5. Measuring inequality in the resulting health distributions. Inequality in health distributions can be quan-
tiﬁed in a variety of ways, and we present a battery of measures in order to be able to inform different inequality
concerns from different stakeholders. We start with relative measures of inequality – those that measure the propor-
tional changes in health across the distribution. These range from simplemeasures focusing only on the extremes of
the distribution, such as the relative gap index, to more sophisticated measures assessing the entire distribution and
allowing for different levels of relative inequality aversion. An example of the latter is the Atkinson index, shown in
the succeeding texts for a population of n individuals with hi representing the health of individual i, h representing
mean health in the population and ε representing the level of constant relative inequality aversion (Atkinson, 1970).
Aε ¼ 1 1n
Xn
i¼1
hi
h
 1ε" # 11ε
We also look at absolute measures of inequality – those that measure the absolute changes in health across
the distribution. These also range from simple extreme group measures, such as the absolute gap index, to more
sophisticated measures assessing the entire distribution and allowing for different levels of absolute inequality
aversion. An example of the latter is the Kolm index shown in the succeeding texts with α representing the level
of constant absolute inequality aversion (Kolm, 1976).
Kα ¼ 1α
 
log
1
n
Xn
i¼1
eα hhi½ 
 !
2.3. Social welfare analysis
Having separately quantiﬁed average population health and the level of health inequality resulting from each of
our four screening strategies, we next combine concerns for maximising population health and concerns for
1Note that the stage of detection will be on average later in those groups with lower uptake, and so modelled cancer-related mortality does
differ between subgroups.
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minimising health inequality using social welfare analysis. We ﬁrst check for distributional dominance in a
very general sense using the idea of generalised Lorenz dominance (Shorrocks, 1983) to compare the estimated
health distributions and eliminate dominated strategies. Health distribution A can be said to generalised Lorenz
dominate health distribution B if the Lorenz curve for health in A multiplied by the mean level of health in A
dominates the Lorenz curve for health in B multiplied by the mean level of health in B. To compare the
remaining, nondominated strategies, we turn to more restricted social welfare indices that explicitly trade-off
increases in the mean health against greater equality in the distribution of health (Wagstaff, 2002). These indi-
ces are calibrated on the same scale by calculating an ‘equally distributed equivalent’ (EDE) level of health for
the health distribution: the level of health each person in the population would receive in a hypothetically per-
fectly equal health distribution such that society would be indifferent between that equal distribution of health
and the actual unequal distribution of health. We focus on two such social welfare indices constructed by com-
bining the mean level of health with the Atkinson and Kolm inequality indices, respectively.
hede ¼ 1 Aεð Þh
hede ¼ h Kα
In the case of no concern for inequality (α= ε= 0), the social welfare indices just collapse to the mean level
of health. The difference between mean health and EDE health for a given level of inequality aversion indicates
the average decrement in health per person society is willing to sacriﬁce in order to achieve a perfectly equal
distribution of health conditional on the level of inequality in the current health distribution. Calculating and
comparing the EDEs for the predicted health distributions allows us to rank these strategies over a range of
possible inequality aversion levels.
2.4. Adjustment for alternative social value judgements
If inequality concern does not apply to all sources of variation in health – for example, if some determinants of
individual ill health are deemed to be a matter of unavoidable bad luck or individual responsibility – then
further analysis is required in order to isolate just the variation in health deemed to be unfair.
We can isolate this health distribution of interest by undertaking multivariate analysis on our raw health
distribution, to control for ‘fair’ variation in health in order to leave a distribution of health reﬂecting only
the ‘unfair’ variation. The adjustment process we use here has been referred to as ‘direct unfairness’ in the
literature (Fleurbaey and Schokkaert, 2009). This ‘fairness-adjusted’ distribution of health is then evaluated
in place of the unadjusted distribution, using the same inequality and social welfare index approaches. Alterna-
tive judgements about which variation in health is considered fair or unfair can lead to different conclusions as
to which intervention strategy is preferred, and so the sensitivity of the decision to alternative sets of reasonable
social value judgements regarding fairness should be assessed. In the current case study, the social variables of
interest are gender, area-based level of deprivation and area-based ethnic diversity. There are eight possible
permutations of social value judgements we can make on whether or not each of these three social variables
represents a fair or unfair source of variation in health, ranging from all three being deemed unfair to all three
being deemed fair (resulting in the trivial case where there is no variation in health in the adjusted distribution).
For our base case analysis, we characterise all variation in health as unfair. We then check the sensitivity of
the ranking of strategies to each of the other seven possible social value judgements that can be made in this
example. To apply these alternative social value judgements, we adjust our health distribution to only reﬂect
unfair variation in health by using reference values for the fair variables while preserving the actual values
for the unfair variables.
In cases where dominance rules, such as generalised Lorenz dominance, do not provide a complete ordering
of strategies, additional social value judgements are required to assess trade-offs between improving total
population health and reducing unfair health inequality. The key additional social value judgements that need
to be made relate to the choice of inequality measures underpinning social welfare and the level of inequality
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aversion. We calculate our results for relative (Atkinson) and absolute (Kolm) inequality indices at both high
and low levels of inequality aversion and check the sensitivity of our decision across a range of inequality
aversion levels in order to identify the thresholds at which each strategy would be preferred.
3. RESULTS
3.1. Cost-effectiveness results
Table I shows the population level cost-effectiveness results for the four different strategies. The results are
based on a lifetime model of a cohort of 1 million 30 year olds, and net health beneﬁts are calculated at a
cost-effectiveness threshold of £20 000 per QALY.
The screening programme in any form improves population health and has positive net health beneﬁts as
compared with no screening. On the basis of these cost-effectiveness results, if the objective is solely to
maximise population health, we should choose screening with the addition of the universal reminder.
3.2. Inequality results
The baseline distribution of health measured in QALE is shown in Figure 1. We can see from this distribution that
in the absence of any screening programme, there are substantial inequalities in the population health distribution.
We next look at the impact of the three screening options on this baseline health distribution. Figure 2 shows
the impact of each option in terms of screening uptake by baseline population health. Figure 3 shows how
uptake translates into changes in the health distribution.
It is evident from Figure 2 that there is a positive monotonic relationship between baseline health and
gFOBT uptake, with uptake being higher for those who are already more healthy, regardless of the speciﬁc
form of the screening programme under consideration. The universal reminder results in a parallel shift in
gFOBT uptake as compared with the standard screening programme, with uptake increasing by the same
amount (6%) in each health quintile. The targeted reminder ﬂattens the uptake gradient between the health
quintiles, resulting in a higher uptake in the lower health quintiles and a lower uptake in the higher health
quintiles as compared with the universal reminder strategy.
Figure 3a shows the changes to the population health distribution associated with each of our three screening
strategies relative to no screening, and Figure 3b looks more closely at the impact of the two redesign strategies
as compared with the standard screening programme.
Compared with no screening, the screening programme in any of the three forms improves health across the
distribution and widens health inequality in absolute terms, improving the health of the healthiest most and the
least healthy least. Looking to Figure 3b, we see that compared with standard screening, the universal reminder
is health improving across the distribution and further exacerbates absolute health inequality. By contrast, the
targeted reminder as compared with standard screening reduces absolute health inequality by focussing
additional beneﬁts on the least healthy. It also reduces the health of some of the more healthy groups who beneﬁt
very little from the targeted reminder but still bear the health losses because of the opportunity cost of the strategy.
Table I. Standard cost-effectiveness results
Bowel cancer-related
cost (£) Life years QALYs
Incremental net health
beneﬁt (QALYs)a
No screening 278 793 874 50 577 384 41 762 818 —
Standard screening 350 872 069 50 634 273 41 806 794 40 372
Screening + targeted reminder 400 936 962 50 639 192 41 810 506 41 581
Screening + universal reminder 385 268 692 50 639 452 41 810 784 42 642
Results based on a lifetime model for a cohort comprising of 1 million 30 year olds.
aIncremental to no screening.
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Combining the baseline health distribution and the estimated distribution of health changes associated with
each of our screening strategies provides the overall health distribution associated with each strategy. Table II
reports a range of absolute and relative inequality measures calculated for each strategy.
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Figure 3. (a) Health compared with no screening (per million of population invited for screened). (b) Health compared with standard
screening (per million of population invited for screening)
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All relative and absolute inequality measures calculated across a range of inequality aversion levels rank no
screening as the least unequal and the universal reminder as the most unequal of the four strategies.
3.3. Social welfare results
We next combine our concerns for maximising health and minimising health inequality using social welfare
analysis. We ﬁnd that the estimated health distributions associated with both no screening and standard
screening are generalised Lorenz dominated by those associated targeted and universal reminder strategies.
This implies that both reminder strategies deliver more population health on average and a fairer distribution
of health than the dominated strategies. Dominance does not apply between the targeted and universal reminder
strategies, however, so we turn to our social welfare indices evaluated across a range of inequality aversion
levels. The values of these indices are reported in Table III.
The social welfare indices show that where there is little or no concern for inequality, the universal reminder
is the preferred strategy. However, as inequality aversion increases, the targeted reminder becomes the
preferred strategy.
The results thus far have assumed an equal distribution of opportunity cost. Table IV reports the sensitivity
of these results to alternative extreme assumptions. When all opportunity costs are borne by the least healthy
subgroup, no screening and standard screening are no longer dominated.
Although the distribution of opportunity cost does not impact mean health, it does impact the distribution of
health, and this is reﬂected in the social welfare measures. This is particularly evident at intermediate levels of
Table II. Measures of inequality
Relative inequality indices No screening Standard Targeted reminder Universal reminder
Relative gap index (ratio) 0.17527a 0.17592 0.17586 0.17596
Relative index of inequality 0.18607a 0.18674 0.18668 0.18678
Gini index 0.03101a 0.03112 0.03111 0.03113
Atkinson index (ε= 1) 0.00171a 0.00172 0.00172 0.00172
Atkinson index (ε= 7) 0.01330a 0.01337 0.01337 0.01338
Atkinson index (ε= 30) 0.06253a 0.06281 0.06279 0.06283
Absolute inequality indices No screening Standard Targeted reminder Universal reminder
Absolute gap index (range) 10.98604a 11.03064 11.02726 11.03325
Slope index of inequality 12.88747a 12.94123 12.93691 12.94438
Kolm index (α= 0.025) 0.20281a 0.20430 0.20416 0.20439
Kolm index (α= 0.1) 0.87801a 0.88429 0.88371 0.88467
Kolm index (α= 0.5) 4.56391a 4.58739 4.58587 4.58883
ε= 1 represents low relative inequality aversion, while ε= 30 represents high relative inequality aversion.
α= 0.025 represents low absolute inequality aversion, while α= 0.5 represents high absolute inequality aversion.
aIndicates the most equal strategy.
Table III. Measures of social welfare
Social welfare indices Targeted reminder Universal reminder
Mean health (ε= α=0) 69.30127 69.30233a
Atkinson EDE (ε= 1) 69.18238 69.18331a
Atkinson EDE (ε= 7) 68.37503 68.37510a
Atkinson EDE (ε= 30) 64.94991a 64.94796
Kolm EDE (α= 0.025) 69.09711 69.09794a
Kolm EDE (α= 0.1) 68.41756 68.41767a
Kolm EDE (α= 0.5) 64.71541a 64.71350
EDE, equally distributed equivalent.
aIndicates the strategy yielding the highest social welfare.
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inequality aversion (ε = 7 or α= 0.1) where we see that the preferred screening strategy changes from standard
screening when all the opportunity cost is borne by the least healthy group, to universal reminder when
opportunity cost is equally distributed, to targeted reminder where all the opportunity cost is borne by the
healthiest group.
3.4. Adjustment for alternative social value judgements results
Our results so far have assumed all inequality is unfair; Table V reports the sensitivity of our results to all
eight possible sets of social value judgements regarding which inequalities are deemed unfair that can be
made in this example.
The sensitivity analysis suggests that in this example, value judgements around the fairness of variation
associated with area level deprivation are pivotal in determining the preferred strategy.
Finally, we explore the sensitivity of our social welfare indices calculated for the nondominated strategies to
the choice of inequality aversion level as shown in Figure 4a and b. These ﬁgures show the difference between
the EDE of the alternative strategies. The threshold level of inequality aversion at which the targeted reminder
becomes the preferred strategy is eight for the Atkinson EDE and 0.12 for the Kolm EDE. At these levels of
inequality aversion, a decision maker would be willing to sacriﬁce 1000 potential QALYs among the
population of 1 million 30 year olds in order to achieve the more equal distribution of health offered by the
targeted screening strategy.
Table IV. Sensitivity to opportunity cost distribution
All opportunity cost borne by least
healthy subgroup
All opportunity cost borne by
healthiest subgroup
Social welfare indices
No
screening Standard
Targeted
reminder
Universal
reminder
Targeted
reminder
Universal
reminder
Mean health 69.25969 69.30006 69.30127 69.30233a 69.30127 69.30233a
Atkinson EDE (ε= 1) 69.14152 69.18056 69.18147 69.18252a 69.18286 69.18373a
Atkinson EDE (ε= 7) 68.33888 68.36800a 68.36610 68.36734 68.37799a 68.37769
Atkinson EDE (ε=30) 64.92865a 64.91468 64.89302 64.89892 64.95627a 64.95350
Kolm EDE (α= 0.025) 69.05688 69.09486 69.09556 69.09660a 69.09793 69.09866a
Kolm EDE (α= 0.1) 68.38168 68.41112a 68.40958 68.41074 68.42046a 68.42020
Kolm EDE (α= 0.5) 64.69578a 64.68086 64.65951 64.66532 64.72148a 64.71879
EDE, equally distributed equivalent.
aIndicates the strategy yielding the highest social welfare.
Table V. Sensitivity of preferred screening strategy decision to the choice of social value judgements
Social value judgment Preferred strategy based on social welfare index
IMD
Ethnic
diversity Gender
Atkinson
EDE (ε= 1)
Atkinson
EDE (ε= 7)
Atkinson EDE
(ε= 30)
Kolm EDE
(α= 0.025)
Kolm EDE
(α= 0.1)
Kolm EDE
(α= 0.5)
Fair Fair Fair U U U U U U
Fair Unfair Fair U U U U U U
Fair Fair Unfair U U U U U U
Fair Unfair Unfair U U U U U U
Unfair Fair Fair U U T U U T
Unfair Unfair Fair U U T U U T
Unfair Fair Unfair U U T U U T
Unfair Unfair Unfair U U T U U T
IMD, index of multiple deprivation; EDE, equally distributed equivalent; U, universal reminder; T, targeted reminder.
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4. DISCUSSION
4.1. Distributional cost-effectiveness analysis
The results from the model show that although the national BCSP has a small per person beneﬁt, this beneﬁt is sub-
stantial at a population level. This is to be expected for a population health intervention such as this, where the ma-
jority of people screened will not have bowel cancer, and some of the people who develop bowel cancer may not
participate in screening. So despite large individual beneﬁts accruing to people who participate in screening and
have their bowel cancer detected early, these beneﬁts accrue to only a relatively small number of people and are
averaged across the whole population, giving a small expected per person beneﬁt among the general population.
Targeted and universal reminder strategies to increase uptake of bowel cancer screening both appear to be worth-
while in terms of improving population health. In the base case analysis, both would be viewed as welfare increasing
compared with no screening or standard screening for a broad range of social welfare functions reﬂecting different
views on health inequality. The universal reminder resulted in a greater population health improvement than the
targeted reminder but was less attractive in terms of its impact on increasing health inequalities. In our base case anal-
ysis, the universal reminder would be the preferred intervention at the lower end of the range of inequality aversion
values considered, but the targeted reminder could become preferred at high levels of health inequality aversion.
Although all three conﬁgurations of the screening programme are health inequality increasing compared
with no screening, augmenting the current screening programme with a targeted reminder reduces health
inequality. By contrast, augmenting the current screening programme with a universal reminder slightly
increases health inequality as compared with the standard screening programme alone. Some aspects of the inter-
vention-generated inequality due to the screening programme arise because of inequalities in uptake of gFOBT and
follow-up colonoscopy. However, some of the health inequality impact arises through differing rates of morbidity
and other-cause mortality (not related to bowel cancer directly). Because we are interested in lifetime health, as
measured here using QALE, detecting cancer earlier and thereby preventing a cancer-related fatality will inevitably
deliver a larger health gain in social groups with relatively high QALE (Hauck et al., 2002).
4.2. Sensitivity analyses
No screening and standard screening could be ruled out on the basis of generalised Lorenz dominance, but this
was sensitive to an assumption about the distribution of the opportunity cost. The ranking produced by social
welfare indices was sensitive to the type and level of inequality aversion. Furthermore, alternative social value
judgements about the fairness of variation associated with the different population characteristics impact our
choice of preferred strategy.
4.3. Other approaches
A number of methods have previously been proposed in the literature for including health inequality concerns
in economic evaluation. These typically involve either weighting health gains differently for different groups in
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the population (Nord et al., 1999) or weighting overall health gains directly against overall changes in health in-
equality in the context of ‘multicriteria decision analysis’ (Baltussen and Niessen, 2006). Both these types of
method can be replicated using the DCEA framework by imposing the relevant restrictions on the fairness adjust-
ment process and on the form and parameters of the social welfare function. We therefore see DCEA as
encompassing these previous equity weighting methods within a more general framework that provides decision
makers with more detailed information about health inequality impacts, rather than as a rival alternative approach.
An important emerging source of empirical literature on incorporating health inequality impacts into economic
evaluation in low and middle income countries is the ‘extended CEA’ framework (Verguet et al., 2014). This
approach is similar in spirit to DCEA, although simpliﬁes the analysis by (i) focusing on a single distributional
variable (wealth quintile group) rather than analysing multiple distributional variables, (ii) setting aside the issue
of opportunity costs falling on the health budget by assuming the intervention is funded by the tax system, and
(iii) presenting results as a disaggregated ‘dashboard’ of costs and consequences by social group rather than using
inequality indices and social welfare functions to explicitly analyse trade-offs between improving health and
reducing unfair health inequality.
4.4. Conclusion
The DCEA framework outlined in this paper demonstrates how concerns for unfair health inequality can be
taken into account when evaluating health care interventions funded within a ﬁxed health budget. Transparency
about value judgements and sensitivity analysis to reﬂect alternative value judgements is a key feature of the
proposed framework. This form of analysis is particularly relevant when considering redesign options for pre-
ventive health care programmes to ameliorate intervention-generated inequalities, as in the case of the NHS
BCSP. Data requirements for such analyses are nontrivial. However, credible DCEAs are currently feasible
in at least some real-world settings, and further analyses will become possible in future as more evidence on
distributional outcomes starts to emerge in the era of ‘big data’. Evidence on distributional outcomes can be
obtained through evidence synthesis research exploiting networks of patient-level trial datasets, as well as
the application of heterogeneous treatment effect estimators to large observational datasets. Research is needed,
for example, to synthesise evidence on the social distribution of the effects of different approaches for increas-
ing the uptake of screening and other forms of preventive care, with a view to gauging how far estimates can be
generalised from one setting to another. More empirical work is also required to determine a realistic distribu-
tion of opportunity costs (plausibly reﬂecting the impact of likely disinvestment decisions in the health service)
and to elicit reasonable ranges of values for societal levels of absolute and relative inequality aversion as well as
social value judgements on what should be deemed as fair and unfair variations in health.
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Distributional Cost-Effectiveness Analysis:
A Tutorial
Miqdad Asaria, MSc, Susan Griffin, PhD, Richard Cookson, PhD
Distributional cost-effectiveness analysis (DCEA) is
a framework for incorporating health inequality concerns
into the economic evaluation of health sector interven-
tions. In this tutorial, we describe the technical details of
how to conduct DCEA, using an illustrative example com-
paring alternative ways of implementing the National
Health Service (NHS) Bowel Cancer Screening Programme
(BCSP). The 2 key stages in DCEA are 1) modeling social
distributions of health associated with different interven-
tions, and 2) evaluating social distributions of health with
respect to the dual objectives of improving total population
health and reducing unfair health inequality. As well as
describing the technical methods used, we also identify
the data requirements and the social value judgments
that have to be made. Finally, we demonstrate the use of
sensitivity analyses to explore the impacts of alternative
modeling assumptions and social value judgments. Key
words: cost-effectiveness analysis; economic evaluation;
efficiency; equality; equity; fairness; health distribution;
health inequality; inequality measures; opportunity cost;
social value judgments; social welfare functions; tradeoff.
(Med Decis Making 2016;36:8–19)
INTRODUCTION
When designing and prioritizing interventions,
health care decision makers often have concerns
about reducing unfair health inequality as well as
improving total population health. However, the eco-
nomic evaluationof such interventions is typically con-
ducted using methods of cost-effectiveness analysis
(CEA), which focus exclusively on maximizing total
population health. These standard methods of CEA
donot provide decisionmakerswith information about
the health inequality impacts of the interventions eval-
uated, or the nature and size of any tradeoffs between
improving total population health and reducing unfair
health inequality.
To address these shortcomings, we have devel-
oped a framework for incorporating health inequality
impacts into CEA, which we call distributional
cost-effectiveness analysis (DCEA).1 DCEA is suitable
for health sector decisions concerning the design
and prioritization of any type of health care interven-
tion with an explicit health inequality reduction
objective—potentially including treatments as well
as preventive health care such as programs of health
promotion, screening, vaccination, case finding, pri-
mary and secondary prevention of chronic disease,
and so on. However, like standard CEA, it focuses
exclusively on health benefits and opportunity costs
falling on the health sector budget. DCEA therefore
does not provide a fully general framework of distri-
butional economic evaluation for the health and
income inequality impacts of cross-government pub-
lic health programs with important nonhealth bene-
fits and opportunity costs falling outside the health
sector budget.
TheDCEA framework has 2main stages: 1)model-
ing social distributions of health associated with
each intervention, and 2) evaluating social
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distributions of health. Themain steps in the model-
ing stage are
1a. estimating the baseline health distribution;
1b.modeling changes to this baseline distribution due to
the health interventions being compared, allowing
for the distribution of opportunity costs from addi-
tional resource use; and
1c. adjusting the resulting modeled health distributions
for alternative social value judgments about fair and
unfair sources of health variation.
And the main steps in the evaluation stage are
2a. using the estimated distributions to quantify the
change in total population health and unfair health
inequality due to each intervention;
2b. ranking the interventions based on dominance crite-
ria; and, finally,
2c. analyzing any tradeoffs between improving popula-
tion health and reducing unfair health inequality,
allowing for alternative specifications of the under-
lying social welfare function.
We have previously applied the DCEA framework
to analyze 4 possible options for promoting
increased uptake of the National Health Service
(NHS) Bowel Cancer Screening Programme (BCSP)
in England.2 In this tutorial, we work through this
applied example to describe the key steps in con-
ducting a DCEA.
The BCSP is a biennial self-test-based screening
program targeted at 60–74 year olds that aims to
detect and treat colorectal cancer (CRC) early, and it
has been shown to reduce CRC-related mortality
risk by a substantial proportion. Individuals in the
relevant age range are sent a guaiac fecal occult blood
test (gFOBT) kit in the mail and are expected to com-
plete the test by collecting 3 stool samples during
a period of a few days and post them back for labora-
tory analysis. Those individuals testing positive are
invited for further diagnostic testing (follow-up colo-
noscopy) and, when appropriate, treatment.
Analysis of the BCSP pilots and early data from the
rollout of the BCSP have indicated large variations
in uptake of the screening program patterned by
the social variables of area deprivation, sex, and eth-
nicity. This variation in uptake can be modeled to
estimate its impact on mortality and morbidity for
the different socioeconomic subgroups in the popu-
lation, and hence to describe the impact of the
screening program on both the average level of
health and the social distribution of health in the
population.
METHODS
Stage A: Modeling Social Distributions of Health
Estimating the baseline health distribution
The first step in DCEA is to describe the baseline
distribution of health, taking into account variation
in both length and health-related quality of life.
This baseline distribution will need to include the
full general population, and not just the population
of recipients of the intervention. This is for 2 reasons.
First, the full general population is typically the rele-
vant population for characterizing policy concerns
with health inequality. Second, within the context
of a national, budget-constrained system such as the
NHS, additional resources used by recipients of an
intervention will displace activities that could have
been provided to anyone within the full general
population.
This baseline distribution of health should be able
to describe variation in health amongmultiple differ-
ent subgroups in the population as defined by
relevant population characteristics, allowing for
the correlation structure among these various charac-
teristics. The relevant population characteristics
include not only dimensions of direct equity concern
(e.g., income and ethnicity) but also characteristics
that are necessary to estimate expected costs and
effects and that may generate further equity concern
(e.g., sex). The latter of these is standard for any
cost-effectiveness analysis (CEA), whereas the former
we discuss further throughout this tutorial. The
health metric we use in this context is quality-
adjusted life expectancy (QALE) at birth, although
other suitable health metrics could also be used—
such as disability-adjusted life expectancy at birth
or age-specific QALE—as long as they are measured
on an interpersonally comparable ratio scale suitable
for use within a CEA.
The population characteristics of interest in this
case study—those by which a substantial variation
in uptake of the BCSP was observed—are sex, area-
level deprivation, and area-level ethnic diversity.
The first step in estimating our population QALE dis-
tribution is to estimate life expectancy (LE), accord-
ing to each of these characteristics. Area-level
deprivation in the BCSP evaluation studies was mea-
sured based on index of multiple deprivation (IMD
2004) quintile groups, and area-level ethnic diversity
was based on the percentage of people in the area
originating from the Indian Subcontinent, again split
into quintile groups.3 National statistics data are
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available by sex and deprivation level/social class,
but are not available by our particular measure of eth-
nic diversity. We therefore did not include correla-
tions with ethnic diversity in our estimation of the
baseline health distribution and instead, for the pur-
poses of the analysis, assumed its distribution is
independent of deprivation and sex.
A full description of how the baseline health distri-
bution was calculated can be found in the appendix.
A summary of this QALE distribution by health quin-
tile is shown in Figure 1. This forms the baseline
health distribution that we will use in our analysis.
Estimating the distribution of health changes due
to the interventions
To evaluate changes in the baseline health distri-
bution that could be attributed to the use of alterna-
tive interventions, it is necessary to know how the
costs and effects of the intervention differ between
the relevant subgroups, and how the opportunity
costs of any change in resource use differ by those
same subgroups.
Having estimated a baseline health distribution,
wenext turn tomodeling how this health distribution
is affected by the BCSP and alternative ways of pro-
moting increased uptake of the BCSP. We do this by
using an existing cost-effectiveness model of the
BCSP that simulates the natural history of CRC and
the impact of screening and treatment on this natural
history.4,5 We adapt the model to look at the dis-
tributional health impacts of 4 different screening
strategies:
1. No screening: the baseline social distribution of
health
2. Standard screening: as implemented in the BCSP
3. Targeted reminder: screening plus a targeted
enhanced reminder letter (personal general practi-
tioner [GP] signed letter and tailored information
package) sent only to those living in the most
income-deprived small areas (IMD4 and IMD5) as
well as to those living in areas with the highest pro-
portion of inhabitants from the Indian Subcontinent
(IS5)
4. Universal reminder: screening plus a universal basic
reminder letter (sending a GP-endorsed reminder let-
ter to all eligible patients)
Impacts are first estimated by subgroup and then
combined to evaluate the impact of the screening
strategies on the overall social distribution of health.
There are a number of parameters in themodel that
can vary by subgroup, including:
1. Disease prevalence, severity, mortality rate, and nat-
ural history: We assume in our case study that bowel
cancer–specific parameters are constant across our
population subgroups. The evidence available6
broadly supports this assumption, although more
detailed data at the subgroup level would be required
to validate this assumption.
2. Uptake of the intervention: The impact of gFOBT
uptake by subgroup is the key difference between
the various implementations of the screening pro-
gram. We discuss in detail in this article how this
parameter is estimated for each subgroup. We also
estimate the uptake of follow-up colonoscopy by sub-
group for those people who are invited back for fur-
ther investigation after being screened.
3. Direct costs associated with the intervention: We
assume the direct costs related to treating a given
stage of bowel cancer do not vary by subgroup
(although the chance of incurring these costs and
the screening-related costs by subgroup may vary
under the different implementations of the screening
program). This seems to be a plausible assumption in
the absence ofmore detailed cost data at the subgroup
level.
4. Opportunity costs from displaced activities: Oppor-
tunity costs are in the base case analysis assumed to
be shared equally among all population subgroups;
this assumption is explored in sensitivity analyses
discussed later in this tutorial.
5. Other-cause mortality: We use the mortality rates by
subgroup in the same way as discussed when deriv-
ing the baseline health distribution. In calculating
these rates, we remove bowel cancer–specific mortal-
ity (assuming this is constant across subgroups) and
apply this separately in the model.
Quality adjustment of health gains to reflect morbid-
ity: We apply the subgroup-specific adjustments to
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quality-adjust health gains resulting from the screen-
ing program in a similar manner to that applied to
estimate the baseline health distribution. The popu-
lation QALE distribution under no screening corre-
sponds to our baseline health distribution as
calculated in the previous section. In our analysis
of the BCSP, we include an additional variable—
area-level proportion of population from the Indian
Subcontinent (IS)—which we were unable to incor-
porate into our estimation of the baseline health dis-
tribution. We assume that this IS variable is
distributed independently of IMD and sex, and
that it has no independent effect on baseline QALE
(i.e., subgroups are adjusted for other-cause mortal-
ity and quality adjusted only according to their
IMD and sex, and these adjustments are not affected
by their IS status). We next adjust the BCSP uptake
parameters by subgroup. Table 1 shows logistic
regression results looking at gFOBT uptake in the 3
rounds of the BCSP pilot.3 We use these data in com-
bination with the proportion of invitees in each cat-
egory by variable, also reported in the pilot
evaluation, to get weighted average odds ratios
(ORs) for uptake that can be applied in the model.
These ORs are applied to a baseline rate of uptake
reported in the third-round pilot, in which males in
the youngest age group, living in the most deprived
areas and with the highest proportion of people
from the Indian Subcontinent, had an uptake proba-
bility of 34%. For example, to calculate the uptake
probability for a woman of any age across all rounds
of the pilot, living in the least deprived areas and
with the least numbers of people from the Indian Sub-
continent, we can use the following calculation:
OR5 0:34= 1 0:34ð Þ  1:38=0:82ð Þ  1:13  0:86
1=0:37ð Þ  1=0:86ð Þ5 2:71
P5OR= 11ORð Þ5 0:73
A similar regression analysis was reported analyzing
the effect of these same variables on the uptake of fol-
low-up colonoscopy. Data were also published in the
pilot study evaluation regarding the numbers of peo-
ple in each category for each variable in the study.
However, cross-tabulations or correlations between
the variables were not available, and we therefore
assumed that each variable was independently dis-
tributed to calculate the proportion of the population
in each subgroup. Table 2 shows our calculated
gFOBT uptake, the follow-up colonoscopy uptake,
and the proportion of the population by each
subgroup.
Using these parameters in the model provides the
total costs and health gains due to the BCSP under
the standard screening approach.
We next turn to modeling the remaining 2
implementations of the screening program. Both
implementations augment the standard screening
program with additional reminders. We derive the
indicative estimates of costs and impacts on screen-
ing uptake of these reminder strategies from similar
interventions studied in the screening literature,7,8
applying plausible exchange rates and inflation rates
to the figures to get costs, and assuming all subgroups
receiving the interventions have equal additive
increases in uptake. The values used in the model
for costs and impacts on gFOBT uptake for each of
the strategies are given in Table 3.
To estimate total costs and health effects, the
model is evaluated for a representative cohort of the
population—in our case, a cohort of 1 million 30
Table 1 Regression Results of gFOBT Uptake
from Evaluation of BCSP Pilot
Adjusted OR
(95% CI)
Age (years) 57–59 1
60–64 1.13
(1.11–1.16)
65–69 1.25
(1.22–1.28)
Sex Male 1
Female 1.38
(1.35–1.40)
Pilot round 1 1
2 0.77
(0.76–0.80)
3 0.82
(0.81–0.84)
Deprivation
category (IMD)
Q1 (Least
deprived)
1
Q2 0.84
(0.81–0.87)
Q3 0.70
(0.68–0.72)
Q4 0.55
(0.54–0.57)
Q5 (Most deprived) 0.37
(0.35–0.38)
% Indian Subcontinent Q1–4 1
Q5 (Highest %) 0.86
(0.84–0.89)
BCSP, National Health Service (NHS) Bowel Cancer Screening Pro-
gramme; CI, confidence interval; gFOBT, guaiac fecal occult blood test;
IMD, index of multiple deprivation; OR, odds ratio.
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year olds, as was used in the original analysis of the
BCSP in themodelwe inherited. The size of each sub-
group is given by the population proportions calcu-
lated in Table 2. We sum the costs across all
subgroups, and convert these to health opportunity
costs using a threshold value of £20,000 per quality-
adjusted life year (QALY). These health opportunity
costs are then apportioned equally to each individual
in the population, allowing the model to characterize
net health gains in each subgroup. For example, the
total costs for the standard screening program during
the lifetime of the cohort of 1million patients came to
£72 million. Converting this to health opportunity
costs at the rate of £20,000 per QALY gives us 3600
QALYs of health opportunity costs. Women who
live in areas with a low percentage of the population
from the Indian Subcontinent (IS Q1–4), and who
also fall within deprivation quintile IMD Q3, make
up 10% of the population. So we allocate 10% of
this total health opportunity cost to them (i.e., 360
QALYs). This is then subtracted from the total health
gains due to the BCSP in this subgroup to give the net
health effect of the BCSP on this subgroup.
The assumption of equally distributed opportu-
nity costs is convenient but not evidence based. So
we explore alternative assumptions in sensitivity
analysis, focusing on 2 extreme cases in which all
opportunity costs are allocated to the least healthy
and the healthiest subgroups, respectively.
The additional parameters that we have added to
themodel are assigned standard distributions by vari-
able type, and their mean and standard error values
are used to generate suitable random draws for these
variables in the probabilistic sensitivity analysis
(PSA). Details of how these additional variables are
dealt with in the PSA are given in Table 4. All the
results presented are produced by running the model
probabilistically and averaging more than 1000 itera-
tions of the model.
The resulting health distributions estimated for
each screening implementation are described in Fig-
ures 2 and 3 and Table 5. Figure 2A shows the gFOBT
uptake byhealth quintile for each strategy, andFigure
2B shows the colonoscopy uptake by health quintile.
Table 2 gFOBT Uptake, Follow-Up Colonoscopy Uptake, and Proportion of Population by Subgroup
Sex
% Indian
Subcontinent
Deprivation
(IMD quintile)
gFOBT
Uptake (%)
Colonoscopy
Uptake (%)
Population
Proportion (%)
Male Q1–4 Q1 (Least deprived) 66 86 6
Q2 62 84 9
Q3 58 80 10
Q4 52 79 8
Q5 (Most deprived) 42 77 6
Q5 (Highest) Q1 (Least deprived) 63 87 1
Q2 59 85 2
Q3 54 81 3
Q4 48 79 2
Q5 (Most deprived) 38 75 2
Female Q1–4 Q1 (Least deprived) 73 85 6
Q2 70 83 9
Q3 66 79 10
Q4 60 77 8
Q5 (Most deprived) 50 76 6
Q5 (Highest) Q1 (Least deprived) 70 86 1
Q2 66 83 2
Q3 62 79 3
Q4 56 78 2
Q5 (Most deprived) 46 76 2
gFOBT, guaiac fecal occult blood test; IMD, index of multiple deprivation.
Table 3 Costs and Impact on gFOBT Uptake of
Reminder Strategies
Strategy
Cost per
Recipient
Increase in gFOBT
Uptake per Recipient
Universal reminder £3.50 6%
Targeted reminder £7.00 12%
gFOBT, guaiac fecal occult blood test.
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QALE for each subgroup calculated fromour adjusted
model is given in Table 5, and these are presented for
our cohort by health quintile in Figure 3A and Figure
3B, allowing us to better appreciate the relative
impacts of the strategies.
Adjusting for social value judgments about fair
and unfair sources of inequality
The distributions of health estimated thus far rep-
resent all variation in health in the population.
However, some variation in health may be deemed
‘‘fair,’’ or at least ‘‘not unfair,’’ perhaps because it is
due to individual choice or unavoidable bad luck.
In such cases, the health distributions should first
be adjusted to only include health variation deemed
‘‘unfair’’ before measuring the level of inequality.
Social value judgments need to be made about
whether health variation associated with each of the
population characteristics is deemed fair. In our
example, we have 3 variables to consider: sex, IMD,
Table 4 Distributions and Parameter Values Used in PSA for Additional Parameters Added to the Model
Parameter Explanation
gFOBT and colonoscopy uptake Uncertainty on these calculated in PSA assuming ln(OR) distributed normally. The
variance covariance matrices for the uptake regressions were not available to us, so we
drew each coefficient independently and combined to create uptake probabilities.
Mortality rates Adjusted for uncertainty by the underlying model.
Quality adjustment Used b distributionwith themean and standard error values as reported in the UKEQ-5D
norms.
Cost of reminders As no data were given on the uncertainty, we assume a 10% standard error and used this
to draw values from the appropriate g distributions.
Impact of reminders on uptake Reported mean and standard error values used to draw from the appropriate b
distributions.
gFOBT, guaiac fecal occult blood test; OR, odds ratio; PSA, probabilistic sensitivity analysis.
Table 5 QALE Distribution by Subgroup Under Each Strategy
QALE
Sex % Indian Subcontinent Deprivation (IMD quintile) Baseline Standard Targeted Universal
Male Q1–4 Q1 (Least deprived) 72.16 72.21 72.20 72.21
Q2 70.48 70.52 70.52 70.52
Q3 69.09 69.12 69.12 69.13
Q4 66.61 66.63 66.63 66.63
Q5 (Most deprived) 60.22 60.24 60.24 60.24
Q5 (Highest) Q1 (Least deprived) 72.16 72.20 72.21 72.21
Q2 70.48 70.52 70.52 70.52
Q3 69.09 69.12 69.13 69.12
Q4 66.61 66.63 66.63 66.63
Q5 (Most deprived) 60.22 60.23 60.24 60.23
Female Q1–4 Q1 (Least deprived) 74.84 74.91 74.91 74.92
Q2 73.10 73.16 73.16 73.17
Q3 71.77 71.82 71.81 71.82
Q4 69.19 69.23 69.24 69.23
Q5 (Most deprived) 63.17 63.20 63.20 63.20
Q5 (Highest) Q1 (Least deprived) 74.84 74.91 74.92 74.91
Q2 73.10 73.16 73.17 73.16
Q3 71.77 71.81 71.82 71.82
Q4 69.19 69.23 69.24 69.23
Q5 (Most deprived) 63.17 63.20 63.20 63.20
Overall average 69.260 69.300 69.301 69.302
IMD, index of multiple deprivation; QALE, quality-adjusted life expectancy.
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and ethnicity. We might make the value judgment
that differences in health due to sex are fair, whereas
differences in health due to IMD and ethnicity are
unfair—this is 1 of 8 possible value judgments that
we can make on fairness in this example. One way
of adjusting our modeled health distributions for this
value judgment is by using direct standardization.9
To do this, we run a regression on our QALE distribu-
tion weighting the subgroups by the proportion of the
population they represent to find the association
between each variable and QALE. An example of
such a regression is given in Table 6. We then use ref-
erence values for those variables deemed fair (i.e., sex
in this case) while leaving the other variables to take
the values they have in the relevant subgroups and
predict out an adjusted QALE distribution. In this
example, we use male as the reference value for sex
and predict out the QALE distribution as shown in
Table 7. This distribution represents only the variation
in health deemed unfair by the social value judgment
made. Reference values used in the adjustment pro-
cess are typically population averages for continuous
variables, whereas for categorical variables the most
commonly occurring category is typically used with
sensitivity analysis performed on the impact of alter-
native choices of reference category.
Stage B: Evaluating Social Distributions of Health
Comparing interventions in terms of total health
and unfair health inequality
Once we have estimated the appropriate health
distributions, we can then go on to characterize the
distributions in terms of the twin policy goals of
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Figure 2 (A) Guaiac fecal occult blood test (gFOBT) uptake distribution by strategy; and (B) colonoscopy uptake distribution.
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Figure 3 (A) Health compared to no screening (per million of population invited for screening); and (B) health compared to standard
screening (per million of population invited for screening).
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improving total health and reducing health inequal-
ity. One useful piece of information for decisionmak-
ers produced at this step of the analysis is the size of
the health opportunity cost of choosing an interven-
tion that reduces health inequality—this is simply
the difference in total health between the interven-
tion and a comparator. However, this step of the anal-
ysis can also go further than that by providing
information about the size of the reduction in health
inequality, in terms of the difference in 1 ormore suit-
able inequality indices between the intervention and
a comparator. The selection of appropriate inequality
indices requires further value judgments about the
nature of the inequality concern. There are a number
of commonly used indices to measure inequality that
can be broadly grouped into those measuring relative
inequality (scale-invariant indices), those measuring
absolute inequality (translation invariant), and those
measuring health poverty or shortfall froma reference
value. If there is no clear choice of inequality mea-
sure, it may be preferable to calculate a range of alter-
native measures.
Table 8 shows the results of calculating a range of
relative and absolute inequality measures for the
QALE distributions associated with our 4 screening
strategies. A higher value for each measure indicates
Table 6 Fairness Adjustment Regression
Coefficient
(SE)
Constant 74.92
(4.37E-05)
IS Q1–4 20.004
(2.56E-05)
Male 22.708
(5.47E-05)
IMD Q2 21.75
(4.91E-05)
IMD Q3 23.097
(4.84E-05)
IMD Q4 25.675
(5.02E-05)
IMD Q5 211.71
(5.33E-05)
Male*IMD Q2 0.065
(6.95E-05)
Male*IMD Q3 0.015
(6.84E-05)
Male*IMD Q4 0.104
(7.10E-05)
Male*IMD Q5 20.259
(7.532E-05)
IMD, index of multiple deprivation; IS, Indian Subcontinent; SE, stan-
dard error.
Table 7 Fairness Adjusted Health Distribution Reference Sex = Male
QALE
Sex % Indian Subcontinent Deprivation (IMD quintile) Targeted Targeted Adjusted
Male Q1–4 Q1 (Least deprived) 72.20 72.20
Q2 70.52 70.52
Q3 69.12 69.12
Q4 66.63 66.63
Q5 (Most deprived) 60.24 60.24
Q5 (Highest) Q1 (Least deprived) 72.21 72.21
Q2 70.52 70.52
Q3 69.13 69.13
Q4 66.63 66.63
Q5 (Most deprived) 60.24 60.24
Female Q1–4 Q1 (Least deprived) 74.91 72.20
Q2 73.16 70.52
Q3 71.81 69.12
Q4 69.24 66.63
Q5 (Most deprived) 63.20 60.24
Q5 (Highest) Q1 (Least deprived) 74.92 72.21
Q2 73.17 70.52
Q3 71.82 69.13
Q4 69.24 66.63
Q5 (Most deprived) 63.20 60.24
IMD, index of multiple deprivation; QALE, quality-adjusted life expectancy.
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a higher level of inequality between the healthiest
and the least healthy.
Ranking interventions using dominance rules
The first step in comparing distributions is looking
to commonly used distributional dominance rules,
because these allow strategies to be ranked with min-
imal restriction to the form of the underlying social
welfare function. In terms of standard economic dom-
inance rules, we can note fromTable 5 that no screen-
ing and standard screening are strictly dominated in
the space of QALE by the universal reminder
strategy—that is, the no sex-IMD-ethnicity subgroup
is less healthy, and at least 1 subgroup is healthier.
However, this rule does not account for the level of
inequality. When ranking distributions based on
mean health and the level of health inequality, it is
possible to use alternative economic dominance rules
provided byAtkinson10 and Shorrocks.11 These dom-
inance rules apply when mean health is higher and
inequality is lower for almost anymeasure of inequal-
ity. Both rules are based around the Lorenz curve,12
a tool to analyze relative inequality constructed for
health distributions by ordering the population
from least healthy to most healthy and plotting the
cumulative proportion of population health against
the cumulative proportion of the population. Regard-
ing Atkinson’s theorem tests for Lorenz dominance
between distributions, this means that the Lorenz
curves for the distributions do not cross, and the
more equal distribution has at least as much mean
health as the less equal distribution. In other words,
a distribution is dominated if it has higher inequality
and the same or lower amount of mean health. On
these criteria, the standard screening strategy is dom-
inated by the targeted reminder. Shorrocks’ theorem
tests for generalized Lorenz dominance, wherein
the Lorenz curve is multiplied by the mean health.
A distribution is dominated if the generalized Lorenz
curve lies wholly below that of an alternative inter-
vention. Under this criterion, both the targeted and
universal reminder strategies dominate the no-
screening option. This leaves us to compare the uni-
versal-reminder and targeted-reminder strategies.
Although the universal reminder produces a higher
average QALE overall and benefits the less deprived
quintile groups more, the targeted reminder is the
more equal strategy on every measure listed in Table
8 and benefits the most deprived quintile groups
more. In our example, the generalized Lorenz curves
for these 2 distributions cross, and hence we cannot
use Shorrocks’ theorem to rank the distributions.
Analyzing tradeoffs between total health and
health inequality using social welfare indices
Having used distributional dominance to elimi-
nate no screening and standard screening, to rank
the remaining 2 strategies it is necessary to specify
more fully an underlying social welfare function. A
number of alternative social welfare indices have
been proposed that could be used to characterize
the dual objectives of increasing total health and
reducing health inequality. A common feature of
such functions is the need to specify the nature of
Table 8 Inequality Measures Calculated for 4 Screening Strategies
Relative Inequality Indices No Screening Standard Targeted Reminder Universal Reminder
Relative gap index (ratio) 0.17527* 0.17592 0.17586 0.17596
Relative index of inequality 0.18607* 0.18674 0.18668 0.18678
Gini index 0.03101* 0.03112 0.03111 0.03113
Atkinson index (e = 1) 0.00171* 0.00172 0.00172 0.00172
Atkinson index (e = 7) 0.01330* 0.01337 0.01337 0.01338
Atkinson index (e = 30) 0.06253* 0.06281 0.06279 0.06283
Absolute Inequality Indices No Screening Standard Targeted Reminder Universal Reminder
Absolute gap index (range) 10.98604* 11.03064 11.02726 11.03325
Slope index of inequality 12.88747* 12.94123 12.93691 12.94438
Kolm index (a = 0.025) 0.20281* 0.20430 0.20416 0.20439
Kolm index (a = 0.1) 0.87801* 0.88429 0.88371 0.88467
Kolm index (a = 0.5) 4.56391* 4.58739 4.58587 4.58883
a = 0.025, low absolute inequality aversion; a = 0.5, high absolute inequality aversion; e = 1, low relative inequality aversion; e = 30, high relative inequality
aversion.
*The most equal strategy.
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and level (or value) of inequality aversion. The
inequality aversion parameters in these functions
describe the tradeoff between total health and the level
of health inequality (i.e., the amount of total health that
a decision maker would be willing to sacrifice to
achieve a more equal distribution). These inequality
aversion parameters are difficult to interpret on a raw
scale. A more intuitive scale can be provided by com-
bining a specific value of the parameter with a specific
health distribution to derive the equally distributed
equivalent (EDE) level of health. The difference
between the mean level of health in that distribution
and the EDE level of health then represents the average
amount of health per person that one would be willing
to sacrifice to achieve full equality in health, given that
specific value of inequality aversion.
In this example, we will use 2 social welfare indi-
ces closely linked to the dominance rules applied
above: the Atkinson index10 to evaluate the distribu-
tions in terms of relative inequality, and the Kolm
index13 to evaluate the distributions in terms of abso-
lute inequality. The EDE for these social welfare indi-
ces can be calculated as follows using the inequality
aversion parameters e and a, respectively:
Atkinson social welfare index:
hede5
1
n
Xn
i5 1
hi½ 1e
" # 1
1e
Kolm social welfare index:
hede5  1
a
 
log
1
n
Xn
i5 1
eahi
 !
Figure 4A and Figure 4B show the difference in EDE
health between the 2 strategies across different levels
of inequality aversion for the relative and absolute
social welfare indices, respectively. With zero
inequality aversion, the EDE represents the mean
health, and we see that the universal strategy offers
1000 more population QALYs compared to the tar-
geted strategy. For inequality aversion levels greater
than e = 8 and a = 0.12, the targeted strategy would
be preferred, implying that the decisionmaker would
be willing to sacrifice those 1000 population QALYs
to achieve the lower level of inequality.
Recent work on eliciting these inequality aversion
parameters from members of the general public in
England14 estimates anAtkinson eparameter of about
10.95 (95% confidence interval [CI]: 9.23–13.54) and
a Kolma parameter of about 0.15 (95%CI: 0.13–0.19).
Sensitivity Analysis
There are a number of sensitivity analyses we can
run to explore the impact of making alternative
assumptions in our modeling on our choice of pre-
ferred strategy. Tables 9 and 10 present the results,
respectively, of exploring 1) the impacts of alterna-
tive assumptions around the distribution of opportu-
nity costs, and 2) the impacts of alternative social
value judgments aboutwhich inequalities are consid-
ered unfair.
We could also perform additional sensitivity anal-
yses, including exploring alternative ways that the
reminder strategies might affect the different popula-
tion subgroups (e.g., having constant proportional
effects rather than constant absolute effects) and
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Figure 4 (A) Sensitivity to level of relative inequality aversion; and (B) sensitivity to level of absolute inequality aversion.
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testing for alternative underlying distributions of
CRC mortality, incidence, and severity.
DISCUSSION
DCEA is a framework for incorporating health
inequality concerns into the cost-effectiveness analy-
sis of health care interventions. It aims to help cost-
effectiveness analysts provide decision makers with
useful quantitative information about the health
inequality impacts of health care interventions, and
the nature and size of tradeoffs between the dual
objectives of improving total health and reducing
health inequality. It also aims to help cost-effective-
ness analysts accommodate different value judg-
ments about health inequality made by different
decision makers and stakeholders.
Social value judgments about health inequality are
complex, context dependent, and contestable. For
this reason, DCEA does not prescribe in advance
any particular set of social value judgments about
health inequality. A number of social value judg-
ments need to be made when implementing the
DCEA framework, in particular regarding which
dimensions of inequality are deemed unfair and the
nature and strength of inequality aversion. The
framework makes these social value judgments
explicit and transparent, and lends itself well to
checking the sensitivity of conclusions based on
alternative plausible social value judgments. DCEA
thus aims to provide decision makers with useful
quantitative information about health inequality
effects that can help to inform a deliberative deci-
sion-making process, by showing how different
social value judgments might lead to different con-
clusions. Empirical work to estimate the nature and
level of societal inequality aversion implicit in cur-
rent health care allocation decisions would be useful
in validating and complementing estimates of the
inequality aversion levels emerging from value
Table 10 Sensitivity to Alternative Social Value Judgments
Social Value Judgment Preferred Strategy Based on Social Welfare Index
IMD
Ethnic
Diversity Sex
Atkinson
EDE (e = 1)
Atkinson
EDE (e = 7)
Atkinson
EDE (e = 30)
Kolm
EDE (a = 0.025)
Kolm
EDE (a = 0.1)
Kolm
EDE (a = 0.5)
Fair Fair Fair U U U U U U
Fair Unfair Fair U U U U U U
Fair Fair Unfair U U U U U U
Fair Unfair Unfair U U U U U U
Unfair Fair Fair U U T U U T
Unfair Unfair Fair U U T U U T
Unfair Fair Unfair U U T U U T
Unfair Unfair Unfair U U T U U T
EDE, equally distributed equivalent; IMD, index of multiple deprivation; T, targeted reminder; U, universal reminder.
Table 9 Sensitivity to Alternative Opportunity Cost Distributions
All Opportunity Cost Borne by Least Healthy Subgroup
All Opportunity Cost Borne
by Healthiest Subgroup
Social Welfare Indices
No
Screening Standard
Targeted
Reminder
Universal
Reminder
Targeted
Reminder
Universal
Reminder
Mean health 69.25969 69.30006 69.30127 69.30233* 69.30127 69.30233*
Atkinson EDE (e = 1) 69.14152 69.18056 69.18147 69.18252* 69.18286 69.18373*
Atkinson EDE (e = 7) 68.33888 68.36800* 68.36610 68.36734 68.37799* 68.37769
Atkinson EDE (e = 30) 64.92865* 64.91468 64.89302 64.89892 64.95627* 64.95350
Kolm EDE (a = 0.025) 69.05688 69.09486 69.09556 69.09660* 69.09793 69.09866*
Kolm EDE (a = 0.1) 68.38168 68.41112* 68.40958 68.41074 68.42046* 68.42020
Kolm EDE (a = 0.5) 64.69578* 64.68086 64.65951 64.66532 64.72148* 64.71879
EDE, equally distributed equivalent.
*The strategy yielding the highest social welfare.
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elicitation exercises conducted on members of the
general public in England.14 This work would be
analogous to the recent work that has been done to
generate empirical estimates of the cost-effectiveness
threshold.15
DCEA is intended to be a general and flexible ana-
lytical framework that allows a diverse range of spe-
cific methods and techniques to be applied at
different stages of the analysis. In particular, the eval-
uation stage can in principle use any kind of equity
weighting and/or multicriteria decision analysis to
analyze tradeoffs between improving total health
and reducing health inequality, and it is not
restricted to application of the specific Atkinson
and Kolm social welfare functions described in this
tutorial.
Wehave seen in this tutorial that DCEA is demand-
ing in terms of data, but feasible to implement in
a real-world context through creative application of
the standard tools of economic analysis. The data
and methods we have used are inevitably partial and
crude in many respects, and it is our hope that the
underpinning data and technical methods will be
improved and refined throughout the years. Although
the framework and methods involved may seem com-
plex, in our opinion this complexity is well within the
capabilities of analysts currently conducting standard
CEA.The key to expanding theuse ofDCEAwill be the
development of better methods for assisting decision
makers to clarify and quantify the nature of their
inequality concerns, and better ways of communicat-
ing findings to nonspecialist audiences.
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APPENDIX 
Estimating the baseline health distribution 
Data on LE by IMD quintile and sex is published directly by the Office of National Statistics (16). 
However, for the purposes of our analysis we also require the underlying mortality rates used to 
estimate these figures in order to incorporate them in the decision analytical model where all-cause 
mortality is separated from colorectal cancer specific mortality.  Unfortunately, these underlying 
mortality rates are not available by IMD quintile groups. So to ensure we remain consistent between 
our baseline QALE distribution and QALE distributions associated with the various implementations 
of the BCSP produced by our model, we use ONS mortality rates by social class (17) to proxy those 
by IMD, and apply the mapping between social classes and IMD quintile groups given in Table A.I. 
Table AI Mapping between IMD Quintile Groups and Social Class 
Deprivation (IMD Quintile) Social Class 
Q1 (Least Deprived) I&II (Professional occupations & Managerial and technical occupations) 
Q2 I&II (Professional occupations & Managerial and technical occupations) 
Q3 IIIN (Skilled non-manual occupations) 
Q4 IIIM (Skilled manual occupations) 
Q5 (Most Deprived) IV&V (Partly-skilled occupations & Unskilled Occupations) 
 
 
We then use these mapped mortality rates to calculate the LE at birth by IMD quintile groups (2002-
05) using the standard ONS methodology (18). Table A.II compares life expectancies estimated 
indirectly using the mapping process described above with published direct estimates of life 
expectancy by IMD quintile for the same period (2002-05). We see from the comparison that while 
the mapped values are on the whole reasonably close to the published values, they begin to diverge 
for the more deprived areas. 
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Table AII Comparison between Mapped and Published LE by IMD Quintile Group 
Sex 
Deprivation (IMD 
Quintile) 
LE by Mapped IMD 
Quintiles (years) 
LE Published IMD Quintiles 
(years) 
Difference  
(Mapped – Published) 
Male Q1 (Least Deprived) 80.4 80.0 0.4 
 Q2 80.4 78.6 1.8 
 Q3 79.2 77.3 1.9 
 Q4 77.7 75.4 2.3 
 Q5 (Most Deprived) 76.2 72.2 4.0 
Female Q1 (Least Deprived) 83.7 83.2 0.5 
 Q2 83.7 82.3 1.4 
 Q3 82.6 81.5 1.1 
 Q4 81.1 80.1 1.0 
 Q5 (Most Deprived) 80.3 77.9 2.4 
 
We next adjust these life expectancies for morbidity. To do this we adjust for age and sex by applying 
the relevant weights from the published EQ-5D Norms (19) for each age range (reproduced in Table 
A.III) and aggregate to give and age and sex adjusted QALE. Taking the example of a male in the 
least deprived IMD quintile group (Q1) we can read from Table A.II that their estimated life 
expectancy is 80.4 years.  Using the weights in Table A.III we estimate the QALE for individuals in 
this subgroup as: 
24*0.94 + (35-25)*0.93 + (45-35)*0.91 + (55-45)*0.84 + (65-55)*0.78 + (75-65)* 0.78 + (80.5-75)*0.75 = 69.8  QALYs 
Table AIII QALY Weights by Age and Sex Based on EQ-5D Norms 
Age Male  Female 
0-25 0.94 0.94 
25-34 0.93 0.93 
35-44 0.91 0.91 
45-54 0.84 0.85 
55-64 0.78 0.81 
65-74 0.78 0.78 
75+ 0.75 0.71 
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 In addition to quality adjusting LE for age and sex, we also would like to adjust for variation in 
quality of life by area level deprivation. In order to do this we turn to the ONS data for LE and 
disability free life expectancy (DFLE) by IMD quintile (16). We assume that the average quality 
adjustment we have applied by using the age and sex weights captures the adjustment for the middle 
IMD quintile group (Q3)for each sex, and calculate relative adjustment factors for the other IMD 
quintile groups by further assuming the ratio of DFLE to LE is the same as the ratio of QALE to LE. 
We use this data to calculate the adjustment factors shown in Table A.IV. 
Table AIV Using LE and DFLE to Calculate QALE Adjustment Factors by IMD 
Sex 
Deprivation (IMD 
Quintile) LE DFLE Ratio DFLE/LE 
QALE Adjustment 
Factor  
Male Q1 (Least Deprived) 80.0 67.3 0.84 1.03 
 Q2 78.6 64.3 0.82 1.00 
 Q3 77.3 63.4 0.82 1.00 
 Q4 75.4 59.7 0.79 0.96 
 Q5 (Most Deprived) 72.2 54.2 0.75 0.91 
Female Q1 (Least Deprived) 83.2 67.8 0.81 1.02 
 Q2 82.3 65.7 0.80 1.00 
 Q3 81.5 64.9 0.80 1.00 
 Q4 80.1 61.8 0.77 0.97 
 Q5 (Most Deprived) 77.9 57.2 0.73 0.92 
 
Applying the adjustment factor to our QALE estimate for our male from IMD Q1 gives a refined 
QALE estimate taking into account area level deprivation of: 
69.8 * 1.03 = 72 QALYs 
Similar calculations for the other subgroups yield the QALE estimates in Table A.V. 
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Table AV QALE by Sex and Deprivation 
Sex Deprivation (IMD Quintile) QALE 
Male Q1 (Least Deprived) 72.2 
 Q2 70.5 
 Q3 69.1 
 Q4 66.6 
 Q5 (Most Deprived) 60.2 
Female Q1 (Least Deprived) 74.8 
 Q2 73.1 
 Q3 71.8 
 Q4 69.2 
 Q5 (Most Deprived) 63.2 
 
Ordering the subgroups by QALE from least healthy to most healthy and adjusting for the size of each 
subgroup we are able to create a population distribution of QALE at birth taking into account 
differential mortality and morbidity by age, sex and area level deprivation. 
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